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THE

RIGHTS OF MAN.

PART I.

By THOMAS PAINE.

Also, by the same Author,

COMMON SENSE.

Price 6d.

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BEING AN

ANSWER TO MR. BURKE'S ATTACK

ON THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION.

BY

THOMAS PAINE,

SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO CONGRESS IN THE AMERICAN WAR, AND

AUTHOR OF THE WORKS INTITLED "*COMMON SENSE*," AND "*A LETTER TO THE ABBE RAYNAL.*"

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TO

GEORGE WASHINGTON,

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

SIR,

I PRESENT you a ſmall Treatiſe in defence of thoſe Principles of Freedom which your exemplary Virtue hath ſo eminently contributed to eſtabliſh.—That the Rights of Man may become as univerſal as your Benevolence can wiſh, and that you may enjoy the Happineſs of ſeeing the New World regenerate the Old, is the Prayer of

SIR,

Your much obliged, and

Obedient humble Servant,

THOMAS PAINE.

PREFACE

TO THE

ENGLISH EDITION.

FROM the part Mr. Burke took in the American Revolution, it was natural that I ſhould conſider him a friend to mankind; and as our acquaintance commenced on that ground, it would have been more agreeable to me to have had cauſe to continue in that opinion, than to change it.

At the time Mr. Burke made his violent ſpeech laſt winter in the Engliſh Parliament againſt the French Revolution and the National Aſſembly, I was in Paris, and had written him, but a ſhort time before, to inform him how proſperouſly matters were going on. Soon after this, I ſaw his advertiſement of the Pamphlet he intended to publiſh: As the attack was to be made in a language but little ſtudied, and leſs underſtood, in France, and as every thing ſuffers by tranſlation, I promiſed ſome of the friends of the Revolution in that country, that whenever Mr. Burke's Pamphlet came forth, I would anſwer it. This appeared to me the more neceſſary to be done, when I ſaw the flagrant miſrepreſentations which Mr. Burke's Pamphlet contains; and that while it is an outrageous abuſe on the French Revolution, and the principles of Liberty, it is an impoſition on the reſt of the world.

I am the more aſtoniſhed and diſappointed at this conduct in Mr. Burke, as (from the circumſtance I am going to mention), I had formed other expectations.

I had ſeen enough of the miſeries of war, to wiſh it might never more have exiſtence in the world, and that ſome other mode might be found out to ſettle the differences that ſhould occaſionally ariſe in the neighbourhood of nations. This certainly might be done if Courts were diſpoſed to ſet honeſtly about it, or if countries were enlightened enough not to be made the dupes of Courts. The people of America had been bred up in the ſame prejudices againſt France, which at that time characterized the people of England; but experience and an acquaintance with the French Nation have moſt effectually ſhown to the Americans the falſehood of thoſe prejudices; and I do not believe that a more cordial and confidential intercourſe exiſts between any two countries than between America and France.

When I came to France in the Spring of 1787, the Archbiſhop of Thouloufe was then Miniſter, and at that time highly eſteemed. I became much acquainted with the private Secretary of that Miniſter, a man of an enlarged benevolent heart; and found, that his ſentiments and my own perfectly agreed with reſpect to the madneſs of war, and the wretched impolicy of two nations, like England and

France, continually worrying each other, to no other end than that o a mutual increaſe of burdens and taxes. That I might be aſſured I had not miſunderſtood him, nor he me, I put the ſubſtance of our opinions into writing, and ſent it to him; ſubjoining a requeſt, that if I ſhould ſee among the people of England, any diſpoſition to cultivate a better underſtanding between the two nations than had hitherto prevailed, how far I might be authorized to ſay that the ſame diſpoſition prevailed on the part of France? He anſwered me by letter in the moſt unreſerved manner, and that not for himſelf only, but for the Miniſter, with whoſe knowledge the letter was declared to be written.

I put this letter into the hands of Mr. Burke almoſt three years ago, and left it with him, where it ſtill remains; hoping, and at the ſame time naturally expecting, from the opinion I had conceived of him, that he would find ſome opportunity of making a good uſe of it, for the purpoſe of removing thoſe errors and prejudices, which two neighbouring nations, from the want of knowing each other, had entertained, to the injury of both.

When the French Revolution broke out, it certainly afforded to Mr. Burke an opportunity of doing ſome good, had he been diſpoſed to it; inſtead of which, no ſooner did he ſee the old prejudices wearing away, than he immediately began ſowing the ſeeds of a new inveteracy, as if he were afraid that England and France would ceaſe to be enemies. That there are men in all countries who get their living by war, and by keeping up the quarrels of Nations, is as ſhocking as it is true; but when thoſe who are concerned in the government of a country, make it their ſtudy to ſow diſcord, and cultivate prejudices between Nations, it becomes the more unpardonable.

With reſpect to a paragraph in this Work alluding to Mr. Burke's having a penſion, the report has been ſome time in circulation, at leaſt two months; and as a perſon is often the laſt to hear what concerns him the moſt to know, I have mentioned it, that Mr. Burke may have an opportunity of contradicting the rumour, if he thinks proper.

THOMAS PAINE.

RIGHTS OF MAN, &c. &c.

AMONG the incivilities by which nations or individuals provoke and irritate each other, Mr. Burke's pamphlet on the French Revolution is an extraordinary inſtance. Neither the People of France, nor the National Aſſembly, were troubling themſelves about the affairs of England, or the Engliſh Parliament; and that Mr. Burke ſhould commence an unprovoked attack upon them, both in parliament and in public, is a conduct that cannot be pardoned on the ſcore of manners, nor juſtified on that of policy.

There is ſcarcely an epithet of abuſe to be found in the Engliſh language, with which Mr. Burke has not loaded the French Nation and the National Aſſembly. Every thing which rancour, prejudice, ignorance, or knowledge could ſuggeſt, are poured forth in the copious fury of near four hundred pages. In the ſtrain and on the plan Mr. Burke was writing, he might have written on to as many thouſands. When the tongue or the pen is let looſe in a frenzy of paſſion, it is the man, and not the ſubject, that becomes exhauſted.

Hitherto Mr. Burke has been miſtaken and diſappointed in the opinions he had formed of the affairs of France; but ſuch is the ingenuity of his hope, or the malignancy of his deſpair, that it furniſhes him with new pretences to go on. There was a time when it was impoſſible to make Mr. Burke believe there would be any revolution in France. His opinion then was, that the French had neither ſpirit to undertake it, nor fortitude to ſupport it; and now that there is one, he ſeeks an eſcape, by condemning it.

Not ſufficiently content with abuſing the National Aſſembly, a great part of his work is taken up with abuſing Dr. Price (one of the beſt-hearted men that lives), and the two ſocieties in England known by the name of the Revolution Society, and the Society for Conſtitutional Information.

Dr. Price had preached a ſermon on the 4th of November 1789, being the anniverſary of what is called in England the Revolution, which took place 1688. Mr. Burke, ſpeaking of this ſermon, ſays, 'The Political Divine proceeds dogmatically to aſſert, that, by 'the principles of the Revolution, the people of England have 'acquired three fundamental rights:

'1. To chooſe our own governors.

'2. To caſhier them for miſconduct.

'3. To frame a government for ourſelves.

Dr. Price does not ſay that the right to do theſe things exiſts in this or in that perſon, or in this or in that deſcription of perſons, but that it exiſts in the *whole*; that it is a right reſident in the nation.—Mr. Burke, on the contrary, denies that ſuch a right exiſts in

the nation, either in whole or in part, or that it exists any where; and, what is still more strange and marvellous, he says, 'that the 'people of England utterly disclaim such a right, and that they 'will resist the practical assertion of it with their lives and for-'tunes.' That men should take up arms, and spend their lives and fortunes, *not* to maintain their rights, but to maintain they have *not* rights, is an entirely new species of discovery, and suited to the paradoxical genius of Mr. Burke.

The method which Mr. Burke takes to prove that the people of England have no such rights, and that such rights do not now exist in the nation, either in whole or in part, or any where at all, is of the same marvellous and monstrous kind with what he has already said; for his arguments are, that the persons, or the generation of persons, in whom they did exist, are dead, and with them the right is dead also. To prove this, he quotes a declaration made by parliament about a hundred years ago, to William and Mary, in these words: "The Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Com-"mons, do, in the name of the people aforesaid,—(meaning the people of England then living)—"most humbly and faithfully "*submit* themselves, their *heirs* and *posterities*, for EVER." He quotes a clause of another act of parliament made in the same reign, the terms of which, he says, "bind us—(meaning the people of that day)—"our *heirs*, and our *posterity*, to *them*, their *heirs* and *posterity*, "to the end of time."

Mr. Burke conceives his point sufficiently established by producing those clauses, which he enforces by saying that they exclude the right of the nation for *ever:* And not yet content with making such declarations, repeated over and over again, he farther says, 'that 'if the people of England possessed such a right before the Revo-'lution, (which he acknowledges to have been the case, not only in England, but throughout Europe, at an early period), 'yet that 'the *English nation* did, at the time of the Revolution, most so-'lemnly renounce and abdicate it, for themselves, and for *all their* '*posterity*, *for ever.*'

As Mr. Burke occasionally applies the poison drawn from his horrid principles, not only to the English nation, but to the French Revolution and the National Assembly, and charges that august, illuminated and illuminating body of men with the epithet of *usurpers*, I shall, *sans ceremonie*, place another system of principles in opposition to his.

The English Parliament of 1688 did a certain thing, which, or themselves and their constituents, they had a right to do, and which it appeared right should be done: But, in addition to this right, which they possessed by delegation, *they set up another right by assumption*, that of binding and controuling posterity to the end of time. The case, therefore, divides itself into two parts; the right which they possessed by delegation, and the right which they set up by assumption. The first is admitted; but, with respect to the second, I reply—

There never did, there never will, and there never can exist a parrament, or any description of men, or any generation of men, in

any country, possessed of the right or the power of binding and controuling posterity to the "*end of time*," or of commanding for ever how the world shall be governed, or who shall govern it; and therefore, all such clauses, acts or declarations, by which the makers of them attempt to do what they have neither the right nor the power to do, nor the power to execute, are in themselves null and void.—Every age and generation must be as free to act for itself, *in all cases*, as the ages and generations which preceded it. The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave, is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies. Man has no property in man; neither has any generation a property in the generations which are to follow. The parliament or the people of 1688, or of any other period, had no more right to dispose of the people of the present day, or to bind or to controul them *in any shape whatever*, than the parliament or the people of the present day have to dispose of, bind or controul those who are to live a hundred or a thousand years hence. Every generation is, and must be, competent to all the purposes which its occasions require. It is the living, and not the dead, that are to be accommodated. When man ceases to be, his power and his wants cease with him; and having no longer any participation in the concerns of this world, he has no longer any authority in directing who shall be its governors, or how its government shall be organized, or how administered.

I am not contending for, nor against, any form of government, nor for, nor against, any party here or elsewhere. That which a whole nation chooses to do, it has a right to do. Mr. Burke says, No. Where then *does* the right exist? I am contending for the rights of the *living*, and against their being willed away, and controuled and contracted for, by the manuscript assumed authority of the dead; and Mr. Burke is contending for the authority of the dead over the rights and freedom of the living. There was a time when kings disposed of their crowns by will upon their death-beds, and consigned the people, like beasts of the field, to whatever successor they appointed. This is now so exploded as scarcely to be remembered, and so monstrous as hardly to be believed: But the parliamentary clauses upon which Mr. Burke builds his political church, are of the same nature.

The laws of every country must be analogous to some common principle. In England, no parent or master, nor all the authority of parliament, omnipotent as it has called itself, can bind or controul the personal freedom even of an individual beyond the age of twenty-one years: On what ground of right, then, could the parliament of 1688, or any other parliament, bind all posterity for ever?

Those who have quitted the world, and those who are not yet arrived at it, are as remote from each other, as the utmost stretch of mortal imagination can conceive: What possible obligation, then, can exist between them; what rule or principle can be laid down, that of two non-entities, the one out of existence, and the

other not in, and who never can meet in this world, the one ſhould controul the other to the end of time?

In England, it is ſaid, that money cannot be taken out of the pockets of the people without their conſent: But who authorized, or who could authorize the parliament of 1688 to controul and take away the freedom of poſterity, (who were not in exiſtence to give or to withhold their conſent,) and limit and confine their right of acting in certain caſes for ever?

A greater abſurdity cannot preſent itſelf to the underſtanding of man, than what Mr. Burke offers to his readers. He tells them, and he tells the world to come, that a certain body of men, who exiſted a hundred years ago, made a law; and that there does not now exiſt in the nation, nor ever will, nor ever can, a power to alter it. Under how many ſubtilties, or abſurdities, has the divine right to govern been impoſed on the credulity of mankind! Mr. Burke has diſcovered a new one, and he has ſhortened his journey to Rome, by appealing to the power of this infallible parliament of former days; and he produces what it has done, as of divine authority: for that power muſt certainly be more than human, which no human power to the end of time can alter.

But Mr. Burke has done ſome ſervice, not to his cauſe, but to his country, by bringing thoſe clauſes into public view. They ſerve to demonſtrate how neceſſary it is at all times to watch againſt the attempted encroachment of power, and to prevent its running to exceſs. It is ſomewhat extraordinary, that the offence for which James II. was expelled, that of ſetting up power by *aſſumption*, ſhould be re-acted, under another ſhape and form, by the parliament that expelled him. It ſhews, that the rights of man were but imperfectly underſtood at the Revolution; for, certain it is, that the right which that parliament ſet up by *aſſumption* (for by delegation it had it not, and could not have it, becauſe none could give it) over the perſons and freedom of poſterity for ever, was of the ſame tyrannical unfounded kind which James attempted to ſet up over the parliament and the nation, and for which he was expelled. The only difference is, (for in principle they differ not), that the one was an uſurper over the living, and the other over the unborn; and as the one has no better authority to ſtand upon than the other, both of them muſt be equally null and void, and of no effect.

From what, or from whence, does Mr. Burke prove the right of any human power to bind poſterity for ever? He has produced his clauſes; but he muſt produce alſo his proofs, that ſuch a right exiſted, and ſhew how it exiſted. If it ever exiſted, it muſt now exiſt; for whatever appertains to the nature of man, cannot be annihilated by man. It is the nature of man to die, and he will continue to die as long as he continues to be born. But Mr. Burke has ſet up a ſort of political Adam, in whom all poſterity are bound for ever; he muſt therefore prove that his Adam poſſeſſed ſuch a power, or ſuch a right.

The weaker any cord is, the leſs will it bear to be ſtretched, and the worſe is the policy to ſtretch it, unleſs it is intended to break it. Had any one purpoſed the overthrow of Mr. Burke's poſitions, he

he would have proceeded as Mr. Burke has done. He would have magnified the authorities, on purpoſe to have called the *right* of them into queſtion; and the inſtant the queſtion of right was ſtarted, the authorities muſt have been given up.

It requires but a very ſmall glance of thought to perceive, that although laws made in one generation often continue in force through ſucceeding generations, yet that they continue to derive their force from the conſent of the living. A law not repealed continues in force, not becauſe it *cannot* be repealed, but becauſe it *is not* repealed; and the non-repealing paſſes for conſent.

But Mr. Burke's clauſes have not even this qualification in their favour. They become null, by attempting to become immortal. The nature of them precludes conſent. They deſtroy the right which they *might* have, by grounding it on a right which they *cannot* have. Immortal power is not a human right, and therefore cannot be a right of parliament. The parliament of 1688 might as well have paſſed an act to have authorized themſelves to live for ever, as to make their authority live for ever. All therefore that can be ſaid of thoſe clauſes is, that they are a formality of words, of as much import, as if thoſe who uſed them had addreſſed a congratulation to themſelves, and, in the oriental ſtile of antiquity, had ſaid, O Parliament, live for ever!

The circumſtances of the world are continually changing, and the opinions of men change alſo; and as government is for the living, and not for the dead, it is the living only that has any right in it. That which may be thought right and found convenient in one age, may be thought wrong and found inconvenient in another. In ſuch caſes, Who is to decide, the living, or the dead?

As almoſt one hundred pages of Mr. Burke's book are employed upon theſe clauſes, it will conſequently follow, that, if the clauſes themſelves, ſo far as they ſet up an *aſſumed*, *uſurped* dominion over poſterity for ever, are unauthoritative, and in their nature null and void; all his voluminous inferences and declamation drawn therefrom, or founded thereon, are null and void alſo: and on this ground I reſt the matter.

We now come more particularly to the affairs of France. Mr. Burke's book has the appearance of being written as inſtruction to the French nation; but if I may permit myſelf the uſe of an extravagant metaphor, ſuited to the extravagance of the caſe, It is darkneſs attempting to illuminate light.

While I am writing this, there are accidentally before me ſome propoſals for a declaration of rights by the Marquis de la Fayette (I aſk his pardon for uſing his former addreſs, and do it only for diſtinction's ſake) to the National Aſſembly, on the 11th of July 1789, three days before the taking of the Baſtille; and I cannot but remark with aſtoniſhment how oppoſite the ſources are from which that Gentleman and Mr. Burke draw their principles. Inſtead of referring to muſty records and mouldy parchments to prove that the rights of the living are loſt, "renounced and abdicated "for ever," by thoſe who are now no more, as Mr. Burke has done, M. de la Fayette applies to the living world, and emphatically

cally ſays, "Call to mind the ſentiments which Nature has engraved in the heart of every citizen, and which take a new force when they are ſolemnly recognized by all:—For a nation to love liberty, it is ſufficient that ſhe knows it; and to be free, it is ſufficient that ſhe wills it." How dry, barren, and obſcure, is the ſource from which Mr. Burke labours! and how ineffectual, though gay with flowers, are all his declamation and his arguments, compared with theſe clear, conciſe, and ſoul-animating ſentiments! Few and ſhort as they are, they lead on to a vaſt field of generous and manly thinking, and do not finiſh, like Mr. Burke's periods, with muſic in the ear, and nothing in the heart.

As I have introduced M. de la Fayette, I will take the liberty of adding an anecdote reſpecting his farewel addreſs to the Congreſs of America in 1783, and which occurred freſh to my mind when I ſaw Mr. Burke's thundering attack on the French Revolution.—M. de la Fayette went to America at an early period of the war, and continued a volunteer in her ſervice to the end. His conduct through the whole of that enterpriſe is one of the moſt extraordinary that is to be found in the hiſtory of a young man, ſcarcely then twenty years of age. Situated in a country that was like the lap of ſenſual pleaſure, and with the means of enjoying it, how few are there to be found who would exchange ſuch a ſcene for the woods and wilderneſſes of America, and paſs the flowery years of youth in unprofitable danger and hardſhip! but ſuch is the fact. When the war ended, and he was on the point of taking his final departure, he preſented himſelf to Congreſs, and contemplating, in his affectionate farewell, the revolution he had ſeen, expreſſed himſelf in theſe words: "*May this great monument, raiſed to Liberty, ſerve as a leſſon to the oppreſſor, and an example to the oppreſſed!*"—When this addreſs came to the hands of Dr. Franklin, who was then in France, he applied to Count Vergennes to have it inſerted in the French Gazette, but never could obtain his conſent. The fact was, that Count Vergennes was an ariſtocratical deſpot at home, and dreaded the example of the American revolution in France, as certain other perſons now dread the example of the French Revolution in England; and Mr. Burke's tribute of fear (for in this light his book muſt be conſidered) runs parallel with Count Vergennes' refuſal. But, to return more particularly to his work—

"We have ſeen (ſays Mr. Burke) the French rebel againſt a mild and lawful Monarch, with more fury, outrage, and inſult, than any people has been known to riſe againſt the moſt illegal uſurper, or the moſt ſanguinary tyrant."—This is one among a thouſand other inſtances, in which Mr. Burke ſhews that he is ignorant of the ſprings and principles of the French revolution.

It was not againſt Louis the XVIth, but againſt the deſpotic principles of the government, that the nation revolted. Theſe principles had not their origin in him, but in the original eſtabliſhment, many centuries back; and they were become too deeply rooted to be removed, and the augean ſtable of paraſites and plunderers too abominably filthy to be cleanſed, by any thing ſhort of

of a complete and univerſal revolution. When it becomes neceſſary to do any thing, the whole heart and ſoul ſhould go into the meaſure, or not attempt it. That criſis was then arrived, and there remained no choice but to act with determined vigour, or not to act at all. The king was known to be the friend of the nation, and this circumſtance was favourable to the enterpriſe. Perhaps no man bred up in the ſtile of an abſolute King, ever poſſeſſed a heart ſo little diſpoſed to the exerciſe of that ſpecies of power as the preſent King of France. But the principles of the government itſelf ſtill remained the ſame. The Monarch and the Monarchy were diſtinct and ſeparate things; and it was againſt the eſtabliſhed deſpotiſm of the latter, and not againſt the perſon or principles of the former, that the revolt commenced, and the revolution has been carried.

Mr. Burke does not attend to the diſtinction between *men* and *principles*; and therefore, he does not ſee that a revolt may take place againſt the deſpotiſm of the latter, while there lies no charge of deſpotiſm againſt the former.

The natural moderation of Louis XVI. contributed nothing to alter the hereditary deſpotiſm of the monarchy. All the tyrannies of former reigns, acted under that hereditary deſpotiſm, were ſtill liable to be revived in the hands of a ſucceſſor. It was not the reſpite of a reign that would ſatisfy France, enlightened as ſhe was then become. A caſual diſcontinuance of the *practice* of deſpotiſm, is not a diſcontinuance of its *principles*; the former depends on the virtue of the individual who is in immediate poſſeſſion of the power; the latter, on the virtue and fortitude of the nation. In the caſe of Charles I. and James II. of England, the revolt was againſt the perſonal deſpotiſm of the men; whereas in France, it was againſt the hereditary deſpotiſm of the eſtabliſhed government. But men who can conſign over the rights of poſterity for ever on the authority of a mouldy parchment, like Mr. Burke, are not qualified to judge of this revolution. It takes in a field too vaſt for their views to explore, and proceeds with a mightineſs of reaſon they cannot keep pace with.

But there are many points of view in which this revolution may be conſidered. When deſpotiſm has eſtabliſhed itſelf for ages in a country, as in France, it is not in the perſon of the King only that it reſides. It has the appearance of being ſo in ſhow, and in nominal authority; but it is not ſo in practice, and in fact. It has its ſtandard every-where. Every office and department has its deſpotiſm, founded upon cuſtom and uſage. Every place has its Baſtille, and every Baſtille its deſpot. The original hereditary deſpotiſm reſident in the perſon of the King, divides and ſubdivides itſelf into a thouſand ſhapes and forms, till at laſt the whole of it is acted by deputation. This was the caſe in France; and againſt this ſpecies of deſpotiſm, proceeding on through an endleſs labyrinth of office till the ſource of it is ſcarcely perceptible, there is no mode of redreſs. It ſtrengthens itſelf by aſſuming the appearance of duty, and tyrannizes under the pretence of obeying.

When a man reflects on the condition which France was in from the nature of her government, he will ſee other cauſes for revolt than

than those which immediately connect themselves with the person or character of Louis XVI. There were, if I may so express it, a thousand despotisms to be reformed in France, which had grown up under the hereditary despotism of the monarchy, and became so rooted as to be in a great measure independent of it. Between the monarchy, the parliament, and the church, there was a *rivalship* of despotism; besides the feudal despotism operating locally, and the ministerial despotism operating every-where. But Mr. Burke, by considering the King as the only possible object of a revolt, speaks as if France was a village, in which every thing that passed must be known to its commanding officer, and no oppression could be acted but what he could immediately controul. Mr. Burke might have been in the Bastille his whole life, as well under Louis XVI. as Louis XIV. and neither the one nor the other have known that such a man as Mr. Burke existed. The despotic principles of the government were the same in both reigns, though the dispositions of the men were as remote as tyranny and benevolence.

What Mr. Burke considers as a reproach to the French Revolution, (that of bringing it forward under a reign more mild than the preceding ones), is one of its highest honours. The revolutions that have taken place in other European countries, have been excited by personal hatred. The rage was against the man, and he became the victim. But, in the instance of France, we see a revolution generated in the rational contemplation of the rights of man, and distinguishing from the beginning between persons and principles.

But Mr. Burke appears to have no idea of principles, when he is contemplating governments. "Ten years ago (says he) I could "have felicitated France on her having a government, without en-"quiring what the nature of that government was, or how it was "administered." Is this the language of a rational man? Is it the language of a heart feeling as it ought to feel for the rights and happiness of the human race? On this ground, Mr. Burke must compliment all the governments in the world, while the victims who suffer under them, whether sold into slavery, or tortured out of existence, are wholly forgotten. It is power, and not principles, that Mr. Burke venerates; and under this abominable depravity, he is disqualified to judge between them.—Thus much for his opinion as to the occasions of the French Revolution. I now proceed to other considerations.

I know a place in America called Point-no-Point; because as you proceed along the shore, gay and flowery as Mr. Burke's language, it continually recedes and presents itself at a distance before you; but when you have got as far as you can go, there is no point at all. Just thus it is with Mr. Burke's three hundred and fifty-six pages. It is therefore difficult to reply to him. But as the points he wishes to establish, may be inferred from what he abuses, it is in his paradoxes that we must look for his arguments.

As to the tragic paintings by which Mr. Burke has outraged his own imagination, and seeks to work upon that of his readers, they are very well calculated for theatrical representation, where facts are manufactured for the sake of show, and accommodated

to produce, through the weakness of sympathy, a weeping effect. But Mr. Burke should recollect that he is writing History, and not *Plays;* and that his readers will expect truth, and not the spouting rant of high-toned exclamation.

When we see a man dramatically lamenting in a publication intended to be believed, that, '*The age of chivalry is gone!* that '*The glory of Europe is extinguished for ever!* that *The unbought* '*grace of life* (if any one knows what it is), *the cheap defence of* '*nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprize, is gone!*' and all this because the Quixot age of chivalry nonsense is gone, what opinion can we form of his judgment, or what regard can we pay to his facts? In the rhapsody of his imagination, he has discovered a world of wind-mills, and his sorrows are, that there are no Quixots to attack them. But if the age of aristocracy, like that of chivalry, should fall, (and they had originally some connection), Mr. Burke, the trumpeter of the Order, may continue his parody to the end, and finish with exclaiming, "*Othello's occupation's* "*gone!*"

Notwithstanding Mr. Burke's horrid paintings, when the French Revolution is compared with the revolutions of other countries, the astonishment will be, that it is marked with so few sacrifices; but this astonishment will cease when we reflect that *principles*, and not *persons*, were the meditated objects of destruction. The mind of the nation was acted upon by a higher stimulus than what the consideration of persons could inspire, and sought a higher conquest than could be produced by the downfal of an enemy. Among the few who fell, there do not appear to be any that were intentionally singled out. They all of them had their fate in the circumstances of the moment, and were not pursued with that long, cold-blooded, unabated revenge which pursued the unfortunate Scotch in the affair of 1745.

Through the whole of Mr. Burke's book I do not observe that the Bastille is mentioned more than once, and that with a kind of implication as if he were sorry it was pulled down, and wished it were built up again. "We have rebuilt Newgate (says he), "and tenanted the mansion; and we have prisons almost as strong "as the Bastille for those who dare to libel the Queens of France*."

As to what a madman, like the person called Lord G—— G——, might say, and to whom Newgate is rather a bedlam than a prison, it is unworthy a rational consideration. It was a madman that libelled—and that is sufficient apology; and it afforded an opportunity for confining him, which was the thing that was wished for:

* Since writing the above, two other places occur in Mr. Burke's pamphlet, in which the name of the Bastille is mentioned, but in the same manner. In the one, he introduces it in a sort of obscure question, and asks—"Will any ministers who now serve such a king, with but a decent appearance of respect, cordially obey the orders of those whom but the other day, *in his name*, they had committed to the Bastille?" In the other, the taking it is mentioned as implying criminality in the French guards who assisted in demolishing it.—"They have not (says he) forgot the taking the king's castles at Paris."—This is Mr. Burke, who pretends to write on constitutional freedom.

But certain it is that Mr. Burke, who does not call himſelf a mad-man, (whatever other people may do), has libelled, in the moſt unprovoked manner, and in the groſſeſt ſtile of the moſt vulgar abuſe, the whole repreſentative authority of France; and yet Mr. Burke takes his ſeat in the Britiſh Houſe of Commons! From his violence and his grief, his ſilence on ſome points, and his exceſs on others, it is difficult not to believe that Mr. Burke is ſorry, extremely ſorry, that arbitrary power, the power of the Pope, and the Baſtille, are pulled down.

Not one glance of compaſſion, not one commiſerating reflection, that I can find throughout his book, has he beſtowed on thoſe who lingered out the moſt wretched of lives, a life without hope, in the moſt miſerable of priſons. It is painful to behold a man employing his talents to corrupt himſelf. Nature has been kinder to Mr. Burke than he is to her. He is not affected by the reality of diſtreſs touching his heart, but by the ſhowy reſemblance of it ſtriking his imagination. He pities the plumage, but forgets the dying bird. Accuſtomed to kiſs the ariſtocratical hand that hath purloined him from himſelf, he degenerates into a compoſition of art, and the genuine ſoul of nature forſakes him. His hero or his heroine muſt be a tragedy-victim expiring in ſhow, and not the real priſoner of miſery, ſliding into death in the ſilence of a dungeon.

As Mr. Burke has paſſed over the whole tranſaction of the Baſtille (and his ſilence is nothing in his favour), and has entertained his readers with reflections on ſuppoſed facts diſtorted into real falſehoods, I will give, ſince he has not, ſome account of the circumſtances which preceded that tranſaction. They will ſerve to ſhew, that leſs miſchief could ſcarcely have accompanied ſuch an event, when conſidered with the treacherous and hoſtile aggravations of the enemies of the Revolution.

The mind can hardly picture to itſelf a more tremendous ſcene than what the city of Paris exhibited at the time of taking the Baſtille, and for two days before and after, nor conceive the poſſibility of its quieting ſo ſoon. At a diſtance, this tranſaction has appeared only as an act of heroiſm, ſtanding on itſelf; and the cloſe political connection it had with the Revolution is loſt in the brilliancy of the atchievement. But we are to conſider it as the ſtrength of the parties, brought man to man, and contending for the iſſue. The Baſtille was to be either the prize or the priſon of the aſſailants. The downfal of it included the idea of the downfal of Deſpotiſm; and this compounded image was become as figuratively united as Bunyan's Doubting Caſtle and Giant Deſpair.

The National Aſſembly, before and at the time of taking the Baſtille, was ſitting at Verſailles, twelve miles diſtant from Paris. About a week before the riſing of the Pariſians, and their taking the Baſtille, it was diſcovered that a plot was forming, at the head of which was the Count d'Artois, the king's youngeſt brother, for demoliſhing the National Aſſembly, ſeizing its members, and thereby cruſhing, by a *coup de main*, all hopes and proſpects of forming a free government. For the ſake of humanity, as well as of freedom, it is well this plan did not ſucceed. Examples are not

not wanting to ſhew how dreadfully vindictive and cruel are all old governments, when they are ſucceſsful againſt what they call a revolt.

This plan muſt have been ſome time in contemplation; becauſe, in order to carry it into execution, it was neceſſary to collect a large military force round Paris, and to cut off the communication between that city and the National Aſſembly at Verſailles. The troops deſtined for this ſervice were chiefly the foreign troops in the pay of France, and who, for this particular purpoſe, were drawn from the diſtant provinces where they were then ſtationed. When they were collected, to the amount of between twenty-five and thirty thouſand, it was judged time to put the plan in execution. The miniſtry who were then in office, and who were friendly to the Revolution, were inſtantly diſmiſſed, and a new miniſtry formed of thoſe who had concerted the project;—among whom was Count de Broglio, and to his ſhare was given the command of thoſe troops. The character of this man, as deſcribed to me in a letter which I communicated to Mr. Burke before he began to write his book, and from an authority which Mr. Burke well knows was good, was that of "an high-flying ariſtocrat, cool, and capable of "every miſchief."

While theſe matters were agitating, the National Aſſembly ſtood in the moſt perilous and critical ſituation that a body of men can be ſuppoſed to act in. They were the devoted victims, and they knew it. They had the hearts and wiſhes of their country on their ſide, but military authority they had none. The guards of Broglio ſurrounded the hall where the aſſembly ſat, ready, at the word of command, to ſeize their perſons, as had been done the year before to the parliament of Paris. Had the National Aſſembly deſerted their truſt, or had they exhibited ſigns of weakneſs or fear, their enemies had been encouraged, and the country depreſſed. When the ſituation they ſtood in, the cauſe they were engaged in, and the criſis then ready to burſt (which was to determine their perſonal and political fate, and that of their country, and probably of Europe) are taken into one view, none but a heart callous with prejudice, or corrupted by dependance, can avoid intereſting itſelf in their ſucceſs.

The archbiſhop of Vienne was at this time preſident of the National Aſſembly; a perſon too old to undergo the ſcene that a few days, or a few hours, might bring forth. A man of more activity, and greater fortitude, was neceſſary; and the National Aſſembly choſe under the form of a vice-preſident, (for the preſidency ſtill reſided in the archbiſhop) M. de la Fayette; and this is the only inſtance of a vice-preſident being choſen. It was at the moment that this ſtorm was pending (July 11.) that a declaration of rights was brought forward by M. de la Fayette, and is the ſame which is alluded to in page 5. It was haſtily drawn up, and makes only a part of a more extenſive declaration of rights, agreed upon and adopted afterwards by the National Aſſembly. The particular reaſon for bringing it forward at this moment, (M. de la Fayette has ſince informed me) was, that if the National Aſſembly ſhould

fall in the threatened deſtruction that then ſurrounded it, ſome traces of its principles might have the chance of ſurviving the wreck.

Every thing now was drawing to a criſis. The event was to be freedom or ſlavery. On one ſide, an army of nearly thirty thouſand men; on the other, an unarmed body of citizens: for the citizens of Paris, on whom the National Aſſembly muſt then immediately depend, were as unarmed and as undiſciplined as the citizens of London are now.—The French guards had given ſtrong ſymptoms of their being attached to the national cauſe; but their numbers were ſmall, not a tenth part of the force that Broglio commanded, and their officers were in the intereſt of Broglio.

Matters being now ripe for execution, the new miniſtry made their appearance in office. The reader will carry in his mind, that the Baſtille was taken the 14th of July: the point of time I am now ſpeaking to, is the 12th. Immediately on the news of the change of miniſtry reaching Paris, in the afternoon, all the play-houſes and places of entertainment, ſhops and houſes, were ſhut up. The change of miniſtry was conſidered as the prelude of hoſtilities, and the opinion was rightly founded.

The foreign troops began to advance towards the city. The Prince de Lambeſc, who commanded a body of German cavalry, approached by the Place of Lewis XV. which connects itſelf with ſome of the ſtreets. In his march, he inſulted and ſtruck an old man with his ſword. The French are remarkable for their reſpect to old age, and the inſolence with which it appeared to be done, uniting with the general fermentation they were in, produced a powerful effect, and a cry of *To arms! to arms!* ſpread itſelf in a moment over the city.

Arms they had none, nor ſcarcely any who knew the uſe of them: but deſperate reſolution, when every hope is at ſtake, ſupplies, for a while, the want of arms. Near where the Prince de Lambeſc was drawn up, were large piles of ſtones collected for building the new bridge, and with theſe the people attacked the cavalry. A party of the French guards, upon hearing the firing, ruſhed from their quarters and joined the people; and night coming on, the cavalry retreated.

The ſtreets of Paris, being narrow, are favourable for defence; and the loftineſs of the houſes conſiſting of many ſtories, from which great annoyance might be given, ſecured them againſt nocturnal enterpriſes; and the night was ſpent in providing themſelves with every ſort of weapon they could make or procure: Guns, ſwords, blackſmiths hammers, carpenters axes, iron crows, pikes, halberts, pitch-forks, ſpits, clubs, &c. &c. The incredible numbers in which they aſſembled the next morning, and the ſtill more incredible reſolution they exhibited, embarraſſed and aſtoniſhed their enemies. Little did the new miniſtry expect ſuch a ſalute. Accuſtomed to ſlavery themſelves, they had no idea that Liberty was capable of ſuch inſpiration, or that a body of unarmed citizens would dare to face the military force of thirty thouſand men. Every moment of this day was employed in collecting arms, concerting plans, and arranging themſelves into the beſt order which ſuch

ſuch an inſtantaneous movement could afford. Broglio continued lying round the city, but made no farther advances this day, and the ſucceeding night paſſed with as much tranquillity as ſuch a ſcene could poſſibly admit.

But defence only was not the object of the citizens. They had a cauſe at ſtake, on which depended their freedom or their ſlavery. They every moment expected an attack, or to hear of one made on the National Aſſembly; and in ſuch a ſituation, the moſt prompt meaſures are ſometimes the beſt. The object that now preſented itſelf was the Baſtille; and the eclat of carrying ſuch a fortreſs in the face of ſuch an army, could not fail to ſtrike a terror into the new miniſtry, who had ſcarcely yet had time to meet. By ſome intercepted correſpondence this morning, it was diſcovered, that the Mayor of Paris, M. Deſſeſſelles, who appeared to be in the intereſt of the citizens, was betraying them; and on this diſcovery, there remained no doubt that Broglio would reinforce the Baſtille the enſuing evening. It was therefore neceſſary to attack it that day; but before this could be done, it was firſt neceſſary to procure a better ſupply of arms than they were then poſſeſſed of.

There was adjoining to the city a large magazine of arms depoſited at the Hoſpital of the Invalids, which the citizens ſummoned to ſurrender; and as the place was not defenſible, nor attempted much defence, they ſoon ſucceeded. Thus ſupplied, they marched to attack the Baſtille; a vaſt mixed multitude of all ages, and of all degrees, and armed with all ſorts of weapons. Imagination would fail in deſcribing to itſelf the appearance of ſuch a proceſſion, and of the anxiety for the events which a few hours or a few minutes might produce. What plans the miniſtry was forming, were as unknown to the people within the city, as what the citizens were doing was unknown to the miniſtry; and what movements Broglio might make for the ſupport or relief of the place, were to the citizens equally as unknown. All was myſtery and hazard.

That the Baſtille was attacked with an enthuſiaſm of heroiſm, ſuch only as the higheſt animation of liberty could inſpire, and carried in the ſpace of a few hours, is an event which the world is fully poſſeſſed of. I am not undertaking a detail of the attack; but bringing into view the conſpiracy againſt the nation which provoked it, and which fell with the Baſtille. The priſon to which the new miniſtry were dooming the National Aſſembly, in addition to its being the high altar and caſtle of deſpotiſm, became the proper object to begin with. This enterpriſe broke up the new miniſtry, who began now to fly from the ruin they had prepared for others. The troops of Broglio diſperſed, and himſelf fled alſo.

Mr. Burke has ſpoken a great deal about plots, but he has never once ſpoken of this plot againſt the National Aſſembly, and the liberties of the nation; and that he might not, he has paſſed over all the circumſtances that might throw it in his way. The exiles who have fled from France, whoſe caſe he ſo much intereſts himſelf in, and from whom he has had his leſſon, fled in conſequence of the miſcarriage of this plot. No plot was formed againſt them: they

they were plotting againſt others; and thoſe who fell, met, not unjuſtly, the puniſhment they were preparing to execute. But will Mr. Burke ſay, that if this plot, contrived with the ſubtilty of an ambuſcade, had ſucceeded, the ſucceſsful party would have reſtrained their wrath ſo ſoon? Let the hiſtory of all old governments anſwer the queſtion.

Whom has the National Aſſembly brought to the ſcaffold? None. They were themſelves the devoted victims of this plot, and they have not retaliated; why then are they charged with revenge they have not acted? In the tremendous breaking forth of a whole people, in which all degrees, tempers and characters are confounded, and delivering themſelves, by a miracle of exertion, from the deſtruction meditated againſt them, is it to be expected that nothing will happen? When men are ſore with the ſenſe of oppreſſions, and menaced with the proſpect of new ones, is the calmneſs of philoſophy, or the palſy of inſenſibility, to be looked for? Mr. Burke exclaims againſt outrage; yet the greateſt is that which himſelf has committed. His book is a volume of outrage, not apologized for by the impulſe of a moment, but cheriſhed through a ſpace of ten months; yet Mr. Burke had no provocation —no life, no intereſt at ſtake.

More of the citizens fell in this ſtruggle than of their opponents: but four or five perſons were ſeized by the populace, and inſtantly put to death; the Governor of the Baſtille, and the Mayor of Paris, who was detected in the act of betraying them; and afterwards Foulon, one of the new miniſtry, and Berthier his ſon-in-law, who had accepted the office of Intendant of Paris. Their heads were ſtuck upon ſpikes, and carried about the city; and it is upon this mode of puniſhment that Mr. Burke builds a great part of his tragic ſcene. Let us therefore examine how men came by the idea of puniſhing in this manner.

They learn it from the goverments they live under, and retaliate the puniſhments they have been accuſtomed to behold. The heads ſtuck upon ſpikes, which remained for years upon Temple-bar, differed nothing in the horror of the ſcene from thoſe carried about upon ſpikes at Paris: yet this was done by the Engliſh government. It may perhaps be ſaid, that it ſignifies nothing to a man what is done to him after he is dead; but it ſignifies much to the living: it either tortures their feelings, or hardens their hearts; and in either caſe, it inſtructs them how to puniſh when power falls into their hands.

Lay then the axe to the root, and teach governments humanity. It is their ſanguinary puniſhments which corrupt mankind. In England, the puniſhment in certain caſes, is by *hanging*, *drawing*, and *quartering*; the heart of the ſufferer is cut out, and held up to the view of the populace. In France, under the former government, the puniſhments were not leſs barbarous. Who does not remember the execution of Damien, torn to pieces by horſes? The effect of thoſe cruel ſpectacles exhibited to the populace, is to deſtroy tenderneſs, or excite revenge; and by the baſe and falſe idea of governing men by terror, inſtead of reaſon, they become precedents.

cedents. It is over the loweſt claſs of mankind that government by terror is intended to operate, and it is on them that it operates to the worſt effect. They have ſenſe enough to feel they are the objects aimed at; and they inflict in their turn the examples of terror they have been inſtructed to practiſe.

There is in all European countries, a large claſs of people of that deſcription which in England is called the "*mob.*" Of this claſs were thoſe who committed the burnings and devaſtations in London in 1780, and of this claſs were thoſe who carried the heads upon ſpikes in Paris. Foulon and Berthier were taken up in the country, and ſent to Paris, to undergo their examination at the Hotel de Ville; for the National Aſſembly, immediately on the new miniſtry coming into office, paſſed a decree, which they communicated to the King and Cabinet, that they (the National Aſſembly) would hold the miniſtry, of which Foulon was one, reſponſible for the meaſures they were adviſing and purſuing; but the mob, incenſed at the appearance of Foulon and Berthier, tore them from their conductors before they were carried to the Hotel de Ville, and executed them on the ſpot. Why then does Mr. Burke charge outrages of this kind on a whole people? As well may he charge the riots and outrages of 1780 on all the people of London, or thoſe in Ireland on all his countrymen.

But every thing we ſee or hear offenſive to our feelings, and derogatory to the human character, ſhould lead to other reflections than thoſe of reproach. Even the beings who commit them have ſome claim to our conſideration. How then is it that ſuch vaſt claſſes of mankind as are diſtinguiſhed by the appellation of the vulgar, or the ignorant mob, are ſo numerous in all old countries? The inſtant we aſk ourſelves this queſtion, reflection feels an anſwer. They ariſe, as an unavoidable conſequence, out of the ill conſtruction of all old governments in Europe, England included with the reſt. It is by diſtortedly exalting ſome men, that others are diſtortedly debaſed, till the whole is out of nature. A vaſt maſs of mankind are degradedly thrown into the back-ground of the human picture, to bring forward with greater glare, the puppet-ſhow of ſtate and ariſtocracy. In the commencement of a Revolution, thoſe men are rather the followers of the *camp* than of the *ſtandard* of liberty, and have yet to be inſtructed how to reverence it.

I give to Mr. Burke all his theatrical exaggerations for facts, and I then aſk him, if they do not eſtabliſh the certainty of what I here lay down? Admitting them to be true, they ſhew the neceſſity of the French Revolution, as much as any one thing he could have aſſerted. Theſe outrages were not the effect of the principles of the Revolution, but of the degraded mind that exiſted before the Revolution, and which the Revolution is calculated to reform. Place them then to their proper cauſe, and take the reproach of them to your own ſide.

It is to the honour of the National Aſſembly, and the city of Paris, that during ſuch a tremendous ſcene of arms and confuſion, beyond the controul of all authority, they have been able, by the influence

influence of example and exhortation, to reſtrain ſo much. Never were more pains taken to inſtruct and enlighten mankind, and to make them ſee that their intereſt conſiſted in their virtue, and not in their revenge, than have been diſplayed in the Revolution of France. I now proceed to make ſome remarks on Mr. Burke's account of the expedition to Verſailles, Oct. the 5th and 6th.

I cannot conſider Mr. Burke's book in ſcarcely any other light than a dramatic performance; and he muſt, I think, have conſidered it in the ſame light himſelf, by the poetical liberties he has taken of omitting ſome facts, diſtorting others, and making the whole machinery bend to produce a ſtage effect. Of this kind is his account of the expedition to Verſailles. He begins this account by omitting the only facts which as cauſes are known to be true; every thing beyond theſe is conjecture even in Paris; and he then works up a tale accommodated to his own paſſions and prejudices.

It is to be obſerved throughout Mr. Burke's book, that he never ſpeaks of plots *againſt* the Revolution; and it is from thoſe plots that all the miſchiefs have ariſen. It ſuits his purpoſe to exhibit the conſequences without their cauſes. It is one of the arts of the drama to do ſo. If the crimes of men were exhibited with their ſufferings, ſtage effect would ſometimes be loſt, and the audience would be inclined to approve where it was intended they ſhould commiſerate.

After all the inveſtigations that have been made into this intricate affair, (the expedition to Verſailles), it ſtill remains enveloped in all that kind of myſtery which ever accompanies events produced more from a concurrence of awkward circumſtances, than from fixed deſign. While the characters of men are forming, as is always the caſe in revolutions, there is a reciprocal ſuſpicion, and a diſpoſition to miſinterpret each other; and even parties directly oppoſite in principle, will ſometimes concur in puſhing forward the ſame movement with very different views, and with the hopes of its producing very different conſequences. A great deal of this may be diſcovered in this embaraſſed affair, and yet the iſſue of the whole was what nobody had in view.

The only things certainly known, are, that conſiderable uneaſineſs was at this time excited at Paris, by the delay of the King in not ſanctioning and forwarding the decrees of the National Aſſembly, particularly that of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, and the decrees of the *fourth of Auguſt*, which contained the foundation principles on which the conſtitution was to be erected. The kindeſt, and perhaps the faireſt conjecture upon this matter is, that ſome of the miniſters intended to make remarks and obſervations upon certain parts of them, before they were finally ſanctioned and ſent to the provinces; but be this as it may, the enemies of the revolution derived hope from the delay, and the friends of the revolution, uneaſineſs.

During this ſtate of ſuſpence, the *Garde du Corps*, which was compoſed, as ſuch regiments generally are, of perſons much connected with the Court, gave an entertainment at Verſailles (Oct. 1,) to

to ſome foreign regiments then arrived; and when the entertainment was at the height, on a ſignal given, the *Garde du Corps* tore the national cockade from their hats, trampled it under foot, and replaced it with a counter cockade prepared for the purpoſe. An indignity of this kind amounted to defiance. It was like declaring war; and if men will give challenges, they muſt expect conſequences. But all this Mr. Burke has carefully kept out of ſight. He begins his account by ſaying, "Hiſtory will record, that on "the morning of the 6th of Oct. 1789, the King and Queen of "France, after a day of confuſion, alarm, diſmay, and ſlaughter, "lay down under the pledged ſecurity of public faith, to indulge "nature in a few hours of reſpite, and troubled melancholy re-"poſe." This is neither the ſober ſtile of hiſtory, nor the intention of it. It leaves every thing to be gueſſed at, and miſtaken. One would at leaſt think there had been a battle; and a battle there probably would have been, had it not been for the moderating prudence of thoſe whom Mr. Burke involves in his cenſures. By his keeping the *Garde du Corps* out of ſight, Mr. Burke has afforded himſelf the dramatic licence of putting the King and Queen in their places, as if the object of the expedition was againſt them. —But, to return to my account—

This conduct of the *Garde du Corps*, as might well be expected, alarmed and enraged the Pariſians. The colours of the cauſe, and the cauſe itſelf, were become too united to miſtake the intention of the inſult, and the Pariſians were determined to call the *Garde du Corps* to an account. There was certainly nothing of the cowardice of aſſaſſination in marching in the face of day to demand ſatisfaction, if ſuch a phraſe may be uſed, of a body of armed men who had voluntarily given defiance. But the circumſtance which ſerves to throw this affair into embarraſſment is, that the enemies of the revolution appear to have encouraged it, as well as its friends. The one hoped to prevent a civil war by checking it in time, and the other to make one. The hopes of thoſe oppoſed to the revolution, reſted in making the King of their party, and getting him from Verſailles to Metz, where they expected to collect a force, and ſet up a ſtandard. We have therefore two different objects preſenting themſelves at the ſame time, and to be accompliſhed by the ſame means: the one, to chaſtiſe the *Garde du Corps*, which was the object of the Pariſians; the other, to render the confuſion of ſuch a ſcene an inducement to the King to ſet off for Metz.

On the 5th of October, a very numerous body of women, and men in the diſguiſe of women, collected round the Hotel de Ville or town-hall at Paris, and ſet off for Verſailles. Their profeſſed object was the *Garde du Corps*; but prudent men readily recollect that miſchief is more eaſily begun than ended; and this impreſſed itſelf with the more force, from the ſuſpicions already ſtated, and the irregularity of ſuch a cavalcade. As ſoon therefore as a ſufficient force could be collected, M. de la Fayette, by orders from the civil authority of Paris, ſet off after them at the head of twenty thouſand of the Paris militia. The revolution could derive no benefit from confuſion, and its oppoſers might. By an amiable and

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ſpirited manner of addreſs, he had hitherto been fortunate n caſming diſquietudes, and in this he was extrordinarily ſucceſsful; to fruſtrate, therefore, the hopes of thoſe who might ſeek to improve this ſcene into a ſort of juſtifiable neceſſity for the King's quitting Verſailles and withdrawing to Metz, and to prevent at the ſame time the conſequences that might enſue between the *Garde du Corps* and this phalanx of men and women, he forwarded expreſſes to the King, that he was on his march to Verſailles, by the orders of the civil authority of Paris, for the purpoſe of peace and protection, expreſſing at the ſame time the neceſſity of reſtraining the *Garde du Corps* from firing upon the people *.

He arrived at Verſailles between ten and eleven at night. The *Garde du Corps* was drawn up, and the people had arrived ſome time before, but every thing had remained ſuſpended. Wiſdom and policy now conſiſted in changing a ſcene of danger into a happy event. M. de la Fayette became the mediator between the enraged parties; and the King, to remove the uneaſineſs which had ariſen from the delay already ſtated, ſent for the Preſident of the National Aſſembly, and ſigned the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, and ſuch other parts of the conſtitution as were in readineſs.

It was now about one in the morning. Every thing appeared to be compoſed, and a general congratulation took place. By the beat of drum a proclamation was made, that the citizens of Verſailles would give the hoſpitality of their houſes to their fellow-citizens of Paris. Thoſe who could not be accommodated in this manner, remained in the ſtreets, or took up their quarters in the churches; and at two o'clock the King and Queen retired.

In this ſtate matters paſſed till the break of day, when a freſh diſturbance aroſe from the cenſurable conduct of ſome of both parties, for ſuch characters there will be all in ſuch ſcenes. One of the *Garde du Corps* appeared at one of the windows of the palace, and the people who had remained during the night in the ſtreets, accoſted him with reviling and provocative language. Inſtead of retiring, as in ſuch a caſe prudence would have dictated, he preſented his muſket, fired, and killed one of the Paris militia. The peace being thus broken, the people ruſhed into the palace in queſt of the offender. They attacked the quarters of the *Garde du Corps* within the palace, and purſued them throughout the avenues of it, and to the apartments of the King. On this tumult, not the Queen only, as Mr. Burke has repreſented it, but every perſon in the palace, was awakened and alarmed; and M. de la Fayette had a ſecond time to interpoſe between the parties, the event of which was, that the *Garde du Corps* put on the national cockade, and the matter ended as by oblivion, after the loſs of two or three lives.

During the latter part of the time in which this confuſion was acting, the King and Queen were in public at the balcony, and neither of them concealed for ſafety's ſake, as Mr. Burke inſinuates. Matters being thus appeaſed, and tranquillity reſtored, a general

* I am warranted in aſſerting this, as I had it perſonally from M. de la Fayette, with whom I have lived in habits of friendſhip for fourteen years.

acclama-

acclamation broke forth, of *Le Roi à Paris—Le Roi à Paris*—The King to Paris. It was the ſhout of peace, and immediately accepted on the part of the King. By this meaſure, all future projects of trapanning the King to Metz, and ſetting up the ſtandard of oppoſition to the conſtitution, were prevented, and the ſuſpicions extinguiſhed. The King and his family reached Paris in the evening, and were congratulated on their arrival by Mr. Bailley the Mayor of Paris, in the name of the citizens. Mr. Burke, who throughout his book confounds things, perſons, and principles, has in his remarks on M. Bailley's addreſs, confounded time alſo. He cenſures M. Bailley for calling it, "*un bon jour*," a good day. Mr. Burke ſhould have informed himſelf, that this ſcene took up the ſpace of two days, the day on which it began with every appearance of danger and miſchief, and the day on which it terminated without the miſchiefs that threatened; and that it is to this peaceful termination that M. Bailley alludes, and to the arrival of the King at Paris. Not leſs than three hundred thouſand perſons arranged themſelves in the proceſſion from Verſailles to Paris, and not an act of moleſtation was committed during the whole march.

Mr. Burke, on the authority of M. Lally Tollendal, a deſerter from the National Aſſembly, ſays, that on entering Paris, the people ſhouted, "*Tous les eveques à la lanterne.*" All Biſhops to be hanged at the lanthorn or lamp-poſts.—It is ſurpriſing that nobody could hear this but Lally Tollendal, and that nobody ſhould believe it but Mr. Burke. It has not the leaſt connection with any part of the tranſaction, and is totally foreign to every circumſtance of it. The biſhops had never been introduced before into any ſcene of Mr. Burke's drama; Why then are they, all at once, and altogether, *tout à coup et tous enſemble*, introduced now? Mr. Burke brings forward his biſhops and his lanthorn like figures in a magic lanthorn, and raiſes his ſcenes by contraſt inſtead of connection. But it ſerves to ſhew, with the reſt of his book, what little credit ought to be given, where even probability is ſet at defiance, for the purpoſe of defaming; and with this reflection, inſtead of a ſoliloquy in praiſe of chivalry, as Mr. Burke has done, I cloſe the account of the expedition to Verſailles *.

I have now to follow Mr. Burke through a pathleſs wilderneſs of rhapſodies, and a ſort of deſcant upon governments, in which he aſſerts whatever he pleaſes, on the preſumption of its being believed, without offering either evidence or reaſons for ſo doing.

Before any thing can be reaſoned upon to a concluſion, certain facts, principles, or data, to reaſon from, muſt be eſtabliſhed, admitted, or denied. Mr. Burke, with his uſual outrage, abuſes the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, publiſhed by the National Aſſembly of France as the baſis on which the conſtitution of France is built. This he calls "paltry and blurred ſheets of paper about the rights of man."—Does Mr. Burke mean to deny that *man* has

* An account of the expedition to Verſailles may be ſeen in No. 13. of the *Revolution de Paris*, containing the events from the 3d to the 10th of October 1789.

any

any rights? If he does, then he muſt mean that there are no ſuch things as rights any where, and that he has none himſelf; for who is there in the world but man? But if Mr. Burke means to admit that man has rights, the queſtion then will be, What are thoſe rights, and how came man by them originally?

The error of thoſe who reaſon by precedents drawn from antiquity, reſpecting the rights of man, is, that they do not go far enough into antiquity. They do not go the whole way. They ſtop in ſome of the intermediate ſtages of an hundred or a thouſand years, and produce what was then done, as a rule for the preſent day. This is no authority at all. If we travel ſtill farther into antiquity, we ſhall find a direct contrary opinion and practice prevailing; and if antiquity is to be authority, a thouſand ſuch authorities may be produced, ſucceſſively contradicting each other: But if we proceed on, we ſhall at laſt come out right; we ſhall come to the time when man came from the hand of his Maker. What was he then? Man. Man was his high and only title, and a higher cannot be given him.——But of titles I ſhall ſpeak hereafter.

We are now got at the origin of man, and at the origin of his rights. As to the manner in which the world has been governed from that day to this, it is no father any concern of ours than to make a proper uſe of the errors or the improvements which the hiſtory of it preſents. Thoſe who lived a hundred or a thouſand years ago, were then moderns, as we are now. They had *their* ancients, and thoſe ancients had others, and we alſo ſhall be ancients in our turn. If the mere name of antiquity is to govern in the affairs of life, the people who are to live an hundred or a thouſand years hence, may as well take us for a precedent, as we make a precedent of thoſe who lived a hundred or a thouſand years ago. The fact is, that portions of antiquity, by proving every thing, eſtabliſh nothing. It is authority againſt authority all the way, till we come to the divine origin of the rights of man at the creation. Here our enquiries find a reſting-place, and our reaſon finds a home. If a diſpute about the rights of man had ariſen at the diſtance of an hundred years from the creation, it is to this ſource of authority they muſt have referred, and it is to the ſame ſource of authority that we muſt now refer.

Though I mean not to touch upon any ſectarian principle of religion, yet it may be worth obſerving, that the genealogy of Chriſt is traced to Adam. Why then not trace the rights of man to the creation of man? I will anſwer the queſtion. Becauſe there have been upſtart governments, thruſting themſelves between, and preſumptuouſly working to *un-make* man.

If any generation of men ever poſſeſſed the right of dictating the mode by which the world ſhould be governed for ever, it was the firſt generation that exiſted; and if that generation did it not, no ſucceeding generation can ſhew any authority for doing it, nor can ſet any up. The illuminating and divine principle of the equal rights of man, (for it has its origin from the Maker of man) relates not only to the living individuals, but to generations of men ſucceeding each other. Every generation is equal in rights to the generations which preceded it, by the ſame rule that every individual is born equal in rights with his contemporary.

Every hiſtory of the creation, and every traditionary account, whether from the lettered or unlettered world, however they may vary in their opinion or belief of certain particulars, all agree in eſtabliſhing one point, *the unity of man*; by which I mean, that men are all of *one degree*, and conſequently that all men are born equal, and with equal natural right, in the ſame manner as if poſterity had been continued by *creation* inſtead of *generation*, the latter being only the mode by which the former is carried forward; and conſequently, every child born into the world muſt be conſidered as deriving its exiſtence from God. The world is as new to him as it was to the firſt man that exiſted, and his natural right in it is of the ſame kind.

The Moſaic account of the creation, whether taken as divine authority, or merely hiſtorical, is full to this point, *the unity or equality of man*. The expreſſions admit of no controverſy. "And "God ſaid, Let us make man in our own image. In the image "of God created he him; male and female created he them." The diſtinction of ſexes is pointed out, but no other diſtinction is even implied. If this be not divine authority, it is at leaſt hiſtorical authority, and ſhews that the equality of man, ſo far from being a modern doctrine, is the oldeſt upon record.

It is alſo to be obſerved, that all the religions known in the world are founded, ſo far as they relate to man, on the *unity of man*, as being all of one degree. Whether in heaven or in hell, or in whatever ſtate man may be ſuppoſed to exiſt hereafter, the good and the bad are the only diſtinctions. Nay, even the laws of governments are obliged to ſlide into this principle, by making degrees to conſiſt in crimes, and not in perſons.

It is one of the greateſt of all truths, and of the higheſt advantage to cultivate. By conſidering man in this light, and by inſtructing him to conſider himſelf in this light, it places him in a cloſe connection with all his duties, whether to his Creator, or to the creation, of which he is a part; and it is only when he forgets his origin, or, to uſe a more faſhionable phraſe, his *birth and family*, that he becomes diſſolute. It is not among the leaſt of the evils of the preſent exiſting governments in all parts of Europe, that man, conſidered as man, is thrown back to a vaſt diſtance from his Maker, and the artificial chaſm filled up by a ſucceſſion of barriers, or ſort of turnpike gates, through which he has to paſs. I will quote Mr. Burke's catalogue of barriers that he has ſet up between man and his Maker. Putting himſelf in the character of a herald, he ſays—"We fear God—we look with *awe* to kings—with af-"fection to parliaments—with duty to magiſtrates—with reverence "to prieſts, and with reſpect to nobility." Mr. Burke has forgotten to put in "*chivalry*." He has alſo forgotten to put in Peter.

The duty of man is not a wilderneſs of turnpike-gates, through which he is to paſs by tickets from one to the other. It is plain and

and ſimple, and conſiſts but of two points. His duty to God, which every man muſt feel; and with reſpect to his neighbour, to do as he would be done by. If thoſe to whom power is delegated do well, they will be reſpected; if not, they will be deſpiſed; and with regard to thoſe to whom no power is delegated, but who aſſume it, the rational world can know nothing of them.

Hitherto we have ſpoken only (and that but in part) of the natural rights of man. We have now to conſider the civil rights of man, and to ſhew how the one originates from the other. Man did not enter into ſociety to become *worſe* than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have thoſe rights better ſecured. His natural rights are the foundation of all his civil rights. But in order to purſue this diſtinction with more preciſion, it will be neceſſary to mark the different qualities of natural and civil rights.

A few words will explain this. Natural rights are thoſe which appertain to man in right of his exiſtence. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and alſo all thoſe rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and happineſs, which are not injurious to the natural rights of others.—— Civil rights are thoſe which appertain to man in right of his being a member of ſociety. Every civil right has for its foundation, ſome natural right pre-exiſting in the individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all caſes, ſufficiently competent. Of this kind are all thoſe which relate to ſecurity and protection.

From this ſhort review, it will be eaſy to diſtinguiſh between that claſs of natural rights which man retains after entering into ſociety, and thoſe which he throws into the common ſtock as a member of ſociety.

The natural rights which he retains, are all thoſe in which the *power* to execute is as perfect in the individual as the right itſelf. Among this claſs, as is before-mentioned, are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind: conſequently, religion is one of thoſe rights. The natural rights which are not retained, are all thoſe in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute them is defective. They anſwer not his purpoſe. A man, by natural right, has a right to judge in his own cauſe; and ſo far as the right of the mind is concerned, he never ſurrenders it: But what availeth it him to judge, if he has not power to redreſs? He therefore depoſits this right in the common ſtock of ſociety, and takes the arm of ſociety, of which he is a part, in preference and in addition to his own. Society *grants* him nothing. Every man is a proprietor in ſociety, and draws on the capital as a matter of right.

From theſe premiſes, two or three certain concluſions will follow.

Firſt, That every civil right grows out of a natural right; or, in other words, is a natural right exchanged.

Secondly, That civil power, properly conſidered as ſuch, is made up of the aggregate of that claſs of the natural rights of man, which becomes defective in the individual in point of power, and anſwers not

not his purpoſe; but when collected to a focus, becomes competent to the purpoſe of every one.

Thirdly, That the power produced from the aggregate of natural rights, imperfect in power in the individual, cannot be applied to invade the natural rights which are retained in the individual, and in which the power to execute is as perfect as the right itſelf.

We have now, in a few words, traced man from a natural individual to a member of ſociety, and ſhewn, or endeavoured to ſhew, the quality of the natural rights retained, and of thoſe which are exchanged for civil rights. Let us now apply theſe principles to governments.

In caſting our eyes over the world, it is extremely eaſy to diſtinguiſh the governments which have ariſen out of ſociety, or out of the ſocial compact, from thoſe which have not: but to place this in a clearer light than what a ſingle glance may afford, it will be proper to take a review of the ſeveral ſources from which governments have ariſen, and on which they have been founded.

They may all be comprehended under three heads. Firſt, Superſtition. Secondly, Power. Thirdly, The common intereſt of ſociety, and the common rights of man.

The firſt was a government of prieſtcraft, the ſecond of conquerors, and the third of reaſon.

When a ſet of artful men pretended, through the medium of oracles, to hold intercourſe with the Deity, as familiarly as they now march up the back-ſtairs in European courts, the world was completely under the government of ſuperſtition. The oracles were conſulted, and whatever they were made to ſay, became the law; and this ſort of government laſted as long as this ſort of ſuperſtition laſted.

After theſe a race of conquerors aroſe, whoſe government, like that of William the Conqueror, was founded in power, and the ſword aſſumed the name of a ſcepter. Governments thus eſtabliſhed, laſt as long as the power to ſupport them laſts; but that they might avail themſelves of every engine in their favour, they united fraud to force, and ſet up an idol which they called *Divine Right*, and which, in imitation of the Pope, who affects to be ſpiritual and temporal, and in contradiction to the Founder of the Chriſtian religion, twiſted itſelf afterwards into an idol of another ſhape, called *Church and State*. The key of St. Peter, and the key of the Treaſury, became quartered on one another, and the wondering cheated multitude worſhipped the invention.

When I contemplate the natural dignity of man; when I feel (for Nature has not been kind enough to me to blunt my feelings) for the honour and happineſs of its character, I become irritated at the attempt to govern mankind by force and fraud, as if they were all knaves and fools, and can ſcarcely avoid diſguſt at thoſe who are thus impoſed upon.

We have now to review the governments which ariſe out of ſociety, in contradiſtinction to thoſe which aroſe out of ſuperſtition and conqueſt.

It

It has been thought a conſiderable advance towards eſtabliſhing the principles of Freedom, to ſay, that government is a compact between thoſe who govern and thoſe who are governed: but this cannot be true, becauſe it is putting the effect before the cauſe; for as man muſt have exiſted before governments exiſted, there neceſſarily was a time when governments did not exiſt, and conſequently there could originally exiſt no governors to form ſuch a compact with. The fact therefore muſt be, that the *individuals themſelves*, each in his own perſonal and ſovereign right, *entered into a compact with each other* to produce a government: and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to ariſe, and the only principle on which they have a right to exiſt.

To poſſeſs ourſelves of a clear idea of what government is, or ought to be, we muſt trace it to its origin. In doing this, we ſhall eaſily diſcover that governments muſt have ariſen, either *out* of the people, or *over* the people. Mr. Burke has made no diſtinction. He inveſtigates nothing to its ſource, and therefore he confounds every thing: but he has ſignified his intention of undertaking at ſome future opportunity, a compariſon between the conſtitutions of England and France. As he thus renders it a ſubject of controverſy by throwing the gauntlet, I take him upon his own ground. It is in high challenges that high truths have the right of appearing; and I accept it with the more readineſs, becauſe it affords me, at the ſame time, an opportunity of purſuing the ſubject with reſpect to governments ariſing out of ſociety.

But it will be firſt neceſſary to define what is meant by a *conſtitution*. It is not ſufficient that we adopt the word; we muſt fix alſo a ſtandard ſignification to it.

A conſtitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact. It has not an ideal, but a real exiſtence; and wherever it cannot be produced in a viſible form, there is none. A conſtitution is a thing *antecedent* to a government, and a government is only the creature of a conſtitution. The conſtitution of a country is not the act of its government, but of the people conſtituting a government. It is the body of elements, to which you can refer, and quote article by article; and which contains the principles on which the government ſhall be eſtabliſhed, the manner in which it ſhall be organized, the powers it ſhall have, the mode of elections, the duration of parliaments, or by what other name ſuch bodies may be called; the powers which the executive part of the government ſhall have; and, in fine, every thing that relates to the compleat organization of a civil government, and the principles on which it ſhall act, and by which it ſhall be bound. A conſtitution, therefore, is to a government, what the laws made afterwards by that government are to a court of judicature. The court of judicature does not make the laws, neither can it alter them; it only acts in conformity to the laws made: and the government is in like manner governed by the conſtitution.

Can then Mr. Burke produce the Engliſh Conſtitution? If he cannot, we may fairly conclude, that though it has been ſo much talked

talked about, no ſuch thing as a conſtitution exiſts, or ever did exiſt, and conſequently that the people have yet a conſtitution to form.

Mr. Burke will not, I preſume, deny the poſition I have already advanced; namely, that governments ariſe, either *out* of the people, or *over* the people. The Engliſh government is one of thoſe which aroſe out of a conqueſt, and not out of ſociety, and conſequently it aroſe over the people; and though it has been much modified from the opportunity of circumſtances ſince the time of William the Conqueror, the country has never yet regenerated itſelf, and is therefore without a conſtitution.

I readily perceive the reaſon why Mr. Burke declined going into the compariſon between the Engliſh and French conſtitutions, becauſe he could not but perceive, when he ſat down to the taſk, that no ſuch thing as a conſtitution exiſted on his ſide the queſtion. His book is certainly bulky enough to have contained all he could ſay on this ſubject, and it would have been the beſt manner in which people could have judged of their ſeparate merits. Why then has he declined the only thing that was worth while to write upon? It was the ſtrongeſt ground he could take, if the advantages were on his ſide; but the weakeſt, if they were not: and his declining to take it, is either a ſign that he could not poſſeſs it, or could not maintain it.

Mr. Burke ſaid in a ſpeech laſt winter in parliament, That when the National Aſſembly firſt met in three Orders, (the Tiers Etats, the Clergy, and the Nobleſſe), France had then a good conſtitution. This ſhews, among numerous other inſtances, that Mr. Burke does not underſtand what a conſtitution is. The perſons ſo met, were not a *conſtitution*, but a *convention*, to make a conſtitution.

The preſent National Aſſembly of France is, ſtrictly ſpeaking, the perſonal ſocial compact.—The members of it are the delegates of the nation in its *original* character; future aſſemblies will be the delegates of the nation in its *organized* character. The authority of the preſent Aſſembly is different to what the authority of future Aſſemblies will be. The authority of the preſent one is to form a conſtitution: the authority of future Aſſemblies will be to legiſlate according to the principles and forms preſcribed in that conſtitution; and if experience ſhould hereafter ſhew that alterations, amendments, or additions, are neceſſary, the conſtitution will point out the mode by which ſuch things ſhall be done, and not leave it to the diſcretionary power of the future government.

A government on the principles on which conſtitutional governments ariſing out of ſociety are eſtabliſhed, cannot have the right of altering itſelf. If it had, it would be arbitrary. It might make itſelf what it pleaſed; and wherever ſuch a right is ſet up, it ſhews there is no conſtitution. The act by which the Engliſh Parliament empowered itſelf to ſit ſeven years, ſhews there is no conſtitution in England. It might, by the ſame ſelf-authority, have ſat any greater number of years, or for life. The Bill which the preſent Mr. Pitt brought into parliament ſome years ago, to reform parliament, was on the ſame erroneous principle. The right of reform

form is in the nation in its original character, and the conſtitutional method would be by a general convention elected for the purpoſe. There is, moreover, a paradox in the idea of vitiated bodies reforming themſelves.

From theſe preliminaries I proceed to draw ſome compariſons. I have already ſpoken of the declaration of rights; and as I mean to be as conciſe as poſſible, I ſhall proceed to other parts of the French conſtitution.

The conſtitution of France ſays, That every man who pays a tax of ſixty ſous *per annum*, (2s. and 6d. Engliſh), is an elector.—What article will Mr. Burke place againſt this? Can any thing be more limited, and at the ſame time more capricious, than the qualifications of Electors are in England? Limited—becauſe not one man in an hundred (I ſpeak much within compaſs) is admitted to vote: Capricious—becauſe the loweſt character that can be ſuppoſed to exiſt, and who has not ſo much as the viſible means of an honeſt livelihood, is an elector in ſome places; while, in other places, the man who pays very large taxes, and has known a fair character, and the farmer who rents to the amount of three or four hundred pounds a year, with a property on that farm to three or four times that amount, is not admitted to be an elector. Every thing is out of nature, as Mr. Burke ſays on another occaſion, in this ſtrange chaos, and all ſorts of follies are blended with all ſorts of crimes. William the Conqueror and his deſcendants parcelled out the country in this manner, and bribed ſome parts of it by what they called Charters, to hold the other parts of it the better ſubjected to their will. This is the reaſon why ſo many of thoſe charters abound in Cornwall; the people were averſe to the government eſtabliſhed at the Conqueſt, and the towns were garriſoned and bribed to enſlave the country. All the old charters are the badges of this conqueſt, and it is from this ſource that the capriciouſneſs of elections ariſes.

The French conſtitution ſays, That the number of repreſentatives for any place ſhall be in a ratio to the number of taxable inhabitants or electors. What article will Mr. Burke place againſt this? The county of Yorkſhire, which contains near a million of ſouls, ſends two county members; and ſo does the county of Rutland, which contains not an hundredth part of that number. The town of old Sarum, which contains not three houſes, ſends two members; and the town of Mancheſter, which contains upwards of ſixty thouſand ſouls, is not admitted to ſend any. Is there any principle in theſe things? Is there any thing by which you can trace the marks of freedom, or diſcover thoſe of wiſdom? No wonder, then, Mr. Burke has declined the compariſon, and endeavoured to lead his readers from the point by a wild unſyſtematical diſplay of paradoxical rhapſodies.

The French conſtitution ſays, That the National Aſſembly ſhall be elected every two years.—What article will Mr. Burke place againſt this? Why, that the nation has no right at all in the caſe: that the government is perfectly arbitrary with reſpect to this point; and

and he can quote for his authority, the precedent of a former parliament.

The French conſtitution ſays, There ſhall be no game laws; that the farmer on whoſe lands wild game ſhall be found (for it is by the produce of his lands they are fed) ſhall have a right to what he can take: That there ſhall be no monopolies of any kind—that all trade ſhall be free, and every man free to follow any occupation by which he can procure an honeſt livelihood, and in any place, town or city throughout the nation.—What will Mr. Burke ſay to this? In England, game is made the property of thoſe at whoſe expence it is not fed; and with reſpect to monopolies, the country is cut up into monopolies. Every chartered town is an ariſtocratical monopoly in itſelf, and the qualification of electors proceeds out of thoſe chartered monopolies. Is this freedom? Is this what Mr. Burke means by a conſtitution?

In theſe chartered monopolies, a man coming from another part of the country, is hunted from them as if he were a foreign enemy. An Engliſhman is not free of his own country: every one of thoſe places preſents a barrier in his way, and tells him he is not a freeman—that he has no rights. Within theſe monopolies, are other monopolies. In a city, ſuch for inſtance as Bath, which contains between twenty and thirty thouſand inhabitants, the right of electing repreſentatives to parliament is monopoliſed by about thirty-one perſons. And within theſe monopolies are ſtill others. A man even of the ſame town, whoſe parents were not in circumſtances to give him an occupation, is debarred, in many caſes, from the natural right of acquiring one, be his genius or induſtry what it may.

Are theſe things examples to hold out to a country regenerating itſelf from ſlavery, like France?—Certainly they are not; and certain am I, that when the people of England come to reflect upon them, they will, like France, annihilate thoſe badges of ancient oppreſſion, thoſe traces of a conquered nation.—Had Mr. Burke poſſeſſed talents ſimilar to the author "On the Wealth of Nations," he would have comprehended all the parts which enter into, and, by aſſemblage, form a conſtitution. He would have reaſoned from minutiæ to magnitude. It is not from his prejudices only, but from the diſorderly caſt of his genius, that he is unfitted for the ſubject he writes upon. Even his genius is without a conſtitution. It is a genius at random, and not a genius conſtituted. But he muſt ſay ſomething—He has therefore mounted in the air like a balloon, to draw the eyes of the multitude from the ground they ſtand upon.

Much is to be learned from the French conſtitution. Conqueſt and tyranny tranſplanted themſelves with William the Conqueror from Normandy into England, and the country is yet diſfigured with the marks. May then the example of all France contribute to regenerate the freedom which a province of it deſtroyed!

The French conſtitution ſays, That to preſerve the national repreſentation from being corrupt, no member of the National Aſſembly ſhall be an officer of the government, a place-man, or a penſioner,—What will Mr. Burke place againſt this? I will

whiſper his anſwer: *Loaves* and *Fiſhes*. Ah! this government of loaves and fiſhes has more miſchief in it than people have yet reflected on. The National Aſſembly has made the diſcovery, and it holds out the example to the world. Had governments agreed to quarrel on purpoſe to fleece their countries by taxes, they could not have ſucceeded better than they have done.

Many things in the Engliſh government appear to me the reverſe of what they ought to be, and of what they are ſaid to be. The Parliament, imperfectly and capriciouſly elected as it is, is nevertheleſs *ſuppoſed* to hold the national purſe in *truſt* for the nation: but in the manner in which an Engliſh parliament is conſtructed, it is like a man being both mortgager and mortgagee; and in the caſe of miſapplication of truſt, it is the criminal ſitting in judgment upon himſelf. If thoſe who vote the ſupplies are the ſame perſons who receive the ſupplies when voted, and are to account for the expenditure of thoſe ſupplies to thoſe who voted them, it is *themſelves accountable to themſelves*, and the Comedy of Errors concludes with the Pantomine of HUSH. Neither the miniſterial party, nor the oppoſition, will touch upon this caſe. The national purſe is the common hack which each mounts upon. It is like what the country people call, "Ride and tie—You ride a little way, and then "I*."—They order theſe things better in France.

The French conſtitution ſays, That the right of war and peace is in the nation. Where elſe ſhould it reſide, but in thoſe who are to pay the expence?

In England, this right is ſaid to reſide in a *metaphor*, ſhewn at the Tower for ſixpence or a ſhilling a-piece: So are the lions; and it would be a ſtep nearer to reaſon to ſay it reſided in them, for any inanimate metaphor is no more than a hat or a cap. We can all ſee the abſurdity of worſhipping Aaron's molten calf, or Nebuchadnezzar's golden image; but why do men continue to practiſe themſelves the abſurdities they deſpiſe in others?

It may with reaſon be ſaid, that in the manner the Engliſh nation is repreſented, it ſignifies not where this right reſides, whether in the Crown, or in the parliament. War is the common harveſt of all thoſe who participate in the diviſion and expenditure of public money, in all countries. It is the art of *conquering at home*: the object of it is an increaſe of revenue; and as revenue cannot be increaſed without taxes, a pretence muſt be made for expenditures. In reviewing the hiſtory of the Engliſh Government, its wars and its taxes, a by-ſtander, not blinded by prejudice, nor warped by intereſt, would declare, that taxes were not raiſed to carry on wars, but that wars were raiſed to carry on taxes.

Mr. Burke, as a Member of the Houſe of Commons, is a part of the Engliſh Government; and though he profeſſes himſelf an

* It is a practice in ſome parts of the country, when two travellers have but one horſe, which like the national purſe will not carry double, that the one mounts and rides two or three miles a-head, and then ties the horſe to a gate, and walks on. When the ſecond traveller arrives, he takes the horſe, rides on, and paſſes his companion a mile or two, and ties again; and ſo on—*Ride and tie.*

enemy

enemy to war, he abuſes the French Conſtitution, which ſeeks to explode it. He holds up the Engliſh Government as a model in all its parts, to France; but he ſhould firſt know the remarks which the French make upon it. They contend, in favour of their own, that the portion of liberty enjoyed in England, is juſt enough to enſlave a country by, more productively than by deſpotiſm; and that as the real object of all deſpotiſm is revenue, a Government ſo formed obtains more than it could do either by direct deſpotiſm, or in a full ſtate of freedom, and is therefore, on the ground of intereſt, oppoſed to both. They account alſo for the readineſs which always appears in ſuch governments for engaging in wars, by remarking on the different motives which produce them. In deſpotic governments, wars are the effect of pride; but in thoſe governments in which they become the means of taxation, they acquire thereby a more permanent promptitude.

The French Conſtitution, therefore, to provide againſt both theſe evils, has taken away the power of declaring war from kings and miniſters, and placed the right where the expence muſt fall.

When the queſtion on the right of war and peace was agitating in the National Aſſembly, the people of England appeared to be much intereſted in the event, and highly to applaud the deciſion.—As a principle, it applies as much to one country as to another. William the conqueror, *as a conqueror*, held this power of war and peace in himſelf, and his deſcendants have ever ſince claimed it under him as a right.

Although Mr. Burke has aſſerted the right of the parliament at the Revolution to bind and controul the nation and poſterity for *ever*, he denies, at the ſame time, that the parliament or the nation had any right to alter what he calls the ſucceſſion of the crown, in any thing but in part, or by a ſort of modification. By his taking this ground, he throws the caſe back to the *Norman Conqueſt*; and by thus running a line of ſucceſſion ſpringing from William the Conqueror to the preſent day, he makes it neceſſary to enquire who and what William the Conqueror was, and where he came from; and into the origin, hiſtory, and nature of what are called prerogatives. Every thing muſt have had a beginning, and the fog of time and antiquity ſhould be penetrated to diſcover it. Let then Mr. Burke bring forward his William of Normandy, for it is to this origin that his argument goes. It alſo unfortunately happens, in running this line of ſucceſſion, that another line, parallel thereto, preſents itſelf, which is, that if the ſucceſſion runs in the line of the conqueſt, the nation runs in the line of being conquered, and it ought to reſcue itſelf from this reproach.

But it will perhaps be ſaid, that though the power of declaring war deſcends in the heritage of the conqueſt, it is held in check by the right of the parliament to with-hold the ſupplies. It will always happen, when a thing is originally wrong, that amendments do not make it right; and it often happens, that they do as much miſchief one way, as good the other: and ſuch is the caſe here; for if the one raſhly declares war as a matter of right, and the other peremptorily with-holds the ſupplies as a matter of right,

the remedy becomes as bad, or worſe than the diſeaſe. The one forces the nation to a combat, and the other ties its hands: but the more probable iſſue is, that the conteſt will end in a colluſion between the parties, and be made a ſcreen to both.

On this queſtion of war, three things are to be conſidered. Firſt, the right of declaring it: Secondly, the expence of ſupporting it: Thirdly, the mode of conducting it after it is declared. The French conſtitution places the *right* where the *expence* muſt fall, and this union can be only in the nation. The mode of conducting it after it is declared, it conſigns to the executive department.—Were this the caſe in all countries, we ſhould hear but little more of wars.

Before I proceed to conſider other parts of the French conſtitution, and by way of relieving the fatigue of argument, I will introduce an anecdote which I had from Dr. Franklin.——

While the doctor reſided in France as miniſter from America during the war, he had numerous propoſals made to him by projectors of every country and of every kind, who wiſhed to go to the land that floweth with milk and honey, America; and among the reſt, there was one who offered himſelf to be King. He introduced his propoſal to the Doctor by letter, which is now in the hands of M. Beaumarchais, of Paris—ſtating, firſt, that as the Americans had diſmiſſed or ſent away * their King, that they would want another. Secondly, that himſelf was a Norman. Thirdly, that he was of a more ancient family than the Dukes of Normandy, and of a more honourable deſcent, his line having never been baſtardized. Fourthly, that there was already a precedent in England, of Kings coming out of Normandy: and on theſe grounds he reſted his offer, *enjoining* that the Doctor would forward it to America. But as the Doctor neither did this, nor yet ſent him an anſwer, the projector wrote a ſecond letter; in which he did not, it is true, threaten to go over and conquer America, but only with great dignity propoſed, that if his offer was not accepted, an acknowledgment of about £30,000 might be made to him for his generoſity!——Now, as all arguments reſpecting ſucceſſion muſt neceſſarily connect that ſucceſſion with ſome beginning, Mr. Burke's arguments on this ſubject go to ſhew, that there is no Engliſh origin of kings, and that they are deſcendants of the Norman line in right of the Conqueſt. It may, therefore, be of ſervice to his doctrine to make this ſtory known, and to inform him, that in caſe of that natural extinction to which all mortality is ſubject, Kings may again be had from Normandy, on more reaſonable terms than William the Conqueror; and conſequently, that the good people of England, at the Revolution of 1688, *might have done much better*, had ſuch a generous Norman as *this* known *their* wants, and they had known *his*. The chivalry character which Mr. Burke ſo much admires, is certainly much eaſier to make a bargain with, than a *hard-dealing Dutchman*.——But, to return to the matters of the conſtitution—

* The word he uſed was *renvoyé*, diſmiſſed or ſent away.

The

The French conſtitution ſays, *There ſhall be no titles*; and of conſequence, all that claſs of equivocal generation, which in ſome countries is called "*ariſtocracy*," and in others "*nobility*," is done away, and the *peer* is exalted into MAN.

Titles are but nick-names, and every nick-name is a title. The thing is perfectly harmleſs in itſelf; but it marks a ſort of foppery in the human character, which degrades it. It reduces man into the diminutive of man in things which are great, and the counterfeit of woman in things which are little. It talks about its fine *blue ribbon* like a girl, and ſhews its new *garter* like a child. A certain writer of ſome antiquity, ſays, "When I was a child, I "thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away "childiſh things."

It is, properly, from the elevated mind of France, that the folly of titles has fallen. It has outgrown the baby-cloaths of *Count* and *Duke*, and breeched itſelf in manhood. France has not levelled; it has exalted. It has put down the dwarf, to ſet up the man. The punyiſm of a ſenſeleſs word like *Duke*, or *Count*, or *Earl*, has ceaſed to pleaſe. Even thoſe who poſſeſſed them have diſowned the gibberiſh, and as they outgrew the rickets, have deſpiſed the rattle. The genuine mind of man, thirſting for its native home, ſociety, contemns the gewgaws that ſeparate him from it. Titles are like circles drawn by the magician's wand, to contract the ſphere of man's felicity. He lives immured within the Baſtille of a word, and ſurveys at a diſtance the envied life of man.

Is it then any wonder that titles ſhould fall in France? Is it not a greater wonder they ſhould be kept up any-where? What are they? What is their worth, and "what is their amount?" When we think or ſpeak of a *Judge* or a *General*, we aſſociate with it the ideas of office and character; we think of gravity in the one, and bravery in the other: but when we uſe a word *merely as a title*, no ideas aſſociate with it. Through all the vocabulary of Adam, there is not ſuch an animal as a Duke or a Count; neither can we connect any certain idea with the words. Whether they mean ſtrength or weakneſs, wiſdom or folly, a child or a man, or the rider or the horſe, is all equivocal. What reſpect then can be paid to that which deſcribes nothing, and which means nothing? Imagination has given figure and character to centaurs, fatyrs, and down to all the fairy tribe; but titles baffle even the powers of fancy, and are a chimerical non-deſcript.

But this is not all.—If a whole country is diſpoſed to hold them in contempt, all their value is gone, and none will own them. It is common opinion only that makes them any thing, or nothing, or worſe than nothing. There is no occaſion to take titles away, for they take themſelves away when ſociety concurs to ridicule them. This ſpecies of imaginary conſequence has viſibly declined in every part of Europe, and it haſtens to its exit as the world of reaſon continues to riſe. There was a time when the loweſt claſs of what are called nobility was more thought of than the higheſt is now, and when a man in armour riding throughout Chriſtendom in queſt of adventures was more ſtared at than a modern Duke. The

world has ſeen this folly fall, and it has fallen by being laughed at, and the farce of titles will follow its fate.—The patriots of France have diſcovered in good time, that rank and dignity in ſociety muſt take a new ground. The old one has fallen through.—It muſt now take the ſubſtantial ground of character, inſtead of the chimerical ground of titles; and they have brought their titles to the altar, and made of them a burnt offering to Reaſon.

If no miſchief had annexed itſelf to the folly of titles, they would not have been worth a ſerious and formal deſtruction, ſuch as the National Aſſembly have decreed them: and this makes it neceſſary to enquire farther into the nature and character of ariſtocracy.

That, then, which is called ariſtocracy in ſome countries, and nobility in others, aroſe out of the governments founded upon conqueſt. It was originally a military order, for the purpoſe of ſupporting military government, (for ſuch were all governments founded in conqueſt); and to keep up a ſucceſſion of this order for the purpoſe for which it was eſtabliſhed, all the younger branches of thoſe families were diſinherited, and the law of *primogeniture*ſhip ſet up.

The nature and character of ariſtocracy ſhews itſelf to us in this law. It is a law againſt every law of nature, and Nature herſelf calls for its deſtruction. Eſtabliſh family juſtice, and ariſtocracy falls. By the ariſtocratical law of primogeniture*ſhip*, in a family of ſix children, five are expoſed. Ariſtocracy has never more than *one* child. The reſt are begotten to be devoured. They are thrown to the cannibal for prey, and the natural parent prepares the unnatural repaſt.

As every thing which is out of nature in man, affects, more or leſs, the intereſt of ſociety, ſo does this. All the children which the ariſtocracy diſowns (which are all, execept the eldeſt) are, in general, caſt like orphans on a pariſh, to be provided for by the public, but at a greater charge.—Unneceſſary offices and places in governments and courts are created at the expence of the public, to maintain them.

With what kind of parental reflections can the father or mother contemplate their younger offspring. By nature they are children, and by marriage they are heirs; but by ariſtocracy they are baſtards and orphans. They are the fleſh and blood of their parents in one line, and nothing akin to them in the other. To reſtore, therefore, parents to their children, and children to their parents—relations to each other, and man to ſociety—and to exterminate the monſter Ariſtocracy, root and branch—the French conſtitution has deſtroyed the law of PRIMOGENITURESHIP. Here then lies the monſter; and Mr. Burke, if he pleaſes, may write its epitaph.

Hitherto we have conſidered ariſtocracy chiefly in one point of view. We have now to conſider it in another. But whether we view it before or behind, or ſide-ways, or any way elſe, domeſtically or publicly, it is ſtill a monſter.

In France, ariſtocracy had one feature leſs in its countenance, than what it has in ſome other countries. It did not compoſe a body

body of hereditary legiſlators. It was not "*a corporation of ariſtocracy*," for ſuch I have heard M. de la Fayette deſcribe an Engliſh Houſe of Peers. Let us then examine the grounds upon which the French conſtitution has reſolved againſt having ſuch a Houſe in France.

Becauſe, in the firſt place, as is already mentioned, ariſtocracy is kept up by family tyranny and injuſtice.

Secondly, Becauſe there is an unnatural unfitneſs in an ariſtocracy to be legiſlators for a nation. Their ideas of *diſtributive juſtice* are corrupted at the very ſource. They begin life by trampling on all their younger brothers and ſiſters, and relations of every kind, and are taught and educated ſo to do. With what ideas of juſtice or honour can that man enter a houſe of legiſlation, who abſorbs in his own perſon the inheritance of a whole family of children, or doles out to them ſome pitiful portion with the inſolence of a gift?

Thirdly, Becauſe the idea of hereditary legiſlators is as inconſiſtent as that of hereditary judges, or hereditary juries; and as abſurd as an hereditary mathematician, or an hereditary wiſe man; and as ridiculous as an hereditary poet-laureat.

Fourthly, Becauſe a body of men holding themſelves accountable to nobody, ought not to be truſted by any body.

Fifthly, Becauſe it is continuing the uncivilized principle of governments founded in conqueſt, and the baſe idea of man having property in man, and governing him by perſonal right.

Sixthly, Becauſe ariſtocracy has a tendency to degenerate the human ſpecies.—By the univerſal œconomy of nature it is known, and by the inſtance of the Jews it is proved, that the human ſpecies has a tendency to degenerate, in any ſmall number of perſons, when ſeparated from the general ſtock of ſociety, and intermarrying conſtantly with each other. It defeats even its pretended end, and becomes in time the oppoſite of what is noble in man. Mr. Burke talks of nobility; let him ſhew what it is. The greateſt characters the world have known, have riſen on the democratic floor. Ariſtocracy has not been able to keep a proportionate pace with democracy. The artificial NOBLE ſhrinks into a dwarf before the NOBLE of Nature; and in the few inſtances of thoſe (for there are ſome in all countries) in whom nature, as by a miracle, has ſurvived in ariſtocracy, THOSE MEN DESPISE IT.——But it is time to proceed to a new ſubject.

The French conſtitution has reformed the condition of the clergy. It has raiſed the income of the lower and middle claſſes, and taken from the higher. None is now leſs than twelve hundred livres (fifty pounds ſterling), nor any higher than about two or three thouſand pounds. What will Mr. Burke place againſt this? Hear what he ſays.

He ſays, "That the people of England can ſee without pain or "grudging, an archbiſhop precede a duke; they can ſee a biſhop "of Durham, or a biſhop of Wincheſter, in poſſeſſion of £,10,000 "a-year; and cannot ſee why it is in worſe hands than eſtates to "the like amount in the hands of this earl or that 'ſquire." And Mr. Burke offers this as an example to France.

As to the first part, whether the archbishop precedes the duke, or the duke the bishop, it is, I believe, to the people in general, somewhat like *Sternhold* and *Hopkins*, or *Hopkins* and *Sternhold*; you may put which you please first: and as I confess that I do not understand the merits of this case, I will not contend it with Mr. Burke.

But with respect to the latter, I have something to say.—Mr. Burke has not put the case right.—The comparison is out of order, by being put between the bishop and the earl or the 'squire. It ought to be put between the bishop and the curate, and then it will stand thus:—*The people of England can see without pain or grudging, a bishop of Durham, or a bishop of Winchester, in possession of ten thousand pounds a-year, and a curate on thirty or forty pounds a-year, or less.*—No, Sir, they certainly do not see those things without great pain or grudging. It is a case that applies itself to every man's sense of justice, and is one among many that calls aloud for constitution.

In France, the cry of "*the church! the church!*" was repeated as often as in Mr. Burke's book, and as loudly as when the dissenter's bill was before the English parliament; but the generality of the French clergy were not to be deceived by this cry any longer. They knew, that whatever the pretence might be, it was themselves who were one of the principal objects of it. It was the cry of the high beneficed clergy, to prevent any regulation of income taking place between those of ten thousand pounds a-year and the parish priest. They, therefore, joined their case to those of every other oppressed class of men, and by this union obtained redress.

The French constitution has abolished tythes, that source of perpetual discontent between the tythe-holder and the parishioner. When land is held on tythe, it is in the condition of an estate held between two parties; the one receiving one-tenth, and the other nine-tenths of the produce: and, consequently, on principles of equity, if the estate can be improved, and made to produce by that improvement double or treble what it did before, or in any other ratio, the expence of such improvement ought to be borne in like proportion between the parties who are to share the produce. But this is not the case in tythes; the farmer bears the whole expence, and the tythe-holder takes a tenth of the improvement, in addition to the original tenth, and by this means gets the value of two-tenths, instead of one. This is another case that calls for a constitution.

The French constitution hath abolished or renounced *Toleration*, and *Intolerance* also, and hath established UNIVERSAL RIGHT OF CONSCIENCE.

Toleration is not the *opposite* of Intolerance, but is the *counterfeit* of it. Both are despotisms. The one assumes to itself the right of withholding Liberty of Conscience, and the other of granting it. The one is the pope armed with fire and faggot, and the other is the pope selling or granting indulgencies. The former is church and state, and the latter is church and traffic.

But

But Toleration may be viewed in a much stronger light. Man worships not himself, but his Maker; and the liberty of conscience which he claims, is not for the service of himself, but of his God. In this case, therefore, we must necessarily have the associated idea of two beings; the *mortal* who renders the worship, and the IMMORTAL BEING who is worshipped. Toleration, therefore, places itself, not between man and man, nor between church and church, nor between one denomination of religion and another, but between God and man; between the being who worships, and the BEING who is worshipped; and by the same act of assumed authority by which it tolerates man to pay his worship, it presumptuously and blasphemously sets itself up to tolerate the Almighty to receive it.

Were a Bill brought into any parliament, intitled "AN ACT "to tolerate or grant liberty to the Almighty to receive the "worship of a Jew or a Turk," or "to prohibit the Almighty "from receiving it," all men would startle, and call it blasphemy. There would be an uproar. The presumption of toleration in religious matters would then present itself unmasked: but the presumption is not the less because the name of "Man" only appears to those laws, for the associated idea of the *worshipper* and the *worshipped* cannot be separated.—Who, then, art thou, vain dust and ashes! by whatever name thou art called, whether a King, a Bishop, a Church, or a State, a Parliament, or any thing else, that obtrudest thine insignificance between the soul of man and its Maker? Mind thine own concerns. If he believes not as thou believest, it is a proof that thou believest not as he believeth, and there is no earthly power can determine between you.

With respect to what are called denominations of religion, if every one is left to judge of its own religion, there is no such thing as a religion that is wrong; but if they are to judge of each others religion, there is no such thing as a religion that is right; and therefore, all the world is right, or all the world is wrong. But with respect to religion itself, without regard to names, and as directing itself from the universal family of mankind to the Divine object of all adoration, *it is man bringing to his Maker the fruits of his heart;* and though those fruits may differ from each other like the fruits of the earth, the grateful tribute of every one is accepted.

A Bishop of Durham, or a Bishop of Winchester, or the Archbishop who heads the Dukes, will not refuse a tythe-sheaf of wheat, because it is not a cock of hay; nor a cock of hay, because it is not a sheaf of wheat; nor a pig, because it is neither one nor the other: but these same persons, under the figure of an established church, will not permit their Maker to receive the varied tythes of man's devotion.

One of the continual choruses of Mr. Burke's book is, "Church "and State." He does not mean some one particular church, or some one particular state, but any church and state; and he uses the term as a general figure to hold forth the political doctrine of always uniting the church with the state in every country, and he censures the National Assembly for not having done this in France. —Let us bestow a few thoughts on this subject.

All religions are in their nature kind and benign, and united with principles of morality. They could not have made proſelites at firſt, by profeſſing any thing that was vicious, cruel, perſecuting, or immoral. Like every thing elſe, they had their beginning; and they proceeded by perſuaſion, exhortation, and example. How then is it that they loſe their native mildneſs, and become moroſe and intolerant?

It proceeds from the connection which Mr Burke recommends. By engendering the church with the ſtate, a ſort of mule-animal, capable only of deſtroying, and not of breeding up, is produced, called *The Church eſtabliſhed by Law*. It is a ſtranger, even from its birth, to any parent mother on which it is begotten, and whom in time it kicks out and deſtroys.

The inquiſition in Spain does not proceed from the religion originally profeſſed, but from this mule animal, engendered between the church and the ſtate. The burnings in Smithfield proceeded from the ſame heterogeneous production; and it was the regeneration of this ſtrange animal in England afterwards, that renewed rancour and irreligion among the inhabitants, and that drove the people called Quakers and Diſſenters to America. Perſecution is not an original feature in *any* religion; but it is always the ſtrongly marked feature of all law-religions, or religions eſtabliſhed by law. Take away the law-eſtabliſhment, and every religion reaſſumes its original benignity. In America, a Catholic Prieſt is a good citizen, a good character, and a good neighbour; an Epiſcopalian Miniſter is of the ſame deſcription: and this proceeds, independently of the men, from there being no law-eſtabliſhment in America.

If alſo we view this matter in a temporal ſenſe, we ſhall ſee the ill effects it has had on the proſperity of nations. The union of church and ſtate has impoveriſhed Spain. The revoking the edict of Nantz drove the ſilk manufacture from France into England; and church and ſtate are now driving the cotton manufacture from England to America and France. Let then Mr. Burke continue to preach his antipolitical doctrine of Church and State. It will do ſome good. The National Aſſembly will not follow his advice, but will benefit by his folly. It was by obſerving the ill effects of it in England, that America has been warned againſt it; and it is by experiencing them in France, that the National Aſſembly have aboliſhed it, and, like America, have eſtabliſhed UNIVERSAL RIGHT OF CONSCIENCE, AND UNIVERSAL RIGHT OF CITIZENSHIP.*

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* When in any country we ſee extraordinary circumſtances taking place, they naturally lead any man who has a talent for obſervation and inveſtigation, to enquire into the cauſes. The manufactures of Mancheſter, Birmingham, and Sheffield, are the principal manufactures in England. From whence did this ariſe? A little obſervation will explain the caſe. The principal, and the generality of the inhabitants of thoſe places, are not of what is called in England, *the church eſtabliſhed by law*; and they, or their fathers, (for it is within but a few years), withdrew from the perſecution of the chartered towns, where teſt-laws more particularly operate, and eſtabliſhed a ſort of aſylum for themſelves in thoſe places. It was the only aſylum that then offered, for the reſt of Europe was worſe.—But the caſe is now changing. France and America bid all comers welcome, and initiate them into all the rights of citizenſhip. Policy and intereſt, therefore, will, but perhaps too late, dictate in England, what reaſon and juſtice could not. Thoſe manufactures are withdrawing, and are ariſing in other places. There is now erecting at Paſſey, three miles from Paris, a large cotton-mill, and ſeveral are already erected in America. Soon after the rejecting the Bill for repealing the teſt-law, one of the richeſt manufacturers in England ſaid in my hearing, "England, Sir, is not a country for a diſſenter to live in—we muſt go to France." Theſe are truths, and it is doing juſtice to both parties to tell them. It is chiefly the diſſenters who have carried Engliſh manufactures to the height they are now at, and the ſame men have it in their power to carry them away; and though thoſe manufactures will afterwards continue to be made in thoſe places, the foreign market will be loſt. There are frequently appearing in the London Gazette, extracts from certain acts to prevent machines and perſons, as far as they can extend to perſons, from going out of the country. It appears from theſe, that the ill effects of the teſt-laws and church-eſtabliſhment begin to be much ſuſpected; but the remedy of force can never ſupply the remedy of reaſon. In the progreſs of leſs than a century, all the unrepreſented part of England, of all denominations, which is at leaſt a hundred times the moſt numerous, may begin to feel the neceſſity of a conſtitution, and then all thoſe matters will come regularly before them.

I will here ceaſe the compariſon with reſpect to the principles of the French conſtitution, and conclude this part of the ſubject with a few obſervations on the organization of the formal parts of the French and Engliſh governments.

The executive power in each country is in the hands of a perſon ſtiled the King; but the French conſtitution diſtinguiſhes between the King and the Sovereign: It conſiders the ſtation of King as official, and places Sovereignty in the nation.

The repreſentatives of the nation, who compoſe the National Aſſembly, and who are the legiſlative power, originate in and from the people by election, as an inherent right in the people.—In England it is otherwiſe; and this ariſes from the original eſtabliſhment of what is called its monarchy; for, as by the conqueſt all the rights of the people or the nation were abſorbed into the hands of the Conqueror, and who added the title of King to that of Conqueror, thoſe ſame matters which in France are now held as rights in the people, or in the nation, are held in England as grants from what is called the Crown. The Parliament in England, in both its branches, was erected by patents from the deſcendants of the Conqueror. The Houſe of Commons did not originate as a matter of right in the people to delegate or elect, but as a grant or boon.

By the French Conſtitution, the Nation is always named before the King. The third article of the Declaration of rights ſays, "*The nation is eſſentially the ſource* (or fountain) *of all ſovereignty.*" Mr Burke argues, that, in England, a King is the fountain—that he is the fountain of all honour. But as this idea is evidently deſcended from the Conqueſt, I ſhall make no other remark upon it, than that it is the nature of conqueſt to turn every thing upſide down; and as Mr. Burke will not be refuſed the privilege of ſpeak-

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ing twice, and as there are but two parts in the figure, the *fountain* and the *ſpout*, he will be right the ſecond time.

The French conſtitution puts the legiſlative before the executive; the Law before the King; *La Loi, Le Roi.* This alſo is in the natural order of things; becauſe laws muſt have exiſtence, before they can have execution.

A King in France does not in addreſſing himſelf to the National Aſſembly, ſay, "My aſſembly," ſimilar to the phraſe uſed in England of *my* "Parliament;" neither can he uſe it conſiſtently with the conſtitution, nor could it be admitted. There may be propriety in the uſe of it in England, becauſe, as is before mentioned, both Houſes of Parliament originated from what is called the Crown by patent or boon—and not from the inherent rights of the people, as the National Aſſembly does in France, and whoſe name deſignates its origin.

The Preſident of the National Aſſembly does not aſk the King *to grant to the Aſſembly liberty of ſpeech*, as is the caſe with the Engliſh Houſe of Commons. The conſtitutional dignity of the National Aſſembly cannot debate itſelf. Speech is, in the firſt place, one of the natural rights of man always retained; and with reſpect to the National Aſſembly, the uſe of it is their *duty*, and the nation is their *authority*. They were elected by the greateſt body of men exerciſing the right of election the European world ever ſaw. They ſprung not from the filth of rotten boroughs, nor are they the vaſſal repreſentatives of ariſtocratical ones. Feeling the proper dignity of their character, they ſupport it. Their parliamentary language, whether for or againſt a queſtion, is free, bold, and manly, and extends to all the parts and circumſtances of the caſe. If any matter or ſubject reſpecting the executive department, or the perſon who preſides in it (the King), comes before them, it is debated on with the ſpirit of men, and the language of gentlemen; and their anſwer, or their addreſs, is returned in the ſame ſtile. They ſtand not aloof with the gaping vacuity of vulgar ignorance, nor bend with the cringe of ſycophantic inſignificance. The graceful pride of truth knows no extremes, and preſerves, in every latitude of life, the right-angled character of man.

Let us now look to the other ſide of the queſtion.—In the addreſſes of the Engliſh Parliaments to their Kings, we ſee neither the intrepid ſpirit of the old Parliaments of France, nor the ſerene dignity of the preſent National Aſſembly; neither do we ſee in them any thing of the ſtile of Engliſh manners, which border ſomewhat on bluntneſs. Since then they are neither of foreign extraction, nor naturally of Engliſh production, their origin muſt be ſought for elſewhere, and that origin is the Norman Conqueſt. They are evidently of the vaſſalage claſs of manners, and emphatically mark the proſtrate diſtance that exiſts in no other condition of men than between the conqueror and the conquered. That this vaſſalage idea and ſtile of ſpeaking was not got rid of even at the Revolution of 1688, is evident from the declaration of Parliament to William and Mary, in theſe words: "We do moſt humbly and "faithfully *ſubmit* ourſelves, our heirs and poſterities, for ever."

Submiſſion

Submiſſion is wholly a vaſſalage term, repugnant to the dignity of Freedom, and an echo of the language uſed at the Conqueſt.

As the eſtimation of all things is by compariſon, the Revolution of 1688, however from circumſtances it may have been exalted beyond its value, will find its level. It is already on the wane, eclipſed by the enlarging orb of reaſon, and the luminous revolutions of America and France. In leſs than another century, it will go, as well as Mr. Burke's labours, "to the family vault of all the Capulets." Mankind will then ſcarcely believe that a country calling itſelf free, would ſend to Holland for a man, and clothe him with power, on purpoſe to put themſelves in fear of him, and give him almoſt a million ſterling a-year for leave to *ſubmit* themſelves and their poſterity, like bond-men and bond-women, for ever.

But there is a truth that ought to be made known: I have had the opportunity of ſeeing it; which is, *that, notwithſtanding appearances, there is not any deſcription of men that deſpiſe monarchy ſo much as courtiers.* But they well know, that if it were ſeen by others, as it is ſeen by them, the juggle could not be kept up. They are in the condition of men who get their living by a ſhow, and to whom the folly of that ſhow is ſo familiar that they ridicule it; but were the audience to be made as wiſe in this reſpect as themſelves, there would be an end to the ſhow and the profits with it. The difference between a republican and a courtier with reſpect to monarchy, is, that the one oppoſes monarchy, believing it to be ſomething; and the other laughs at it, knowing it to be nothing.

As I uſed ſometimes to correſpond with Mr. Burke, believing him then to be a man of ſounder principles than his book ſhews him to be, I wrote to him laſt winter from Paris, and gave him an account how proſperouſly matters were going on. Among other ſubjects in that letter, I referred to the happy ſituation the National Aſſembly were placed in; that they had taken a ground on which their moral duty and their political intereſt were united. They have not to hold out a language which they do not themſelves believe, for the fraudulent purpoſe of making others believe it. Their ſtation requires no artifice to ſupport it, and can only be maintained by enlightening mankind. It is not their intereſt to cheriſh ignorance, but to diſpel it. They are not in the caſe of a miniſterial or an oppoſition party in England, who, though they are oppoſed, are ſtill united to keep up the common myſtery. The National Aſſembly muſt throw open a magazine of light. It muſt ſhew man the proper character of man; and the nearer it can bring him to that ſtandard, the ſtronger the National Aſſembly becomes.

In contemplating the French conſtitution, we ſee in it a rational order of things. The principles harmoniſe with the forms, and both with their origin. It may perhaps be ſaid as an excuſe for bad forms, that they are nothing more than forms; but this is a miſtake. Forms grow out of principles, and operate to continue the principles they grow from. It is impoſſible to practiſe a bad

form

form on any thing but a bad principle. It cannot be ingrafted on a good one; and wherever the forms in any government are bad, it is a certain indication that the principles are bad alſo.

I will here finally cloſe this ſubject. I began it by remarking that Mr. Burke had *voluntarily* declined going into a compariſon of the Engliſh and French conſtitutions. He apologiſes (in page 241) for not doing it, by ſaying that he had not time. Mr. Burke's book was upwards of eight months in hand, and is extended to a volume of three hundred and ſixty-ſix pages. As his omiſſion does injury to his cauſe, his apology makes it worſe; and men on the Engliſh ſide the water will begin to conſider, whether there is not ſome radical defect in what is called the Engliſh conſtitution, that made it neceſſary for Mr. Burke to ſuppreſs the compariſon, to avoid bringing it into view.

As Mr. Burke has not written on conſtitutions, ſo neither has he written on the French revolution. He gives no account of its commencement or its progreſs. He only expreſſes his wonder. "It looks," ſays he, "to me, as if I were in a great criſis, not "of the affairs of France alone, but of all Europe, perhaps of "more than Europe. All circumſtances taken together, the "French Revolution is the moſt aſtoniſhing that has hitherto hap-"pened in the world."

As wiſe men are aſtoniſhed at fooliſh things, and other people at wiſe ones, I know not on which ground to account for Mr. Burke's aſtoniſhment; but certain it is, that he does not underſtand the French revolution. It has apparently burſt forth like a creation from a chaos, but it is no more than the conſequence of a mental revolution priorily exiſting in France. The mind of the nation had changed before-hand, and the new order of things has naturally followed the new order of thoughts.—I will here, as conciſely as I can, trace out the growth of the French revolution, and mark the circumſtances that have contributed to produce it.

The deſpotiſm of Louis XIV. united with the gaiety of his Court, and the gaudy oſtentation of his character, had ſo humbled, and at the ſame time ſo faſcinated the mind of France, that the people appeared to have loſt all ſenſe of their own dignity, in contemplating that of their Grand Monarch: and the whole reign of Louis XV. remarkable only for weakneſs and effeminacy, made no other alteration than that of ſpreading a ſort of lethargy over the nation, from which it ſhewed no diſpoſition to riſe.

The only ſigns which appeared of the ſpirit of Liberty during thoſe periods, are to be found in the writings of the French philoſophers. Monteſquieu, preſident of the Parliament of Bourdeaux, went as far as a writer under a deſpotic government could well proceed; and being obliged to divide himſelf between principle and prudence, his mind often appears under a veil, and we ought to give him credit for more than he has expreſſed.

Voltaire, who was both the flatterer and the ſatiriſt of deſpotiſm, took another line. His forte lay in expoſing and ridiculing the ſuperſtitions which prieſt-craft united with ſtate-craft had interwoven

woven with governments. It was not from the purity of his principles, or his love of mankind, (for ſatire and philanthropy are not naturally concordant), but from his ſtrong capacity of ſeeing folly in its true ſhape, and his irreſiſtible propenſity to expoſe it, that he made thoſe attacks. They were however as formidable as if the motives had been virtuous; and he merits the thanks, rather than the eſteem of mankind.

On the contrary, we find in the writings of Rouſſeau, and the Abbé Raynal, a lovelineſs of ſentiment in favour of Liberty, that excites reſpect, and elevates the human faculties; but having raiſed this animation, they do not direct its operations, and leave the mind in love with an object, without deſcribing the means of poſſeſſing it.

The writings of Queſnay, Turgot, and the friends of thoſe authors, are of the ſerious kind; but they laboured under the ſame diſadvantage with Monteſquieu: their writings abound with moral maxims of government, but are rather directed to œconomiſe and reform the adminiſtration of the government, than the government itſelf.

But all thoſe writings and many others had their weight; and by the different manner in which they treated the ſubject of government, Monteſquieu by his judgment and knowledge of laws, Voltaire by his wit, Rouſſeau and Raynal by their animation, and Queſnay and Turgot by their moral maxims and ſyſtems of œconomy, readers of every claſs met with ſomething to their taſte, and a ſpirit of political enquiry began to diffuſe itſelf through the nation at the time the diſpute between England and the then colonies of America broke out.

In the war which France afterwards engaged in, it is very well known that the nation appeared to be before-hand with the French miniſtry. Each of them had its view: but thoſe views were directed to different objects; the one ſought liberty, and the other retaliation on England. The French officers and ſoldiers who after this went to America, were eventually placed in the ſchool of Freedom, and learned the practice as well as the principles of it by heart.

As it was impoſſible to ſeparate the military events which took place in America from the principles of the American revolution, the publication of thoſe events in France neceſſarily connected themſelves with the principles which produced them. Many of the facts were in themſelves principles; ſuch as the declaration of American independence, and the treaty of alliance between France and America, which recogniſed the natural right of man, and juſtified reſiſtance to oppreſſion.

The then Miniſter of France, Count Vergennes, was not the friend of America; and it is both juſtice and gratitude to ſay, that it was the Queen of France who gave the cauſe of America a faſhion at the French Court. Count Vergennes was the perſonal and ſocial friend of Dr. Franklin; and the Doctor had obtained, by his ſenſible gracefulneſs, a ſort of influence over him; but with reſpect to principles, Count Vergennes was a deſpot.

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The ſituation of Dr. Franklin as Miniſter from America to France, ſhould be taken into the chain of circumſtances. The diplomatic character is of itſelf the narroweſt ſphere of ſociety that man can act in. It forbids intercourſe by a reciprocity of ſuſpicion; and a diplomatic is a ſort of unconnected atom, continually repelling and repelled. But this was not the caſe with Dr. Franklin. He was not the diplomatic of a Court, but of MAN. His character as a philoſopher had been long eſtabliſhed, and his circle of Society in France was univerſal.

Count Vergennes reſiſted for a conſiderable time the publication in France of the American conſtitutions, tranſlated into the French language; but even in this he was obliged to give way to public opinion, and a ſort of propriety in admitting to appear what he had undertaken to defend. The American conſtitutions were to liberty, what a grammar is to language: they define its parts of ſpeech, and practically conſtruct them into ſyntax.

The peculiar ſituation of the then Marquis de la Fayette is another link in the great chain. He ſerved in America as an American officer under a commiſſion of Congreſs, and by the univerſality of his acquaintance, was in cloſe friendſhip with the civil government of America, as well as with the military line. He ſpoke the language of the country, entered into the diſcuſſions on the principles of government, and was always a welcome friend at any election.

When the war cloſed, a vaſt reinforcement to the cauſe of Liberty ſpread itſelf over France, by the return of the French officers and ſoldiers. A knowledge of the practice was then joined to the theory; and all that was wanting to give it real exiſtence, was opportunity. Man cannot, properly ſpeaking, make circumſtances for his purpoſe, but he always has it in his power to improve them when they occur; and this was the caſe in France.

M. Neckar was diſplaced in May 1781; and by the ill management of the finances afterwards, and particularly during the extravagant adminiſtration of M. Calonne, the revenue of France, which was nearly twenty-four millions ſterling *per* year, was become unequal to the expenditure, not becauſe the revenue had decreaſed, but becauſe the expences had increaſed; and this was the circumſtance which the nation laid hold of to bring forward a revolution. The Engliſh Miniſter, Mr. Pitt, has frequently alluded to the ſtate of the French finances in his budgets, without underſtanding the ſubject. Had the French Parliaments been as ready to regiſter edicts for new taxes, as an Engliſh Parliament is to grant them, there had been no derangement in the finances, nor yet any revolution; but this will better explain itſelf as I proceed.

It will be neceſſary here to ſhew how taxes were formerly raiſed in France. The King, or rather the Court or Miniſtry acting under the uſe of that name, framed the edicts for taxes at their own diſcretion, and ſent them to the Parliaments to be regiſtered; for until they were regiſtered by the Parliaments, they were not operative. Diſputes had long exiſted between the Court and the Parliaments with reſpect to the extent of the Parliament's authority on

on this head. The Court inſiſted that the authority of Parliaments went no farther than to remonſtrate or ſhew reaſons againſt the tax, reſerving to itſelf the right of determining whether the reaſons were well or ill-founded; and in conſequence thereof, either to withdraw the edict as a matter of choice, or to *order* it to be enregiſtered as a matter of authority. The Parliaments on their part inſiſted, that they had not only a right to remonſtrate, but to reject; and on this ground they were always ſupported by the Nation.

But, to return to the order of my narrative—M. Calonne wanted money; and as he knew the ſturdy diſpoſition of the Parliaments with reſpect to new taxes, he ingeniouſly ſought either to approach them by a more gentle means than that of direct authority, or to get over their heads by a manœuvre: and, for this purpoſe, he revived the project of aſſembling a body of men from the ſeveral provinces, under the ſtile of an "Aſſembly of the Notables," or Men of Note, who met in 1787, and who were either to recommend taxes to the Parliaments, or to act as a Parliament themſelves. An Aſſembly under this name had been called in 1617.

As we are to view this as the firſt practical ſtep towards the revolution, it will be proper to enter into ſome particulars reſpecting it. The Aſſembly of the Notables has in ſome places been miſtaken for the States-General, but was wholly a different body; the States-General being always by election. The perſons who compoſed the Aſſembly of the Notables were all nominated by the King, and conſiſted of one hundred and forty members. But as M. Calonne could not depend upon a majority of this Aſſembly in his favour, he very ingeniouſly arranged them in ſuch a manner as to make forty-four a majority of one hundred and forty: to effect this, he diſpoſed of them into ſeven ſeparate committees, of twenty members each. Every general queſtion was to be decided, not by a majority of perſons, but by a majority of committees; and as eleven votes would make a majority in a committee, and four committees a majority of ſeven, M. Calonne had good reaſon to conclude, that as forty-four would determine any general queſtion, he could not be out-voted. But all his plans deceived him, and in the event became his overthrow.

The then Marquis de la Fayette was placed in the ſecond committee, of which Count d'Artois was preſident: and as money-matters was the object, it naturally brought into view every circumſtance connected with it. M. de la Fayette made a verbal charge againſt Calonne, for ſelling crown-lands to the amount of two millions of livres, in a manner that appeared to be unknown to the King. The Count D'Artois (as if to intimidate, for the Baſtille was then in being) aſked the Marquis, if he would render the charge in writing? He replied, that he would.—The Count D'Artois did not demand it, but brought a meſſage from the King to that purport. M. de la Fayette then delivered in his charge in writing, to be given to the King, undertaking to ſupport it. No farther proceedings were had upon this affair; but M. Calonne was ſoon after diſmiſſed by the King, and ſet off to England.

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As M. de la Fayette, from the experience of what he had ſeen in America, was better acquainted with the ſcience of civil government than the generality of the members who compoſed the Aſſembly of the Notables could then be, the brunt of the buſineſs fell conſiderably to his ſhare. The plan of thoſe who had a conſtitution in view, was to contend with the Court on the ground of taxes, and ſome of them openly profeſſed their object. Diſputes frequently aroſe between Count D'Artois and M. de la Fayette, upon various ſubjects. With reſpect to the arrears already incurred, the latter propoſed to remedy them, by accommodating the expences to the revenue, inſtead of the revenue to the expences; and as objects of reform, he propoſed to aboliſh the Baſtille, and all the State-priſons throughout the nation, (the keeping of which was attended with great expence), and to ſuppreſs *Lettres de Cachet:* But thoſe matters were not then much attended to; and with reſpect to *Lettres de Cachet, a majority of the Nobles appeared to be in favour of them.*

On the ſubject of ſupplying the Treaſury by new taxes, the Aſſembly declined taking the matter on themſelves, concurring in the opinion that they had not authority. In a debate on this ſubject, M. de la Fayette ſaid, that raiſing money by taxes could only be done by a National Aſſembly, freely elected by the people, and acting as their repreſentatives. Do you mean, ſaid the Count D'Artois, the *States General?* M. de la Fayette replied, that he did. Will you, ſaid the Count D'Artois, ſign what you ſay, to be given to the King? The other replied, that he not only would do this, but that he would go farther, and ſay, that the effectual mode would be, for the King to agree to the eſtabliſhment of a Conſtitution.

As one of the plans had thus failed, that of getting the Aſſembly to act as a Parliament, the other came into view, that of recommending. On this ſubject, the Aſſembly agreed to recommend two new taxes to be enregiſtered by the Parliament: The one a ſtamp-tax, and the other a territorial tax, or ſort of land-tax. The two have been eſtimated at about five millions ſterling *per ann.* We have now to turn our attention to the Parliaments, on whom the buſineſs was again devolving.

The Archbiſhop of Thouloufe (ſince Archbiſhop of Sens, and now a Cardinal) was appointed to the adminiſtration of the finances, ſoon after the diſmiſſion of Calonne. He was alſo made Prime Miniſter, an office that did not always exiſt in France. When this office did not exiſt, the Chief of each of the principal departments tranſacted buſineſs immediately with the King; but when a Prime Miniſter was appointed, they did buſineſs only with him. The Archbiſhop arrived to more State-authority than any Miniſter ſince the Duke de Choiſeul, and the nation was ſtrongly diſpoſed in his favour; but by a line of conduct ſcarcely to be accounted for, he perverted every opportunity, turned out a deſpot, and ſunk into diſgrace, and a Cardinal.

The Aſſembly of the Notables having broken up, the new Miniſter ſent the edicts for the two new taxes recommended by the Aſſembly

Aſſembly to the Parliaments, to be enregiſtered. They of courſe came firſt before the parliament of Paris, who returned for anſwer, *That with ſuch a revenue as the Nation then ſupported, the name of taxes ought not to be mentioned, but for the purpoſe of reducing them;* and threw both the edicts out *.

On this refuſal, the Parliament was ordered to Verſailles, where, in the uſual form, the King held, what under the old government was called, a Bed of Juſtice; and the two edicts were enregiſtered in preſence of the Parliament, by an order of State, in the manner mentioned in page 42. On this, the Parliament immediately returned to Paris, renewed their ſeſſion in form, and ordered the enregiſtering to be ſtruck out, declaring that every thing done at Verſailles was illegal. All the members of the Parliament were then ſerved with Lettres de Cachet, and exiled to Trois; but as they continued as inflexible in exile as before, and as vengeance did not ſupply the place of taxes, they were after a ſhort time recalled to Paris.

The edicts were again tendered to them, and the Count D'Artois undertook to act as repreſentative of the King. For this purpoſe, he came from Verſailles to Paris, in a train of proceſſion; and the Parliament were aſſembled to receive him. But ſhow and parade had loſt their influence in France; and whatever ideas of importance he might ſet off with, he had to return with thoſe of mortification and diſappointment. On alighting from his carriage to aſcend the ſteps of the Parliament Houſe, the crowd (which was numerouſly collected) threw out trite expreſſions, ſaying, This is "Monſieur D'Artois, who wants more of our money to ſpend." The marked diſapprobation which he ſaw, impreſſed him with apprehenſions; and the word *Aux armes!* (*To arms!*) was given out by the officer of the guard who attended him. It was ſo loudly vociferated, that it echoed through the avenues of the Houſe, and produced a temporary confuſion: I was then ſtanding in one of the apartments through which he had to paſs, and could not avoid reflecting how wretched was the condition of a diſreſpected man.

He endeavoured to impreſs the Parliament by great words and opened his authority by ſaying, "The King, our Lord and Maſter." The Parliament received him very coolly, and with ther uſual determination not to regiſter the taxes: and in this manner the interview ended.

After this a new ſubject took place: In the various debates and conteſts which aroſe between the Court and the Parliaments on the ſubject of taxes, the Parliament of Paris at laſt declared, that although it had been cuſtomary for Parliaments to enregiſter edicts for taxes as a matter of convenience, the right belonged only to the *States-General*; and that, therefore, the Parliament could no longer with propriety continue to debate on what it had not authority to act. The King after this came to Paris, and held a meeting with the Parliament, in which he continued from ten in the morn-

* When the Engliſh Miniſter, Mr. Pitt, mentions the French finances again in the Engliſh Parliament, it would be well he noticed this as an example.

ing till about ſix in the evening; and, in a manner that appeared to proceed from him, as if unconſulted upon with the cabinet or the miniſtry, gave his word to the Parliament, that the States-General ſhould be convened.

But after this another ſcene aroſe, on a ground different from all the former. The miniſter and the cabinet were averſe to calling the States-General: They well knew, that if the States-General were aſſembled, themſelves muſt fall; and as the King had not mentioned *any time*, they hit on a project calculated to elude, without appearing to oppoſe.

For this purpoſe, the Court ſet about making a ſort of conſtitution itſelf: It was principally the work of M. Lamoignon, Keeper of the Seals, who afterwards ſhot himſelf. This new arrangement conſiſted in eſtabliſhing a body under the name of a *Cour pléniere*, or full Court, in which were inveſted all the powers that the government might have occaſion to make uſe of. The perſons compoſing this Court were to be nominated by the King; the contended right of taxation was given up on the part of the King, and a new criminal code of laws, and law proceedings, was ſubſtituted in the room of the former. The thing, in many points, contained better principles than thoſe upon which the government had hitherto been adminiſtered: but with reſpect to the *Cour pléniere*, it was no other than a medium through which deſpotiſm was to paſs, without appearing to act directly from itſelf.

The Cabinet had high expectations from their new contrivance. The perſons who were to compoſe the *Cour pléniere*, were already nominated; and as it was neceſſary to carry a fair appearance, many of the beſt characters in the nation were appointed among the number. It was to commence on the 8th of May 1788: But an oppoſition aroſe to it, on two grounds—the one as to principle, the other as to form.

On the ground of Principle it was contended, That government had not a right to alter itſelf; and that if the practice was once admitted, it would grow into a principle, and be made a precedent for any future alterations the government might wiſh to eſtabliſh: That the right of altering the government was a national right, and not a right of government.—And on the ground of Form, it was contended, That the *Cour pléniere* was nothing more than a larger Cabinet.

The then Duke de la Rochefoucault, Luxembourg, De Noailles, and many others, refuſed to accept the nomination, and ſtrenuouſly oppoſed the whole plan. When the edict for eſtabliſhing this new Court was ſent to the Parliaments to be enregiſtered, and put into execution, they reſiſted alſo. The Parliament of Paris not only refuſed, but denied the authority; and the conteſt renewed itſelf between the Parliament and the Cabinet more ſtrongly than ever. While the Parliament were ſitting in debate on this ſubject, the Miniſtry ordered a regiment of ſoldiers to ſurround the Houſe, and form a blockade. The Members ſent out for beds and proviſion, and lived as in a beſieged citadel: and as this had no effect, the commanding officer was ordered to enter the Parliament houſe and

ſeize them; which he did, and ſome of the principal members were ſhut up in different priſons. About the ſame time a deputation of perſons arrived from the province of Brittany, to remonſtrate againſt the eſtabliſhment of the *Cour pléniere*; and thoſe the Archbiſhop ſent to the Baſtille. But the ſpirit of the Nation was not to be overcome; and it was ſo fully ſenſible of the ſtrong ground it had taken, that of withholding taxes, that it contented itſelf with keeping up a ſort of quiet reſiſtance, which effectually overthrew all the plans at that time formed againſt it. The project of the *Cour pléniere* was at laſt obliged to be given up, and the Prime Miniſter not long afterwards followed its fate; and M. Neckar was recalled into office.

The attempt to eſtabliſh the *Cour pléniere* had an effect upon the Nation which itſelf did not perceive. It was a ſort of new form of government, that inſenſibly ſerved to put the old one out of ſight, and to unhinge it from the ſuperſtitious authority of antiquity. It was government dethroning government; and the old one, by attempting to make a new one, made a chaſm.

The failure of this ſcheme renewed the ſubject of convening the States-General; and this gave riſe to a new ſeries of politics. There was no ſettled form for convening the States-General: all that it poſitively meant, was a deputation from what was then called the Clergy, the Nobleſſe, and the Commons; but their numbers, or their proportions, had not been always the ſame. They had been convened only on extraordinary occaſions, the laſt of which was in 1614; their number were then in equal proportions, and they voted by orders.

It could not well eſcape the ſagacity of M. Neckar, that the mode of 1614 would anſwer neither the purpoſe of the then government, nor of the nation. As matters were at that time circumſtanced, it would have been too contentious to agree upon any thing. The debates would have been endleſs upon privileges and exemptions, in which neither the wants of the government, nor the wiſhes of the nation for a conſtitution, would have been attended to. But as he did not chuſe to take the deciſion upon himſelf, he ſummoned again the *Aſſembly of the Notables*, and referred it to them. This body was in general intereſted in the deciſion, being chiefly of the ariſtocracy and the high-paid clergy; and they decided in favour of the mode of 1614. This deciſion was againſt the ſenſe of the Nation, and alſo againſt the wiſhes of the Court; for the ariſtocracy oppoſed itſelf to both, and contended for privileges independent of either. The ſubject was then taken up by the Parliament, who recommended, that the number of the Commons ſhould be equal to the other two; and that they ſhould all ſit in one houſe, and vote in one body. The number finally determined on was twelve hundred: ſix hundred to be choſen by the Commons, (and this was leſs than their proportion ought to have been when their worth and conſequence is conſidered on a national ſcale) three hundred by the Clergy, and three hundred by the Ariſtocracy; but with reſpect to the mode of aſſembling themſelves, whe-

ther together or apart, or the manner in which they ſhould vote, thoſe matters were referred*.

The election that followed, was not a conteſted election, but an animated one. The candidates were not men, but principles. Societies were formed in Paris, and committees of correſpondence and communication eſtabliſhed throughout the nation, for the purpoſe of enlightening the people, and explaining to them the principles of civil government; and ſo orderly was the election conducted, that it did not give riſe even to the rumour of tumult.

The States-General were to meet at Verſailles in April 1789, but did not aſſemble till May. They ſituated themſelves in three ſeparate chambers, or rather the Clergy and the Ariſtocracy withdrew each into a ſeparate chamber. The majority of the ariſtocracy claimed what they called the privilege of voting as a ſeparate body, and of giving their conſent or their negative in that manner; and many of the biſhops and the high-beneficed clergy claimed the ſame privilege on the part of their Order.

The *Tiers Etat* (as they were then called) diſowned any knowledge of artificial Orders and artificial privileges; and they were not only reſolute on this point, but ſomewhat diſdainful. They began to conſider ariſtocracy as a kind of fungus growing out of the corruption of ſociety, that could not be admitted even as a branch of it; and from the diſpoſition the ariſtocracy had ſhewn by upholding Lettres de Cachet, and in ſundry other inſtances, it was manifeſt that no conſtitution could be formed by admitting men in any other character than as National Men.

After various altercations on this head, the Tiers Etat or Commons (as they were then called) declared themſelves (on a motion made for that purpoſe by the Abbé Sieyes) "THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATION; *and that the two Orders could be*

* Mr. Burke, (and I muſt take the liberty of telling him he is very unacquainted with French affairs), ſpeaking upon this ſubject, ſays, "The firſt "thing that ſtruck me in the calling the States-General, was a great departure "from the ancient courſe;"—and he ſoon after ſays, "From the moment I "read the liſt, I ſaw diſtinctly, and very nearly as it has happened, all that was "to follow."—Mr. Burke certainly did not ſee all that was to follow. I endeavoured to impreſs him, as well before as after the States-General met, that there would be a *revolution*; but was not able to make him ſee it, neither would he believe it. How then he could diſtinctly ſee all the parts, when the whole was out of ſight, is beyond my comprehenſion. And with reſpect to the "departure from the ancient courſe," beſides the natural weakneſs of the remark, it ſhews that he is unacquainted with circumſtances. The departure was neceſſary, from the experience had upon it, that the ancient courſe was a bad one. The States-General of 1614 were called at the commencement of the civil war in the minority of Louis XIII; but by the claſs of arranging them by orders, they increaſed the confuſion they were called to compoſe. The Author of *L'Intrigue du Cabinet* (Intrigue of the Cabinet), who wrote before any revolution was thought of in France, ſpeaking of the States-General of 1614, ſays, "They "held the public in ſuſpence five months; and by the queſtions agitated there"in, and the heat with which they were put, it appears that the Great (*les "grands*) thought more to ſatisfy their *particular* paſſions, than to procure the "good of the nation; and the whole time paſſed away in altercations, ceremo"nies, and parade." L'Intrigue du Cabinet, vol. i. p. 329.

"*conſidered*

"*conſidered but as deputies of corporations, and could only have a* "*deliberative voice when they aſſembled in a national character* "*with the national repreſentatives.*" This proceeding extinguiſhed the ſtile of *Etats Généraux*, or States-General, and erected it into the ſtile it now bears, that of L'Aſſemblée Nationale, or National Aſſembly.

This motion was not made in a precipitate manner: It was the reſult of cool deliberation, and concerted between the national repreſentatives and the patriotic members of the two chambers, who ſaw into the folly, miſchief, and injuſtice of artificial privileged diſtinctions. It was become evident, that no conſtitution, worthy of being called by that name, could be eſtabliſhed on any thing leſs than a national ground. The ariſtocracy had hitherto oppoſed the deſpotiſm of the Court, and affected the language of patriotiſm; but it oppoſed it as its rival (as the Engliſh Barons oppoſed King John), and it now oppoſed the nation from the ſame motives.

On carrying this motion, the national repreſentatives, as had been concerted, ſent an invitation to the two chambers, to unite with them in a national character, and proceed to buſineſs. A majority of the clergy, chiefly of the pariſh prieſts, withdrew from the clerical chamber, and joined the nation; and forty-five from the other chamber joined in like manner. There is a ſort of ſecret hiſtory belonging to this laſt circumſtance, which is neceſſary to its explanation: It was not judged prudent that all the patriotic members of the chamber ſtiling itſelf the Nobles, ſhould quit it at once; and in conſequence of this arrangement, they drew off by degrees, always leaving ſome, as well to reaſon the caſe, as to watch the ſuſpected. In a little time, the numbers increaſed from forty-five to eighty, and ſoon after to a greater number; which, with a majority of the clergy, and the whole of the national repreſentatives, put the mal-contents in a very diminutive condition.

The King, who, very different from the general claſs called by that name, is a man of a good heart, ſhewed himſelf diſpoſed to recommend an union of the three chambers, on the ground the National Aſſembly had taken; but the mal-contents exerted themſelves to prevent it and began now to have another project in view. Their numbers conſiſted of a majority of the ariſtocratical chamber, and a minority of the clerical chamber, chiefly of biſhops and high-beneficed clergy; and theſe men were determined to put every thing to iſſue, as well by ſtrength as by ſtratagem. They had no objection to a conſtitution; but it muſt be ſuch a one as themſelves ſhould dictate, and ſuited to their own views and particular ſituations. On the other hand, the Nation diſowned knowing any thing of them but as citizens, and was determined to ſhut out all ſuch up-ſtart pretenſions. The more ariſtocracy appeared, the more it was deſpiſed; there was a viſible imbecility and want of intellects in the majority, a ſort of *je ne ſais quoi*, that while it affected to be more than citizen, was leſs than man. It loſt ground from contempt more than from hatred; and was rather jeered at

as an aſs, than dreaded as a lion. This is the general character of ariſtocracy, or what are called Nobles or Nobility, or rather No-ability, in all countries.

The plan of the mal-contents conſiſted now of two things; either to deliberate and vote by chambers, (or orders), more eſpecially on all queſtions reſpecting a conſtitution, (by which the ariſtocratical chamber would have had a negative on any article of the conſtitution); or, in caſe they could not accompliſh this object, to overthrow the National Aſſembly entirely.

To effect one or other of theſe objects, they began now to cultivate a friendſhip with the deſpotiſm they had hitherto attempted to rival, and the Count D'Artois became their chief. The King (who has ſince declared himſelf deceived into their meaſures) held, according to the old form, *a Bed of Juſtice*, in which he accorded to the deliberation and vote *par tête* (by head) upon ſeveral ſubjects; but reſerved the deliberation and vote upon all queſtions reſpecting a conſtitution, to the three chambers ſeparately. This declaration of the King was made againſt the advice of M. Neckar, who now begar to perceive that he was growing out of faſhion at Court, and that another miniſter was in contemplation.

As the form of ſitting in ſeparate chambers was yet apparently kept up, though eſſentially deſtroyed, the national repreſentatives, immediately after this declaration of the King, reſorted to their own chambers to conſult on a proteſt againſt it; and the minority of the chamber (calling itſelf the Nobles), who had joined the national cauſe, retired to a private houſe to conſult in like manner. The mal-contents had by this time concerted their meaſures with the Court, which Count D'Artois undertook to conduct; and as they ſaw from the diſcontent which the declaration excited, and the oppoſition making againſt it, that they could not obtain a controul over the intended conſtitution by a ſeparate vote, they prepared themſelves for their final object— that of conſpiring againſt the National Aſſembly, and overthrowing it.

The next morning, the door of the chamber of the National Aſſembly was ſhut againſt them, and guarded by troops; and the Members were refuſed admittance. On this, they withdrew to a tennis-ground in the neighbourhood of Verſailles, as the moſt convenient place they could find, and, after renewing their ſeſſion, took an oath never to ſeparate from each other, under any circumſtance whatever, death excepted, until they had eſtabliſhed a conſtitution. As the experiment of ſhutting up the houſe had no other effect than that of producing a cloſer connection in the Members, it was opened again the next day, and the public buſineſs recommenced in the uſual place.

We now are to have in view the forming of the new Miniſtry, which was to accompliſh the overthrow of the National Aſſembly. But as force would be neceſſary, orders were iſſued to aſſemble thirty thouſand troops, the command of which was given to Broglio, one of the new-intended Miniſtry, who was recalled from the country for this purpoſe. But as ſome management was neceſſary

neceſſary to keep this plan concealed till the moment it ſhould be ready for execution, it is to this policy that a declaration made by Count D'Artois muſt be attributed, and which is here proper to be introduced.

It could not but occur, that while the mal-contents continued to reſort to their chambers ſeparate from the National Aſſembly, more jealouſy would be excited than if they were mixed with it, and that the plot might be ſuſpected. But as they had taken their ground, and now wanted a pretence for quitting it, it was neceſſary that one ſhould be deviſed. This was effectually accompliſhed by a declaration made by Count D'Artois, "*That if they "took not a part in the National Aſſembly, the life of the King would "be endangered:*" on which they quitted their chambers, and mixed with the Aſſembly in one body.

At the time this declaration was made, it was generally treated as a piece of abſurdity in Count D'Artois, and calculated merely to relieve the outſtanding Members of the two chambers from the diminutive ſituation they were put in; and if nothing more had followed, this concluſion would have been good. But as things beſt explain themſelves by their events, this apparent union was only a cover to the machinations which were ſecretly going on; and the declaration accommodated itſelf to anſwer that purpoſe. In a little time the National Aſſembly found itſelf ſurrounded by troops, and thouſands more were daily arriving. On this a very ſtrong declaration was made by the National Aſſembly to the King, remonſtrating on the impropriety of the meaſure, and demanding the reaſon. The King, who was not in the ſecret of this buſineſs, as himſelf afterwards declared, gave ſubſtantially for anſwer, that he had no other object in view than to preſerve the public tranquillity, which appeared to be much diſturbed.

But in a few days from this time, the plot unravelled itſelf. M. Neckar and the Miniſtry were diſplaced, and a new one formed, of the enemies of the Revolution; and Broglio, with between twenty-five and thirty thouſand foreign troops, was arrived to ſupport them. The maſk was now thrown off, and matters were come to a criſis. The event was, that in the ſpace of three days, the new Miniſtry and their abettors found it prudent to fly the nation; the Baſtille was taken, and Broglio and his foreign troops diſperſed; as is already related in the former part of this work.

There are ſome curious circumſtances in the hiſtory of this ſhort-lived miniſtry, and this ſhort-lived attempt at a counter revolution. The palace of Verſailles, where the Court was ſitting, was not more than four hundred yards diſtant from the hall where the National Aſſembly was ſitting. The two places were at this moment like the ſeparate head-quarters of two combatant armies; yet the Court was as perfectly ignorant of the information which had arrived from Paris to the National Aſſembly, as if it had reſided at an hundred miles diſtance. The then Marquis de la Fayette, who, (as has already been mentioned) was choſen to preſide in the National Aſſembly on this particular occaſion, named,

by order of the Aſſembly, three ſucceſſive deputations to the King, on the day, and up to the evening on which the Baſtille was taken, to inform and confer with him on the ſtate of affairs: but the miniſtry, who knew not ſo much as that it was attacked, precluded all communication, and were ſolacing themſelves how dextrouſly they had ſucceeded; but in a few hours the accounts arrived ſo thick and faſt, that they had to ſtart from their deſks and run. Some ſet off in one diſguiſe, and ſome in another, and none in their own character. Their anxiety now was to outride the news leſt they ſhould be ſtopt, which, though it flew faſt, flew not ſo faſt as themſelves.

It is worth remarking, that the National Aſſembly neither purſued thoſe fugitive conſpirators, nor took any notice of them, nor ſought to retaliate in any ſhape whatever. Occupied with eſtabliſhing a conſtitution founded on the Rights of Man and the Authority of the People, the only authority on which Government has a right to exiſt in any country, the National Aſſembly felt none of thoſe mean paſſions which mark the character of impertinent governments, founding themſelves on their own authority, or on the abſurdity of hereditary ſucceſſion. It is the faculty of the human mind to become what it contemplates, and to act in uniſon with its object.

The conſpiracy being thus diſperſed, one of the firſt works of the National Aſſembly, inſtead of vindictive proclamations, as has been the caſe with other governments, publiſhed a Declaration of the Rights of Man, as the baſis on which the new conſtitution was to be built, and which is here ſubjoined:

DECLA-

DECLARATION

OF THE

RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS,

By the National Aſſembly of France.

" THE Repreſentatives of the people of FRANCE, formed into a NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, conſidering that ignorance, neglect, or contempt of human rights, are the ſole cauſes of public misfortunes and corruptions of Government, have reſolved to ſet forth, in a ſolemn declaration, theſe natural, impreſcriptible, and unalienable rights: that this declaration being conſtantly preſent to the minds of the members of the body ſocial, they may be ever kept attentive to their rights and their duties: that the acts of the legiſlative and executive powers of Government, being capable of being every moment compared with the end of political inſtitutions, may be more reſpected: and alſo, that the future claims of the citizens, being directed by ſimple and inconteſtible principles, may always tend to the maintenance of the Conſtitution, and the general happineſs.

" For theſe reaſons, the NATIONAL ASSEMBLY doth recognize and declare, in the preſence of the Supreme Being, and with the hope of his bleſſing and favour, the following *ſacred* rights of men and of citizens:

' I. *Men are born, and always continue, free, and equal in reſpect* ' *of their rights. Civil diſtinctions, therefore, can be founded only* ' *on public utility.*

' II. *The end of all political aſſociations, is, the preſervation of the* ' *natural and impreſcriptible rights of man; and theſe rights are* ' *liberty, property, ſecurity, and reſiſtance of oppreſſion.*

' III. *The nation is eſſentially the ſource of all ſovereignty; nor* ' *can any* INDIVIDUAL, *or* ANY BODY OF MEN, *be entitled to* ' *any authority which is not expreſly derived from it.*

' IV. Political Liberty conſiſts in the power of doing whatever ' does not injure another. The exerciſe of the natural rights of ' every man, has no other limits than thoſe which are neceſſary to ' ſecure to every *other* man the free exerciſe of the ſame rights; ' and theſe limits are determinable only by the law.

' V. The law ought to prohibit only actions hurtful to ſociety. ' What is not prohibited by the law, ſhould not be hindered; nor ' ſhould any one be compelled to that which the law does not ' require.

' VI. The law is an expreſſion of the will of the community. ' All citizens have a right to concur, either perſonally, or by their ' repreſentatives, in its formation. It ſhould be the ſame to all, ' whether it protects or puniſhes; and *all being equal in its ſight,* ' *are equally eligible to all honours, places, and employments, according*

'to their *different abilities, without any other diſtinction than that created by their virtues and talents.*

'VII. No man ſhould be accuſed, arreſted, or held in confinement, except in caſes determined by the law, and according to the forms which it has preſcribed. All who promote, ſolicit, execute, or cauſe to be executed, arbitrary orders, ought to be puniſhed; and every citizen called upon, or apprehended by virtue of the law, ought immediately to obey, and renders himſelf culpable by reſiſtance.

'VIII. The law ought to impoſe no other penalties but ſuch as are abſolutely and evidently neceſſary: and no one ought to be puniſhed, but in virtue of a law promulgated before the offence, and legally applied.

'IX. Every man being preſumed innocent till he has been convicted, whenever his detention becomes indiſpenſible, all rigour to him, more than is neceſſary to ſecure his perſon, ought to be provided againſt by the law.

'X. No man ought to be moleſted on account of his opinions, not even on account of his *religious* opinions, provided his avowal of them does not diſturb the public order eſtabliſhed by the law.

'XI. The unreſtrained communication of thoughts and opinions being one of the moſt precious rights of man, every citizen may ſpeak, write, and publiſh freely, provided he is reſponſible for the abuſe of this liberty in caſes determined by the law.

'XII. A public force being neceſſary to give ſecurity to the rights of men and of citizens, that force is inſtituted for the benefit of the community, and not for the particular benefit of the perſons with whom it is entruſted.

'XIII. A common contribution being neceſſary for the ſupport of the public force, and for defraying the other expences of government, it ought to be divided equally among the members of the community, according to their abilities.

'XIV Every citizen has a right, either by himſelf or his repreſentative, to a free voice in determining the neceſſity of public contributions, the appropriation of them, and their amount, mode of aſſeſſment, and duration.

'XV. Every community has a right to demand of all its agents, an account of their conduct.

'XVI. Every community in which a ſeparation of powers and a ſecurity of rights is not provided for, wants a conſtitution.

'XVII. The right to property being inviolable and ſacred, no one ought to be deprived of it, except in caſes of evident public neceſſity, legally aſcertained, and on condition of a previous juſt indemnity."

OBSER-

OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.

THE three firſt articles comprehend in general terms, the whole of a Declaration of Rights: All the ſucceeding articles either originate from them, or follow as elucidations. The 4th, 5th, and 6th, define more particularly what is only generally expreſſed in the 1ſt, 2d, and 3d.

The 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th articles, are declaratory of *principles* upon which laws ſhall be conſtructed, conformable to *rights* already declared. But it is queſtioned by ſome very good people in France, as well as in other countries, whether the 10th article ſufficiently guarantees the right it is intended to accord with: beſides which, it takes off from the divine dignity of religion, and weakens its operative force upon the mind, to make it a ſubject of human laws. It then preſents itſelf to Man, like light intercepted by a cloudy medium, in which the ſource of it is obſcured from his ſight, and he ſees nothing to reverence in the duſky ray*.

The remaining articles, beginning with the twelfth, are ſubſtantially contained in the principles of the preceding articles; but, in the particular ſituation in which France then was, having to undo what was wrong, as well as to ſet up what was right, it was proper to be more particular than what in another condition of things would be neceſſary.

While the Declaration of Rights was before the National Aſſembly, ſome of its members remarked, that if a Declaration of Rights was publiſhed, it ſhould be accompanied by a Declaration of Duties. The obſervation diſcovered a mind that reflected, and it only erred by not reflecting far enough. A Declaration of

* There is a ſingle idea, which, if it ſtrikes rightly upon the mind either in a legal or a religious ſenſe, will prevent any man, or any body of men, or any government, from going wrong on the ſubject of Religion; which is, that before any human inſtitutions of government were known in the world, there exiſted, if I may ſo expreſs it, a compact between God and Man, from the beginning of time; and that as the relation and condition which man in his *individual perſon* ſtands in towards his Maker, cannot be changed, or any-ways altered by any human laws or human authority, that religious devotion, which is a part of this compact, cannot ſo much as be made a ſubject of human laws; and that all laws muſt conform themſelves to this prior exiſting compact, and not aſſume to make the compact conform to the laws, which, beſides being human, are ſubſequent thereto. The firſt act of man, when he looked around and ſaw himſelf a creature which he did not make, and a world furniſhed for his reception, muſt have been devotion, and devotion muſt ever continue ſacred to every individual man, *as it appears right to him*; and governments do miſchief by interfering.

Rights is, by reciprocity, a Declaration of Duties alſo. Whatever is my right as a man, is alſo the right of another; and it becomes my duty to guarantee, as well as to poſſeſs.

The three firſt articles are the baſis of Liberty, as well individual as national; nor can any country be called free, whoſe government does not take its beginning from the principles they contain, and continue to preſerve them pure; and the whole of the Declaration of Rights is of more value to the world, and will do more good, than all the laws and ſtatutes that have yet been promulgated.

In the declaratory exordium which prefaces the Declaration of Rights, we ſee the ſolemn and majeſtic ſpectacle of a Nation opening its commiſſion, under the auſpices of its Creator, to eſtabliſh a Government; a ſcene ſo new, and ſo tranſcendantly unequalled by any thing in the European world, that the name of a Revolution is diminutive of its character, and it riſes into a Regeneration of man. What are the preſent Governments of Europe, but a ſcene of iniquity and oppreſſion? What is that of England? Do not its own inhabitants ſay, It is a market where every man has his price, and where corruption is common traffic, at the expence of a deluded people? No wonder, then, that the French Revolution is traduced. Had it confined itſelf merely to the deſtruction of flagrant deſpotiſm, perhaps Mr. Burke and ſome others had been ſilent. Their cry now is, "It is gone too far:" that is, it has gone too far for them. It ſtares corruption in the face, and the venal tribe are all alarmed. Their fear diſcovers itſelf in their outrage, and they are but publiſhing the groans of a wounded vice. But from ſuch oppoſition, the French Revolution, inſtead of ſuffering, receives an homage. The more it is ſtruck, the more ſparks it will emit; and the fear is, it will not be ſtruck enough. It has nothing to dread from attacks: Truth has given it an eſtabliſhment; and Time will record it with a name as laſting as his own.

Having now traced the progreſs of the French Revolution through moſt of its principal ſtages, from its commencement, to the taking of the Baſtille, and its eſtabliſhment by the Declaration of Rights, I will cloſe the ſubject with the energetic apoſtrophe of M. de la Fayett—*May this great monument, raiſed to Liberty, ſerve as a leſſon to the oppreſſor, and an example to the oppreſſed!* *

* See page 6 of this work.—N. B. Since the taking of the Baſtille, the occurrences have been publiſhed: but the matters recorded in this narrative, are prior to that period; and ſome of them, as may be eaſily ſeen, can be but very little known.

MISCEL-

MISCELLANEOUS CHAPTER.

TO prevent interrupting the argument in the preceding part of this work, or the narrative that follows it, I reſerved ſome obſervations to be thrown together into a Miſcellaneous Chapter: by which variety might not be cenſured for confuſion. Mr. Burke's Book is *all* Miſcellany. His intention was to make an attack on the French Revolution; but inſtead of proceeding with an orderly arrangement, he has ſtormed it with a mob of ideas tumbling over and deſtroying one another.

But this confuſion and contradiction in Mr. Burke's Book is eaſily accounted for.—When a man in a long cauſe attempts to ſteer his courſe by any thing elſe than ſome polar truth or principle, he is ſure to be loſt. It is beyond the compaſs of his capacity to keep all the parts of an argument together, and make them unite in one iſſue, by any other means than having this guide always in view. Neither memory nor invention will ſupply the want of it. The former fails him, and the latter betrays him.

Notwithſtanding the nonſenſe, for it deſerves no better name, that Mr Burke has aſſerted about hereditary rights, and hereditary ſucceſſion, and that a Nation has not a right to form a Government for itſelf; it happened to fall in his way to give ſome account of what Government is. "*Government*, ſays he, *is a contrivance of human wiſdom.*"

Admitting that Government is a contrivance of human *wiſdom*, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that hereditary ſucceſſion, and hereditary rights (as they are called), can make no part of it, becauſe it is impoſſible to make wiſdom hereditary; and on the other hand, *that* cannot be a wiſe contrivance, which in its operation may commit the government of a nation to the wiſdom of an idiot. The ground which Mr. Burke now takes, is fatal to every part of his cauſe. The argument changes from hereditary rights to hereditary wiſdom; and the queſtion is, Who is the wiſeſt man? He muſt now ſhew that every one in the line of hereditary ſucceſſion was a Solomon, or his title is not good to be a king.—What a ſtroke has Mr. Burke now made! To uſe a ſailor's phraſe, he has *ſwabbed the deck*, and ſcarcely left a name legible in the liſt of Kings; and he has mowed down and thinned the Houſe of Peers, with a ſcythe as formidable as Death and Time.

But Mr. Burke appears to have been aware of this retort; and he has taken care to guard againſt it, by making government to be not only a *contrivance* of human wiſdom, but a *monopoly* of wiſdom. He puts the nation as fools on one ſide, and places his government of wiſdom, all wiſe men of Gotham, on the other ſide; and he then proclaims, and ſays, that "*Men have a* RIGHT *that their* WANTS *ſhould be provided for by this wiſdom.*" Having thus made proclamation, he next proceeds to explain to them what their *wants* are, and alſo what their *rights* are. In this he has ſucceeded dextrouſly, for he makes their wants to be a *want* of wiſ-

dom; but as this is but cold comfort, he then informs them, that they have a *right* (not to any of the wiſdom) but to be governed by it: and in order to impreſs them with a ſolemn reverence for this monopoly-government of wiſdom, and of its vaſt capacity for all purpoſes, poſſible or impoſſible, right or wrong, he proceeds with aſtrological myſterious importance, to tell to them its powers, in theſe words—"The Rights of men in government are their ad- "vantages; and theſe are often in balances between differences of "good; and in compromiſes ſometimes between *good* and *evil*, "and ſometimes between *evil* and *evil*. Political reaſon is a *com-* "*puting principle*; adding—ſubtracting—multiplying—and divid- "ing, morally, and not metaphyſically or mathematically, true "moral demonſtrations."

As the wondering audience, whom Mr. Burke ſuppoſes himſelf talking to, may not underſtand all this learned jargon, I will undertake to be its interpreter. The meaning then, good people, of all this, is, *That government is governed by no principle whatever; that it can make evil good, or good evil, juſt as it pleaſes. In ſhort, that goverment is arbitrary power.*

But there are ſome things which Mr. Burke has forgotten. *Firſt*, He has not ſhewn where the wiſdom originally came from: and *ſecondly*, he has not ſhewn by what authority it firſt began to act. In the manner he introduces the matter, it is either government ſtealing wiſdom, or wiſdom ſtealing government. It is without an origin, and its powers without authority. In ſhort, it is uſurpation.

Whether it be from a ſenſe of ſhame, or from a conſciouſneſs of ſome radical defect in a government neceſſary to be kept out of ſight, or from both, or from any other cauſe, I undertake not to determine; but ſo it is, that a monarchical reaſoner never traces government to its ſource, or from its ſource. It is one of the *ſhibboleths* by which he may be known. A thouſand years hence, thoſe who ſhall live in America or in France, will look back with contemplative pride on the origin of their governments, and ſay, *This was the work of our glorious anceſtors!* But what can a monarchical talker ſay? What has he to exult in? Alas! he has nothing. A certain ſomething forbids him to look back to a beginning, leſt ſome robber or ſome Robin Hood ſhould riſe from the long obſcurity of time, and ſay, *I am the origin!* Hard as Mr. Burke laboured the Regency Bill and Hereditary Succeſſion two years ago, and much as he dived for precedents, he ſtill had not boldneſs enough to bring up William of Normandy, and ſay, *There is the head of the liſt! there is the fountain of honour!* the ſon of a proſtitute, and the plunderer of the Engliſh nation.

The opinions of men with reſpect to government, are changing faſt in all countries. The revolutions of America and France have thrown a beam of light over the world, which reaches into man. The enormous expence of governments have provoked people to think, by making them feel: and when once the veil begins to rend, it admits not of repair. Ignorance is of a peculiar nature: once diſpelled, and it is impoſſible to re-eſtabliſh it. It is not

not originally a thing of itſelf, but is only the abſence of knowledge; and though man may be *kept* ignorant, he cannot be *made* ignorant. The mind, in diſcovering truth, acts in the ſame manner as it acts through the eye in diſcovering objects; when once any object has been ſeen, it is impoſſible to put the mind back to the ſame condition it was in before it ſaw it. Thoſe who talk of a counter revolution in France, ſhew how little they underſtand of man. There does not exiſt in the compaſs of language, an arrangement of words to expreſs ſo much as the means of effecting a counter revolution. The means muſt be an obliteration of knowledge; and it has never yet been diſcovered, how to make man *unknow* his knowledge, or *unthink* his thoughts.

Mr. Burke is labouring in vain to ſtop the progreſs of knowledge; and it comes with the worſe grace from him, as there is a certain tranſaction known in the city, which renders him ſuſpected of being a penſioner in a fictitious name. This may account for ſome ſtrange doctrine he has advanced in his book, which, though he points it at the Revolution Society, is effectually directed againſt the whole Nation.

"The King of England," ſays he, "holds *his* Crown (for it "does not belong to the Nation, according to Mr. Burke) in *con-* "*tempt* of the choice of the Revolution Society, who have not a "ſingle vote for a King among them either *individually* or *collec-* "*tively*; and his Majeſty's heirs, each in their time and order, "will come to the Crown *with the ſame contempt* of their choice, "with which his Majeſty has ſucceeded to that which he now "wears."

As to who is King in England or elſewhere, or whether there is any King at all, or whether the people chuſe a Cherokee Chief, or a Heſſian Huſſar for a King, it is not a matter that I trouble myſelf about—be that to themſelves; but with reſpect to the doctrine, ſo far as it relates to the Rights of Men and Nations, it is as abominable as any thing ever uttered in the moſt enſlaved country under heaven. Whether it ſounds worſe to my ear, by not being accuſtomed to hear ſuch deſpotiſm, than what it does to the ear of another perſon, I am not ſo well a judge of; but of its abominable principle I am at no loſs to judge.

It is not the Revolution Society that Mr. Burke means; it is the Nation, as well in its *original*, as in its *repreſentative* character; and he has taken care to make himſelf underſtood, by ſaying that they have not a vote either *collectively* or *individually*. The Revolution Society is compoſed of citizens of all denominations, and of members of both the Houſes of Parliament; and conſequently, if there is not a right to a vote in any of the characters, there can be no right to any, either in the nation, or in its parliament. This ought to be a caution to every country, how it imports foreign families to be kings. It is ſomewhat curious to obſerve, that although the people of England have been in the habit of talking about kings, it is always a Foreign Houſe of kings; hating Foreigners, yet governed by them.—It is now the Houſe of Brunſwick, one of the petty tribes of Germany.

It has hitherto been the practice of the Engliſh Parliaments, to regulate what was called the ſucceſſion, (taking it for granted, that the Nation then continued to accord to the form of annexing a monarchical branch to its government; for without this, the Parliament could not have had authority to have ſent either to Holland or to Hanover, or to impoſe a King upon the Nation againſt its will.) And this muſt be the utmoſt limit to which Parliament can go upon the caſe; but the right of the Nation goes to the *whole* caſe, becauſe it has the right of changing its *whole* form of government. The right of a Parliament is only a right in truſt, a right by delegation, and that but from a very ſmall part of the Nation; and one of its Houſes has not even this. But the right of the Nation is an original right, as univerſal as taxation. The Nation is the paymaſter of every thing, and every thing muſt conform to its general will.

I remember taking notice of a ſpeech in what is called the Engliſh Houſe of Peers, by the then Earl of Shelburne, and I think it was at the time he was Miniſter, which is applicable to this caſe. I do not directly charge my memory with every particular; but the words and the purport, as nearly as I remember, were theſe: *That the form of a Government was a matter wholly at the will of a Nation, at all times: that if it choſe a monarchical form, it had a right to have it ſo; and if it afterwards choſe to be a Republic, it had a right to be a Republic, and to ſay to a King, 'We have no longer any occaſion for you.'*

When Mr. Burke ſays that "His Majeſty's heirs and ſucceſſors, "each in their time and order, will come to the crown with the "*ſame contempt* of their choice with which His Majeſty has ſuc- "ceeded to that he wears," it is ſaying too much even to the humbleſt individual in the country; part of whoſe daily labour goes towards making up the million ſterling a year, which the country gives the perſon it ſtiles a King. Government with inſolence, is deſpotiſm; but when contempt is added, it becomes worſe; and to pay for contempt, is the exceſs of ſlavery. This ſpecies of government comes from Germany; and reminds me of what one of the Brunſwick ſoldiers told me, who was taken priſoner by the Americans in the late war. "Ah!" ſaid he, "America is a fine "free country, it is worth the people's fighting for; I know the "difference by knowing my own: in my country, if the prince "ſays, Eat ſtraw, we eat ſtraw." God help that country, thought I, be it England or elſewhere, whoſe liberties are to be protected by German principles of government, and Princes of Brunſwick!

As Mr. Burke ſometimes ſpeaks of England, ſometimes of France, and ſometimes of the world, and of government in general, it is difficult to anſwer his book without apparently meeting him on the ſame ground. Although principles of Government are general ſubjects, it is next to impoſſible in many caſes to ſeparate them from the idea of place and circumſtance; and the more ſo when circumſtances are put for arguments, which is frequently the caſe with Mr. Burke.

In

In the former part of his book, addreſſing himſelf to the people of France, he ſays, "No experience has taught us, (meaning the Engliſh), "that in any other courſe or method than that of an "*hereditary crown*, can our liberties be regularly perpetuated and "preſerved ſacred as our *hereditary right*." I aſk Mr. Burke, who is to take them away?—M. de la Fayette, in ſpeaking to France, ſays, "*For a Nation to be free, it is ſufficient that ſhe wills "it.*" But Mr. Burke repreſents England as wanting capacity to take care of itſelf, and that its liberties muſt be taken care of by a King holding it in "contempt." If England is ſunk to this, it is preparing itſelf to eat ſtraw, as in Hanover or in Brunſwick. But beſides the folly of the declaration, it happens that the facts are all againſt Mr. Burke. It was by the Government *being hereditary*, that the liberties of the people were endangered. Charles I. and James II. are inſtances of this truth; yet neither of them went ſo far as to hold the Nation in contempt.

As it is ſometimes of advantage to the people of one country, to hear what thoſe of other countries have to ſay reſpecting it, it is poſſible that the people of France may learn ſomething from Mr. Burke's book, and that the people of England may alſo learn ſomething from the anſwers it will occaſion. When Nations fall out about freedom, a wide field of debate is opened. The argument commences with the rights of war, without its evils; and as knowledge is the object contended for, the party that ſuſtains the defeat obtains the prize.

Mr. Burke talks about what he calls an hereditary crown, as if it were ſome production of Nature; or as if, like Time, it had a power to operate, not only independently, but in ſpite of man; or as if it were a thing or a ſubject univerſally conſented to. Alas! it has none of thoſe properties, but is the reverſe of them all. It is a thing in imagination, the propriety of which is more than doubted, and the legality of which in a few years will be denied.

But, to arrange this matter in a clearer view than what general expreſſions can convey, it will be neceſſary to ſtate the diſtinct heads under which (what is called) an hereditary crown, or, more properly ſpeaking, an hereditary ſucceſſion to the Government of a Nation, can be conſidered; which are,

Firſt, The right of a particular Family to eſtabliſh itſelf.

Secondly, The right of a Nation to eſtabliſh a particular Family.

With reſpect to the *firſt* of theſe heads, that of a Family eſtabliſhing itſelf with hereditary powers on its own authority, and independent of the conſent of a Nation, all men will concur in calling it deſpotiſm; and it would be treſpaſſing on their underſtanding to attempt to prove it.

But the *ſecond* head, that of a Nation eſtabliſhing a particular Family with *hereditary powers*, does not preſent itſelf as deſpotiſm on the firſt reflection; but if men will permit a ſecond reflection to take place, and carry that reflection forward but one remove out of their own perſons to that of their offſpring, they will then ſee that hereditary ſucceſſion becomes in its conſequences the ſame

deſpotiſm

deſpotiſm to others, which they reprobated for themſelves. It operates to preclude the conſent of the ſucceeding generation; and the preclusion of conſent is deſpotiſm. When the perſon who at any time ſhall be in poſſeſſion of a Government, or thoſe who ſtand in ſucceſſion to him, ſhall ſay to a Nation, I hold this power in 'contempt' of you, it ſignifies not on what authority he pretends to ſay it. It is no relief, but an aggravation to a perſon in ſlavery, to reflect that he was ſold by his parent; and as that which heightens the criminality of an act cannot be produced to prove the legality of it, hereditary ſucceſſion cannot be eſtabliſhed as a legal thing.

In order to arrive at a more perfect deciſion on this head, it will be proper to conſider the generation which undertakes to eſtabliſh a Family with *hereditary powers*, a-part and ſeparate from the generations which are to follow; and alſo to conſider the character in which the *firſt* generation acts with reſpect to ſucceeding generations.

The generation which firſt ſelects a perſon, and puts him at the head of its Government, either with the title of King, or any other diſtinction, acts its *own choice*, be it wiſe or fooliſh, as a free agent for itſelf. The perſon ſo ſet up is not hereditary, but ſelected and appointed; and the generation who ſets him up, does not live under an hereditary government, but under a government of its own choice and eſtabliſhment. Were the generation who ſets him up, and the perſon ſo ſet up, to live for ever, it never could become hereditary ſucceſſion; and of conſequence, hereditary ſucceſſion can only follow on the death of the firſt parties.

As therefore hereditary ſucceſſion is out of the queſtion with reſpect to the *firſt* generation, we have now to conſider the character in which *that* generation acts with reſpect to the commencing generation, and to all ſucceeding ones.

It aſſumes a character, to which it has neither right nor title. It changes itſelf from a *Legiſlator* to a *Teſtator*, and affects to make its Will, which is to have operation after the demiſe of the makers, to bequeath the Government; and it not only attempts to bequeath, but to eſtabliſh on the ſucceeding generation, a new and different form of government under which itſelf lived. Itſelf, as is already obſerved, lived not under an hereditary Government, but under a Government of its own choice and eſtabliſhment; and it now attempts, by virtue of a will and teſtament, (which it has not authority to make), to take from the commencing generation, and all future ones, the rights and free agency by which itſelf acted.

But, excluſive of the right which any generation has to act collectively as a teſtator, the objects to which it applies itſelf in this caſe, are not within the compaſs of any law, or of any will or teſtament.

The rights of men in ſociety, are neither deviſeable, nor tranſferable, nor annihilable, but are deſcendable only; and it is not in the power of any generation to intercept finally, and cut off the deſcent. If the preſent generation, or any other, are diſpoſed to

to be ſlaves, it does not leſſen the right of the ſucceeding generation to be free: wrongs cannot have a legal deſcent. When Mr. Burke attempts to maintain, that the *Engliſh Nation did at the Revolution of* 1688, *moſt ſolemnly renounce and abdicate their rights for themſelves, and for all their poſterity for ever*; he ſpeaks a language that merits not reply, and which can only excite contempt for his proſtitute principles, or pity for his ignorance.

In whatever light hereditary ſucceſſion, as growing out of the will and teſtament of ſome former generation, preſents itſelf, it is an abſurdity. A cannot make a will to take from B the property of B, and give it to C; yet this is the manner in which (what is called) hereditary ſucceſſion by law operates. A certain former generation made a will, to take away the rights of the commencing generation, and all future ones, and convey thoſe rights to a third perſon, who afterwards comes forward, and tells them, in Mr. Burke's language, that they have *no rights*, that their rights are already bequeathed to him, and that he will govern in *contempt* of them. From ſuch principles, and ſuch ignorance, Good Lord deliver the world!

But, after all, what is this metaphor called a crown, or rather what is monarchy? Is it a thing, or is it a name, or is it a fraud? Is it "a contrivance of human wiſdom," or of human craft to obtain money from a nation under ſpecious pretences? Is it a thing neceſſary to a nation? If it is, in what does that neceſſity conſiſt, what ſervices does it perform, what is its buſineſs, and what are its merits? Doth the virtue conſiſt in the metaphor, or in the man? Doth the goldſmith that makes the crown, make the virtue alſo? Doth it operate, like Fortunatus's wiſhing-cap, or Harlequin's wooden ſword? Doth it make a man a conjuror? In fine, what is it? It appears to be a ſomething going much out of faſhion, falling into ridicule, and rejected in ſome countries both as unneceſſary and expenſive. In America it is conſidered as an abſurdity; and in France it has ſo far declined, that the goodneſs of the man, and the reſpect for his perſonal character, are the only things that preſerve the appearance of its exiſtence.

If Government be what Mr. Burke deſcribes it, "a contrivance "of human wiſdom," I might aſk him, if wiſdom was at ſuch a low ebb in England, that it was become neceſſary to import it from Holland and from Hanover? But I will do the country the juſtice to ſay, that was not the caſe; and even if it was, it miſtook the cargo. The wiſdom of every country, when properly exerted, is ſufficient for all its purpoſes; and there could exiſt no more real occaſion in England to have ſent for a Dutch Stadtholder, or a German Elector, than there was in America to have done a ſimilar thing. If a country does not underſtand its own affairs, how is a foreigner to underſtand them, who knows neither its laws, its manners, nor its language? If there exiſted a man ſo tranſcendantly wiſe above all others, that his wiſdom was neceſſary to inſtruct a nation, ſome reaſon might be offered for monarchy; but when we caſt our eyes about a country, and obſerve how every

part

part underſtands its own affairs; and when we look around the world, and ſee that of all men in it, the race of kings are the moſt inſignificant in capacity, our reaſon cannot fail to aſk us—What are thoſe men kept for?

If there is any thing in monarchy which we people of America do not underſtand, I wiſh Mr. Burke would be ſo kind as to inform us. I ſee in America, a government extending over a country ten times as large as England, and conducted with regularity, for a fortieth part of the expence which government coſts in England. If I aſk a man in America, if he wants a King? he retorts, and aſks me if I take him for an ideot? How is it that this difference happens? are we more wiſe than others? I ſee in America, the generality of people living in a ſtile of plenty unknown in monarchical countries; and I ſee that the principle of its government, which is that of the *equal Rights of Man*, is making a rapid progreſs in the world.

If monarchy is a uſeleſs thing, why is it kept up any-where? and if a neceſſary thing, how can it be diſpenſed with? That *civil government* is neceſſary, all civilized nations will agree; but civil government is republican government. All that part of the government of England which begins with the office of conſtable, and proceeds through the department of magiſtrate, quarter-ſeſſion, and general aſſize, including trial by jury, is republican government. Nothing of monarchy appears in any part of it, except the name which William the Conqueror impoſed upon the Engliſh, that of obliging them to call him "Their Sovereign Lord the "King."

It is eaſy to conceive, that a band of intereſted men, ſuch as Placemen, Penſioners, Lords of the bed-chamber, Lords of the kitchen, Lords of the neceſſary-houſe, and the Lord knows what beſides, can find as many reaſons for monarchy as their ſalaries, paid at the expence of the country, amount to; but if I aſk the farmer, the manufacturer, the merchant, the tradeſman, and down through all the occupations of life to the common labourer, what ſervice monarchy is to him? he can give me no anſwer. If I aſk him what monarchy is, he believes it is ſomething like a ſinecure.

Notwithſtanding the taxes of England amount to almoſt ſeventeen millions a-year, ſaid to be for the expences of Government, it is ſtill evident that the ſenſe of the Nation is left to govern itſelf, and does govern itſelf by magiſtrates and juries, almoſt at its own charge, on republican principles excluſive of the expence of taxes. The ſalaries of the Judges are almoſt the only charge that is paid out of the revenue. Conſidering that all the internal Government is executed by the people, the taxes of England ought to be the lighteſt of any nation in Europe; inſtead of which, they are the contrary. As this cannot be accounted for on the ſcore of civil government, the ſubject neceſſarily extends itſelf to the monarchical part.

When the people of England ſent for George the Firſt, (and it would puzzle a wiſer man than Mr. Burke to diſcover for what he

he could be wanted, or what ſervice he could render), they ought at leaſt to have conditioned for the abandonment of Hanover. Beſides the endleſs German intrigues that muſt follow from a German Elector being King of England, there is a natural impoſſibility of uniting in the ſame perſon the principles of Freedom and the principles of Deſpotiſm, or, as it is uſually called in England, Arbitrary Power. A German Elector is in his electorate a deſpot: How then could it be expected that he ſhould be attached to principles of liberty in one country, while his intereſt in another was to be ſupported by deſpotiſm? The union cannot exiſt; and it might eaſily have been foreſeen, that German Electors would make German Kings, or, in Mr. Burke's words, would aſſume government with 'contempt.' The Engliſh have been in the habit of conſidering a King of England only in the character in which he appears to them: whereas the ſame perſon, while the connection laſts, has a home-ſeat in another country, the intereſt of which is different to their own, and the principles of the governments in oppoſition to each other.—To ſuch a perſon England will appear as a town-reſidence, and the Electorate as the eſtate. The Engliſh may wiſh, as I believe they do, ſucceſs to the principles of Liberty in France, or in Germany; but a German Elector trembles for the fate of deſpotiſm in his electorate; and the Dutchy of Mecklenburgh, where the preſent Queen's family governs, is under the ſame wretched ſtate of arbitrary power, and the people in ſlaviſh vaſſalage.

There never was a time when it became the Engliſh to watch continental intrigues more circumſpectly than at the preſent moment, and to diſtinguiſh the politics of the Electorate from the politics of the Nation. The revolution of France has entirely changed the ground with reſpect to England and France, as nations: but the German deſpots, with Pruſſia at their head, are combining againſt Liberty; and the fondneſs of Mr. Pitt for office, and the intereſt which all his family connections have obtained, do not give ſufficient ſecurity againſt this intrigue.

As every thing which paſſes in the world becomes matter for hiſtory, I will now quit this ſubject, and take a conciſe review of the ſtate of parties and politics in England, as Mr. Burke has done in France.

Whether the preſent reign commenced with contempt, I leave to Mr. Burke: certain however it is, that it had ſtrongly that appearance. The animoſity of the Engliſh Nation, it is very well remembered, ran high; and, had the true principles of Liberty been as well underſtood then as they now promiſe to be, it is probable the Nation would not have patiently ſubmitted to ſo much. George the Firſt and Second were ſenſible of a rival in the remains of the Stuarts; and as they could not but conſider themſelves as ſtanding on their good behaviour, they had prudence to keep their German principles of Government to themſelves; but as the Stuart family wore away, the prudence became leſs neceſſary.

The conteſt between rights, and what were called prerogatives, continued to heat the Nation till ſome time after the concluſion

of

of the American War, when all at once it fell a calm—Execration exchanged itſelf for applauſe, and Court popularity ſprung up like a muſhroom in a night.

To account for this ſudden tranſition, it is proper to obſerve, that there are two diſtinct ſpecies of popularity; the one excited by merit; the other by reſentment. As the Nation had formed itſelf into two parties, and each was extolling the merits of its parliamentary champions for and againſt prerogative, nothing could operate to give a more general ſhock than an immediate coalition of the champions themſelves. The partiſans of each being thus ſuddenly left in the lurch, and mutually heated with diſguſt at the meaſure, felt no other relief than uniting in a common execration againſt both. A higher ſtimulus of reſentment being thus excited, than what the conteſt on prerogatives had occaſioned, the Nation quitted all former objects of rights and wrongs, and ſought only that of gratification. The indignation at the Coalition, ſo effectually ſuperſeded the indignation againſt the Court, as to extinguiſh it; and without any change of principles on the part of the Court, the ſame people who had reprobated its deſpotiſm, united with it, to revenge themſelves on the Coalition Parliament. The caſe was not, which they liked beſt,—but, which they hated moſt; and the leaſt hated paſſed for love. The diſſolution of the Coalition Parliament, as it afforded the means of gratifying the reſentment of the Nation, could not fail to be popular; and from hence aroſe the popularity of the Court.

Tranſitions of this kind exhibit a Nation under the government of temper, inſtead of a fixed and ſteady principle, and having once committed itſelf, however raſhly, it feels itſelf urged along to juſtify by continuance its firſt proceeding.—Meaſures which at other times it would cenſure, it now approves, and acts perſuaſion upon itſelf to ſuffocate its judgment.

On the return of a new Parliament, the new Miniſter, Mr. Pitt, found himſelf in a ſecure majority: and the nation gave him credit, not out of regard to himſelf, but becauſe it had reſolved to do it out of reſentment to another.—He introduced himſelf to public notice by a propoſed Reform of Parliament, which in its operation would have amounted to a public juſtification of corruption. The Nation was to be at the expence of buying up the rotten boroughs, whereas it ought to puniſh the perſons who deal in the traffic.

Paſſing over the two bubbles, of the Dutch buſineſs, and the million a-year to ſink the national debt, the matter which moſt preſents itſelf, is the affair of the Regency. Never, in the courſe of my obſervation, was deluſion more ſucceſsfully acted, nor a nation more completely deceived.—But, to make this appear, it will be neceſſary to go over the circumſtances.

Mr. Fox had ſtated in the Houſe of Commons, that the Prince of Wales, as heir in ſucceſſion, had a right in himſelf to aſſume the government. This was oppoſed by Mr. Pitt; and, ſo far as the oppoſition was confined to the doctrine, it was juſt. But the principles which Mr. Pitt maintained on the contrary ſide, were as bad, or

or worſe in their extent, than thoſe of Mr. Fox; becauſe they went to eſtabliſh an ariſtocracy over the Nation, and over the ſmall repreſentation it has in the Houſe of Commons.

Whether the Engliſh form of Government be good or bad, is not in this caſe the queſtion; but, taking it as it ſtands, without regard to its merits or demerits, Mr. Pitt was farther from the point than Mr. Fox.

It is ſuppoſed to conſiſt of three parts:—while therefore the Nation is diſpoſed to continue this form, the parts have a *national ſtanding*, independent of each other, and are not the creatures of each other. Had Mr. Fox paſſed through Parliament, and ſaid, that the perſon alluded to claimed on the ground of the Nation, Mr. Pitt muſt then have contended (what he called) the right of the Parliament, againſt the right of the Nation.

By the appearance which the conteſt made, Mr. Fox took the hereditary ground, and Mr. Pitt the parliamentary ground; but the fact is, they both took hereditary ground, and Mr. Pitt took the worſt of the two.

What is called the Parliament, is made up of two Houſes; one of which is more hereditary, and more beyond the controul of the Nation, than what the Crown (as it is called) is ſuppoſed to be. It is an hereditary ariſtocracy, aſſuming and aſſerting indefeaſible, irrevokable rights and authority, wholly independent of the Nation. Where then was the merited popularity of exalting this hereditary power over another hereditary power leſs independent of the Nation than what itſelf aſſumed to be, and of abſorbing the rights of the Nation into a Houſe over which it has neither election nor controul?

The general impulſe of the Nation was right; but it acted without reflection. It approved the oppoſition made to the right ſet up by Mr. Fox, without perceiving that Mr. Pitt was ſupporting another indefeaſible right, more remote from the Nation, in oppoſition to it.

With reſpect to the Houſe of Commons, it is elected but by a ſmall part of the Nation; but were the election as univerſal as taxation, which it ought to be, it would ſtill be only the organ of the Nation, and cannot poſſeſs inherent rights.—When the National Aſſembly of France reſolves a matter, the reſolve is made in right of the Nation; but Mr. Pitt, on all national queſtions, ſo far as they refer to the Houſe of Commons, abſorbs the rights of the Nation into the organ, and makes the organ into a Nation, and the Nation itſelf into a cypher.

In a few words, the queſtion on the Regency was a queſtion on a million a-year, which is appropriated to the executive department: and Mr. Pitt could not poſſeſs himſelf of any management of this ſum, without ſetting up the ſupremacy of Parliament; and when this was accompliſhed, it was indifferent who ſhould be Regent, as he muſt be Regent at his own coſt. Among the curioſities which this contentious debate afforded, was that of making the Great Seal into a King; the affixing of which to an act, was

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to be royal authority. If, therefore, Royal Authority is a Great Seal, it consequently is in itself nothing; and a good Constitution would be of infinitely more value to the Nation, than what the three Nominal Powers, as they now stand, are worth.

The continual use of the word *Constitution* in the English Parliament, shews there is none; and that the whole is merely a form of Government without a Constitution, and constituting itself with what powers it pleases. If there were a Constitution, it certainly could be referred to; and the debate on any constitutional point, would terminate by producing the Constitution. One member says, This is Constitution; and another says, That is Constitution—To-day it is one thing; and to-morrow, it is something else—while the maintaining the debate proves there is none. Constitution is now the cant word of Parliament, tuning itself to the ear of the Nation. Formerly it was the *universal supremacy of Parliament*—the *omnipotence of Parliament*: But since the progress of Liberty in France, those phrases have a despotic harshness in their note; and the English Parliament have catched the fashion from the National Assembly, but without the substance, of speaking of *Constitution*.

As the present generation of people in England did not make the Government, they are not accountable for any of its defects; but that sooner or later it must come into their hands to undergo a constitutional reformation, is as certain as that the same thing has happened in France. If France, with a revenue of nearly twenty-four millions sterling, with an extent of rich and fertile country above four times larger than England, with a population of twenty-four millions of inhabitants to support taxation, with upwards of ninety millions sterling of gold and silver circulating in the nation, and with a debt less than the present debt of England—still found it necessary, from whatever cause, to come to a settlement of its affairs, it solves the problem of funding for both countries.

It is out of the question to say how long what is called the English constitution has lasted, and to argue from thence how long it is to last; the question is, how long can the funding system last? It is a thing but of modern invention, and has not yet continued beyond the life of a man; yet in that short space it has so far accumulated, that, together with the current expences, it requires an amount of taxes at least equal to the whole landed rental of the nation in acres to defray the annual expenditure. That a government could not always have gone on by the same system which has been followed for the last seventy years, must be evident to every man; and for the same reason it cannot always go on.

The funding system is not money; neither is it, properly speaking, credit. It in effect creates upon paper the sum which it appears to borrow, and lays on a tax to keep the imaginary capital alive by the payment of interest, and sends the annuity to market, to be sold for paper already in circulation. If any credit is given, it is to the disposition of the people to pay the tax, and not to the government which lays it on. When this disposition expires, what is supposed to be the credit of Goverment expires with it. The instance of France under the former Government, shews that it is impossible to compel the payment of taxes by force, when a whole nation is determined to take its stand upon that ground.

Mr. Burke, in his review of the finances of France, states the quantity of gold and silver in France, at about eighty-eight millions sterling. In doing this, he has, I presume, divided by the difference of exchange, instead of the standard of twenty-four livres to a pound sterling; for M. Neckar's statement, from which Mr. Burke's is taken, is *two thousand two hundred millions of livres*, which is upwards of ninety-one millions and an half sterling.

M. Neckar in France, and Mr. George Chalmers of the Office of Trade and Plantation in England, of which Lord Hawkesbury is president, published nearly about the same time (1786) an account of the quantity of money in each nation, from the returns of the Mint of each nation. Mr. Chalmers, from the returns of the English Mint at the Tower of London, states the quantity of money in England, including Scotland and Ireland, to be twenty millions sterling *.

M. Neckar † says, that the amount of money in France, recoined from the old coin which was called in, was two thousand five hundred millions of livres, (upwards of one hundred and four millions sterling); and, after deducting for waste, and what may be in the West Indies, and other possible circumstances, states the circulation quantity at home, to be ninety-one millions and an half sterling; but, taking it as Mr. Burke has put it, it is sixty-eight millions more than the national quantity in England.

That the quantity of money in France cannot be under this sum, may at once be seen from the state of the French Revenue, without referring to the records of the French Mint for proofs. The revenue of France prior to the Revolution, was nearly twenty-four millions sterling; and as paper had then no existence in France, the whole revenue was collected upon gold and silver; and it would have been impossible to have collected such a quantity of revenue upon a less national quantity than M. Neckar has stated. Before the establishment of paper in England, the revenue was about a fourth part of the national amount of gold and silver, as may be known by referring to the revenue prior to King William, and the quantity of money stated to be in the nation at that time, which was nearly as much as it is now.

It can be of no real service to a Nation, to impose upon itself, or to permit itself to be imposed upon; but the prejudices of some, and the imposition of others, have always represented France as a nation possessing but little money—whereas the quantity is not only more than four times what the quantity is in England, but is considerably greater on a proportion of numbers. To account for this deficiency

* See *Estimate of the Comparative Strength of Great Britain*, by G. Chalmers.

† See Administation of the Finances of France, Vol. III. by M. Neckar.

deficiency on the part of England, ſome reference ſhould be had to the Engliſh ſyſtem of funding. It operates to multiply paper, and to ſubſtitute it in the room of money, in various ſhapes; and the more paper is multiplied, the more opportunities are afforded to export the ſpecie; and it admits of a poſſibility (by extending it to ſmall notes) of increaſing paper till there is no money left.

I know this is not a pleaſant ſubject to Engliſh readers; but the matters I am going to mention, are ſo important in themſelves, as to require the attention of men intereſted in money-tranſactions of a public nature.—There is a circumſtance ſtated by M. Neckar, in his treatiſe on the adminiſtration of the finances, which has never been attended to in England, but which forms the only baſis whereon to eſtimate the quantity of money (gold and ſilver) which ought to be in every nation in Europe, to preſerve a relative proportion with other nations.

Liſbon and Cadiz are the two ports into which (money) gold and ſilver from South America are imported, and which afterwards divides and ſpreads itſelf over Europe by means of commerce, and increaſes the quantity of money in all parts of Europe. If, therefore, the amount of the annual importation into Europe can be known, and the relative proportion of the foreign commerce of the ſeveral nations by which it is diſtributed can be aſcertained, they give a rule, ſufficiently true, to aſcertain the quantity of money which ought to be found in any nation, at any given time.

M. Neckar ſhews from the regiſters of Liſbon and Cadiz, that the importation of gold and ſilver into Europe, is five millions ſterling annually. He has not taken it on a ſingle year, but on an average of fifteen ſucceeding years, from 1763 to 1777, both inclusive; in which time, the amount was one thouſand eight hundred million livres, which is ſeventy-five millions ſterling*.

From the commencement of the Hanover ſucceſſion in 1714, to the time Mr. Chalmers publiſhed, is ſeventy-two years; and the quantity imported into Europe, in that time, would be three hundred and ſixty millions ſterling.

If the foreign commerce of Great Britain be ſtated at a ſixth part of what the whole foreign commerce of Europe amounts to, (which is probably an inferior eſtimation to what the gentlemen at the Exchange would allow) the proportion which Britain ſhould draw by commerce of this ſum, to keep herſelf on a proportion with the reſt of Europe, would be alſo a ſixth part, which is ſixty millions ſterling; and if the ſame allowance for waſte and accident be made for England which M. Neckar makes for France, the quantity remaining after theſe deductions would be fifty-two millions; and this ſum ought to have been in the nation (at the time Mr. Chalmers publiſhed) in addition to the ſum which was in the nation at the commencement of the Hanover ſucceſſion, and to have made in the whole at leaſt ſixty-ſix millions ſterling; inſtead of which, there were but twenty millions, which is forty-ſix millions below its proportionate quantity.

* Adminiſtration of the Finances of France, Vol. iii.

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As the quantity of gold and ſilver imported into Liſbon and Cadiz, is more exactly aſcertained than that of any commodity imported into England; and as the quantity of money coined at the Tower of London, is ſtill more poſitively known; the leading facts do not admit of controverſy. Either, therefore, the commerce of England is unproductive of profit, or the gold and ſilver which it brings in, leak continually away by unſeen means, at the average rate of about threee quarters of a million a-year, which, in the courſe of ſeventy-two years, accounts for the deficiency; and its abſence is ſupplied by paper*.

The Revolution of France is attended with many novel circumſtances, not only in the political ſphere, but in the circle of money tranſactions. Among others, it ſhews that a Government may be

* Whether the Engliſh commerce does not bring in money, or whether the Government ſends it out after it is brought in, is a matter which the parties concerned can beſt explain; but that the deficiency exiſts, is not in the power of either to diſprove. While Dr. Price, Mr. Eden (now Auckland), Mr. Chalmers, and others, were debating whether the quantity of money in England was greater or leſs than at the Revolution, the circumſtance was not adverted to, that ſince the Revolution, there cannot have been leſs than four hundred millions ſterling imported into Europe; and therefore, the quantity in England ought at leaſt to have been four times greater than it was at the Revolution, to be on a proportion with Europe. What England is now doing by paper, is what ſhe would have been able to have done by ſolid money, if gold and ſilver had come into the nation in the proportion it ought, or had not been ſent out; and ſhe is endeavouring to reſtore by paper, the balance ſhe has loſt by money. It is certain, that the gold and ſilver which arrive annually in the regiſter-ſhips to Spain and Portugal, do not remain in thoſe countries. Taking the value half in gold and half in ſilver, it is about four hundred tons annually; and from the number of ſhips and galloons employed in the trade of bringing thoſe metals from South America to Portugal and Spain, the quantity ſufficiently proves itſelf, without referring to the regiſters.

In the ſituation England now is, it is impoſſible ſhe can increaſe in money. High taxes not only leſſen the property of the individuals, but they leſſen alſo the money-capital of a nation, by inducing ſmuggling, which can only be carried on by gold and ſilver. By the politics which the Britiſh Government have carried on with the Inland Powers of Germany and the Continent, it has made an enemy of all the Maritime Powers, and is therefore obliged to keep up a large navy; but though the navy is built in England, the naval ſtores muſt be purchaſed from abroad, and that from countries where the greateſt part muſt be paid for in gold and ſilver. Some fallacious rumours have been ſet afloat in England to induce a belief of money, and, among others, that of the French refugees bringing great quantities. The idea is ridiculous. The general part of the money in France is ſilver; and it would take upwards of twenty of the largeſt broad wheel waggons, with ten horſes each, to remove one million ſterling of ſilver. Is it then to be ſuppoſed, that a few people fleeing on horſe-back, or in poſt-chaiſes, in a ſecret manner, and having the French Cuſtom-Houſe to paſs, and the ſea to croſs, could bring even a ſufficiency for their own expences?

When millions of money are ſpoken of, it ſhould be recollected, that ſuch ſums can only accumulate in a country by ſlow degrees, and a long proceſſion of time. The moſt frugal ſyſtem that England could now adopt, would not recover, in a century, the balance ſhe has loſt in money ſince the commencement of the Hanover ſucceſſion. She is ſeventy millions behind France, and ſhe muſt be in ſome conſiderable proportion behind every country in Europe, becauſe the returns of the Engliſh Mint do not ſhew an increaſe of money, while the regiſters of Liſbon and Cadiz ſhew an European increaſe of between three and four hundred millions ſterling.

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in a ſtate of inſolvency, and a Nation rich. So far as the fact is confined to the late Government of France, it was inſolvent; becauſe the nation would no longer ſupport its extravagance, and therefore it could no longer ſupport itſelf—but with reſpect to the Nation, all the means exiſted. A Government may be ſaid to be inſolvent, every time it applies to a Nation to diſcharge its arrears. The inſolvency of the late Government of France, and the preſent Government of England, differed in no other reſpect than as the diſpoſition of the people differ. The people of France refuſed their aid to the old Government; and the people of England ſubmit to taxation without enquiry. What is called the Crown in England, has been inſolvent ſeveral times; the laſt of which, publicly known, was in May 1777, when it applied to the Nation to diſcharge upwards of £. 600,000, private debts, which otherwiſe it could not pay.

It was the error of Mr. Pitt, Mr. Burke, and all thoſe who were unacquainted with the affairs of France, to confound the French Nation with the French Government. The French Nation, in effect, endeavoured to render the late Government inſolvent, for the purpoſe of taking Government into its own hands; and it reſerved its means for the ſupport of the new Government. In a country of ſuch vaſt extent and population as France, the natural means cannot be wanting; and the political means appear the inſtant the Nation is diſpoſed to permit them. When Mr. Burke, in a ſpeech laſt Winter in the Britiſh Parliament, *caſt his eyes over the map of Europe, and ſaw a chaſm that once was France*, he talked like a dreamer of dreams. The ſame natural France exiſted as before, and all the natural means exiſted with it. The only chaſm was that which the extinction of deſpotiſm had left, and which was to be filled up with a conſtitution more formidable in reſources than the power which had expired.

Although the French Nation rendered the late Government inſolvent, it did not permit the inſolvency to act towards the creditors; and the creditors conſidering the Nation as the real paymaſter, and the Government only as the agent, reſted themſelves on the Nation, in preference to the Government. This appears greatly to diſturb Mr. Burke, as the precedent is fatal to the policy by which Governments have ſuppoſed themſelves ſecure. They have contracted debts, with a view of attaching what is called the monied intereſt of a Nation to their ſupport; but the example in France ſhews, that the permanent ſecurity of the creditor is in the Nation, and not in the Government; and that in all poſſible revolutions that may happen in Governments, the means are always with the Nation, and the Nation always in exiſtence. Mr. Burke argues, that the creditors ought to have abided the fate of the Government which they truſted; but the National Aſſembly conſidered them as the creditors of the Nation, and not of the Government—of the maſter, and not of the ſteward.

Notwithſtanding the late Government could not diſcharge the current expences, the preſent Government has paid off a great part of the capital. This has been accompliſhed by two means; the one

one by leſſening the expences of Government, and the other by the ſale of the monaſtic and eccleſiaſtical landed eſtates. The devotees and penitent debauchees, extortioners and miſers of former days, to enſure themſelves a better world than that which they were about to leave, had bequeathed immenſe property in truſt to the prieſthood, for *pious uſes*; and the prieſthood kept it for themſelves. The National Aſſembly has ordered it to be ſold for the good of the whole Nation, and the prieſthood to be decently provided for.

In conſequence of the Revolution, the annual intereſt of the debt of France will be reduced at leaſt ſix millions ſterling, by paying off upwards of one hundred millions of the capital; which, with leſſening the former expences of Government at leaſt three millions, will place France in a ſituation worthy the imitation of Europe.

Upon a whole review of the ſubject, how vaſt is the contraſt! While Mr. Burke has been talking of a general bankruptcy in France, the National Aſſembly has been paying off the capital of its debt; and while taxes have increaſed near a million a-year in England, they have lowered ſeveral millions a-year in France. Not a word has either Mr. Burke or Mr. Pitt ſaid about French affairs, or the ſtate of the French finances, in the preſent Seſſion of Parliament. The ſubject begins to be too well underſtood, and impoſition ſerves no longer.

There is a general enigma running through the whole of Mr. Burke's Book. He writes in a rage againſt the National Aſſembly; but what is he enraged about? If his aſſertions were as true as they are groundleſs, and that France, by her Revolution, had annihilated her power, and become what he calls a *chaſm*, it might excite the grief of a Frenchman (conſidering himſelf as a national man), and provoke his rage againſt the National Aſſembly; but why ſhould it excite the rage of Mr. Burke?—Alas! it is not the Nation of France that Mr. Burke means, but the COURT; and every Court in Europe, dreading the ſame fate, is in mourning. He writes neither in the character of a Frenchman nor an Engliſhman, but in the fawning character of that creature known in all countries, and a friend to none, a COURTIER. Whether it be the Court of Verſailles, or the Court of St. James or Carlton-Houſe, or the Court in expectation, ſignifies not; for the caterpillar principles of all Courts and Courtiers are alike. They form a common policy throughout Europe, detached and ſeparate from the intereſt of Nations: and while they appear to quarrel, they agree to plunder. Nothing can be more terrible to a Court or a Courtier, than the Revolution of France. That which is a bleſſing to Nations, is bitterneſs to them; and as their exiſtence depends on the duplicity of a country, they tremble at the approach of principles, and dread the precedent that threatens their overthrow.

CONCLUSION.

REASON and Ignorance, the oppoſites of each other, influence the great bulk of mankind. If either of theſe can be rendered ſufficiently extenſive in a country, the machinery of Government goes eaſily on. Reaſon obeys itſelf; and Ignorance ſubmits to whatever is dictated to it.

The two modes of Government which prevail in the world, are, *firſt*, Government by election and repreſentation: *Secondly*, Government by hereditary ſucceſſion. The former is generally known by the name of republic; the latter by that of monarchy and ariſtocracy.

Thoſe two diſtinct and oppoſite forms, erect themſelves on the two diſtinct and oppoſite baſes of Reaſon and Ignorance.—As the exerciſe of Government requires talents and abilities, and as talents and abilities cannot have hereditary deſcent, it is evident that hereditary ſucceſſion requires a belief from man, to which his reaſon cannot ſubſcribe, and which can only be eſtabliſhed upon his ignorance; and the more ignorant any country is, the better it is fitted for this ſpecies of Government.

On the contrary, Government in a well-conſtituted republic, requires no belief from man beyond what his reaſon can give. He ſees the *rationale* of the whole ſyſtem, its origin and its operation; and as it is beſt ſupported when beſt underſtood, the human faculties act with boldneſs, and acquire, under this form of Government, a gigantic manlineſs.

As, therefore, each of thoſe forms acts on a different baſe, the one moving freely by the aid of reaſon, the other by ignorance; we have next to conſider what it is that gives motion to that ſpecies of Government which is called mixed Government, or, as it is ſometimes ludicrouſly ſtiled, a Government of *this*, *that*, and *t'other*.

The moving power in this ſpecies of Government, is of neceſſity, Corruption. However imperfect election and repreſentation may be in mixed Governments, they ſtill give exerciſe to a greater portion of reaſon than is convenient to the hereditary part; and therefore it becomes neceſſary to buy the reaſon up. A mixed Government is an imperfect every-thing, cementing and ſoldering the diſcordant parts together by corruption, to act as a whole. Mr. Burke appears highly diſguſted, that France, ſince ſhe had reſolved on a revolution, did not adopt what he calls "*A Britiſh Conſtitution*;" and the regretful manner in which he expreſſes himſelf on this occaſion, implies a ſuſpicion, that the Britiſh Conſtitution needed ſomething to keep its defects in countenance.

In mixed Governments there is no reſponſibility: the parts cover each other till reſponſibility is loſt; and the corruption which moves the machine, contrives at the ſame time its own eſcape. When it is laid down as a maxim, that *a King can do no wrong*, it places him in a ſtate of ſimilar ſecurity with that of ideots and perſons inſane, and reſponſibility is out of the queſtion with reſpect to himſelf. It then deſcends upon the Miniſter, who ſhelters himſelf under a majority in Parliament, which, by places, penſions, and corruption,

corruption, he can always command; and that majority juſtifies itſelf by the ſame authority with which it protects the Miniſter. In this rotatory motion, reſponſibility is thrown off from the parts, and from the whole.

When there is a Part in a Government which can do no wrong, it implies that it does nothing; and is only the machine of another power, by whoſe advice and direction it acts. What is ſuppoſed to be the King in mixed Governments, is the Cabinet; and as the Cabinet is always a part of the Parliament, and the members juſtify in one character what they adviſe and act in another, a mixed Government becomes a continual enigma; entailing upon a country, by the quantity of corruption neceſſary to ſolder the parts, the expence of ſupporting all the forms of Government at once, and finally reſolving itſelf into a Government by Committee; in which the adviſers, the actors, the approvers, the juſtifiers, the perſons reſponſible, and the perſons not reſponſible, are the ſame perſons.

By this pantomimical contrivance, and change of ſcene and character, the parts help each other out in matters which neither of them ſingly would aſſume to act. When money is to be obtained, the maſs of variety apparently diſſolves, and a profuſion of parliamentary praiſes paſſes between the parts. Each admires with aſtoniſhment, the wiſdom, the liberality, the diſintereſtedneſs of the other; and all of them breathe a pitying ſigh at the burthens of the Nation.

But in a well-conſtitutioned republic, nothing of this ſoldering, praiſing, and pitying, can take place; the repreſentation being equal throughout the country, and complete in itſelf, however it may be arranged into legiſlative and executive, they have all one and the ſame natural ſource. The parts are not foreigners to each other, like democracy, ariſtocracy, and monarchy. As there are no diſcordant diſtinctions, there is nothing to corrupt by compromiſe, nor confound by contrivance. Public meaſures appeal of themſelves to the underſtanding of the Nation, and, reſting on their own merits, diſown any flattering application to vanity. The continual whine of lamenting the burden of taxes, however ſucceſsfully it may be practiſed in mixed Governments, is inconſiſtent with the ſenſe and ſpirit of a republic. If taxes are neceſſary, they are of courſe advantageous; but if they require an apology, the apology itſelf implies an impeachment. Why then is man thus impoſed upon, or why does he impoſe upon himſelf?

When men are ſpoken of as kings and ſubjects, or when Government is mentioned under the diſtinct or combined heads of monarchy, ariſtocracy, and democracy, what is it that *reaſoning* man is to underſtand by the terms? If there really exiſted in the world two or more diſtinct and ſeparate *elements* of human power, we ſhould then ſee the ſeveral origins to which thoſe terms would deſcriptively apply: but as there is but one ſpecies of man, there can be but one element of human power, and that element is man himſelf. Monarchy, ariſtocracy, and democracy, are but creatures of imagination; and a thouſand ſuch may be contrived, as well as three.

FROM

FROM the Revolutions of America and France, and the ſymptoms that have appeared in other countries, it is evident that the opinion of the world is changed with reſpect to ſyſtems of Government, and that revolutions are not within the compaſs of political calculations. The progreſs of time and circumſtances, which men aſſign to the accompliſhment of great changes, is too mechanical to meaſure the force of the mind, and the rapidity of reflection, by which revolutions are generated: All the old governments have received a ſhock from thoſe that already appear, and which were once more improbable, and are a greater ſubject of wonder, than a general revolution in Europe would be now.

When we ſurvey the wretched condition of man under the monarchical and hereditary ſyſtems of Government, dragged from his home by one power, or driven by another, and impoveriſhed by taxes more than by enemies, it becomes evident that thoſe ſyſtems are bad, and that a general revolution in the principle and conſtruction of Governments is neceſſary.

What is government more than the management of the affairs of a Nation? It is not, and from its nature cannot be, the property of any particular man or family, but of the whole community, at whoſe expence it is ſupported; and though by force or contrivance it has been uſurped into an inheritance, the uſurpation cannot alter the right of things. Sovereignty, as a matter of right, appertains to the Nation only, and not to any individual; and a Nation has at all times an inherent indefeaſible right to aboliſh any form of Government it finds inconvenient, and eſtabliſh ſuch as accords with its intereſt, diſpoſition, and happineſs. The romantic and barbarous diſtinction of men into Kings and ſubjects, though it may ſuit the condition of courtiers, cannot that of citizens; and is exploded by the principle upon which Governments are now founded. Every citizen is a member of the ſovereignty, and, as ſuch, can acknowledge no perſonal ſubjection; and his obedience can be only to the laws.

When men think of what Government is, they muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe it to poſſeſs a knowledge of all the objects and matters upon which its authority is to be exerciſed. In this view of Government, the republican ſyſtem, as eſtabliſhed by America and France, operates to embrace the whole of a Nation; and the knowledge neceſſary to the intereſt of all the parts, is to be found in the center, which the parts by repreſentation form: But the old Governments are on a conſtruction that excludes knowledge as well as happineſs; Government by Monks, who know nothing of the world beyond the walls of a Convent, is as conſiſtent as government by Kings.

What were formerly called Revolutions, were little more than a change of perſons, or an alteration of local circumſtances. They roſe and fell like things of courſe, and had nothing in their exiſtence or their fate that could influence beyond the ſpot that produced them. But what we now ſee in the world, from the Revolutions of America and France, is a renovation of the natural order of things, a ſyſtem of principles as univerſal as truth and the exiſtence of man, and combining moral with political happineſs and national proſperity.

'I. *Men*

'I. *Men are born and always continue free, and equal in reſpect* 'of their rights. *Civil diſtinctions, therefore, can be founded only* 'on public utility.

'II. *The end of all political aſſociations is the preſervation of the* 'natural and impreſcriptible rights of man; and theſe rights are 'liberty, property, ſecurity, and reſiſtance of oppreſſion.

III. *The Nation is eſſentially the ſource of all Sovereignty; nor* 'can any INDIVIDUAL, or ANY BODY OF MEN, be entitled to 'any authority which is not expreſsly derived from it.'

In theſe principles, there is nothing to throw a Nation into confuſion by inflaming ambition. They are calculated to call forth wiſdom and abilities, and to exerciſe them for the public good, and not for the emolument or aggrandizement of particular deſcriptions of men or families. Monarchical ſovereignty, the enemy of mankind, and the ſource of miſery, is aboliſhed; and ſovereignty itſelf is reſtored to its natural and original place, the Nation. Were this the cauſe throughout Europe, the cauſe of wars would be taken away.

It is attributed to Henry the Fourth of France, a man of an enlarged and benevolent heart, that he propoſed, about the year 1610, a plan for aboliſhing war in Europe. The plan conſiſted in conſtituting an European Congreſs, or as the French Authors ſtile it, a Pacific Republic; by appointing delegates from the ſeveral Nations, who were to act as a Court of arbitration in any diſputes that might ariſe between nation and nation.

Had ſuch a plan been adopted at the time it was propoſed, the taxes of England and France, as two of the parties, would have been at leaſt ten millions ſterling annually to each Nation leſs than they were at the commencement of the French Revolution.

To conceive a cauſe why ſuch a plan has not been adopted, (and that inſtead of a Congreſs for the purpoſe of *preventing* war, it has been called only to *terminate* a war, after a fruitleſs expence of ſeveral years, it will be neceſſary to conſider the intereſt of Governments as a diſtinct intereſt to that of Nations.

Whatever is the cauſe of taxes to a Nation, becomes alſo the means of revenue to a Government. Every war terminates with an addition of taxes, and conſequently with an addition of revenue; and in any event of war, in the manner they are now commenced and concluded, the power and intereſt of Governments are increaſed. War, therefore, from its productiveneſs, as it eaſily furniſhes the pretence of neceſſity for taxes and appointments to places and offices, becomes a principal part of the ſyſtem of old Governments; and to eſtabliſh any mode to aboliſh war, however advantageous it might be to Nations, would be to take from ſuch Government the moſt lucrative of its branches. The frivolous matters upon which war is made, ſhow the diſpoſition and avidity of Governments to uphold the ſyſtem of war, and betray the motives upon which they act.

Why are not Republics plunged into war, but becauſe the nature of their Government does not admit of an intereſt diſtinct from that of the Nation? Even Holland, though an ill-conſtructed Republic, and with a commerce extending over the world, exiſted nearly a century without war: and the inſtant the form of Government

was

was changed in France, the republican principles of peace and domeſtic proſperity and œconomy aroſe with the new Government; and the ſame conſequences would follow the ſame cauſes in other Nations.

As war is the ſyſtem of Government on the old conſtruction, the animoſity which Nations reciprocally entertain, is nothing more than what the policy of their Governments excites, to keep up the ſpirit of the ſyſtem. Each Government accuſes the other of perfidy, intrigue, and ambition, as a means of heating the imagination of their reſpective Nations, and incenſing them to hoſtilities. Man is not the enemy of man, but through the medium of a falſe ſyſtem of Government. Inſtead, therefore, of exclaiming againſt the ambition of Kings, the exclamation ſhould be directed againſt the principle of ſuch Governments; and inſtead of ſeeking to reform the individual, the wiſdom of a Nation ſhould apply itſelf to reform the ſyſtem.

Whether the forms and maxims of Governments which are ſtill in practice, were adapted to the condition of the world at the period they were eſtabliſhed, is not in this caſe the queſtion. The older they are, the leſs correſpondence can they have with the preſent ſtate of things. Time, and change of circumſtances and opinions, have the ſame progreſſive effect in rendering modes of Government obſolete, as they have upon cuſtoms and manners.—Agriculture, commerce, manufactures, and the tranquil arts, by which the proſperity of Nations is beſt promoted, require a different ſyſtem of Government, and a different ſpecies of knowledge to direct its operations, than what might have been required in the former condition of the world.

As it is not difficult to perceive, from the enlightened ſtate of mankind, that hereditary Governments are verging to their decline, and that Revolutions on the broad baſis of national ſovereignty, and Government by repreſentation, are making their way in Europe, it would be an act of wiſdom to anticipate their approach, and produce Revolutions by reaſon and accommodation, rather than commit them to the iſſue of convulſions.

From what we now ſee, nothing of reform in the political world ought to be held improbable. It is an age of Revolutions, in which every thing may be looked for. The intrigue of Courts, by which the ſyſtem of war is kept up, may provoke a confederation of Nations to aboliſh it: and an European Congreſs, to patronize the progreſs of free Government, and promote the civilization of Nations with each other, is an event nearer in probability, than once were the revolutions and alliance of France and America.

FINIS.

Lately publiſhed,

BY THE SAME AUTHOR,

RIGHTS OF MAN.

PART II.

COMBINING

PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE.

RIGHTS OF MAN;

PART

THE SECOND.

COMBINING

PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE.

BY

THOMAS PAINE,

SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO CONGRESS IN THE AMERICAN WAR, AND

AUTHOR OF THE WORKS ENTITLED "COMMON SENSE;" AND THE "FIRST PART OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN."

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1792.

[Price SIXPENCE.]

TO

M. DE LA FAYETTE.

AFTER an acquaintance of nearly fifteen years, in difficult ſituations in America, and various conſultations in Europe, I feel a pleaſure in preſenting to you this ſmall treatiſe, in gratitude for your ſervices to my beloved America, and as a teſtimony of my eſteem for the virtues, public and private, which I know you to poſſeſs.

The only point upon which I could ever diſcover that we differed was not as to principles of government, but as to time. For my own part, I think it equally as injurious to good principles to permit them to linger, as to puſh them on too faſt. That which you ſuppoſe accompliſhable in fourteen or fifteen years, I may believe practicable in a much ſhorter period. Mankind, as it appears to me, are always ripe enough to underſtand their true intereſt, provided it be preſented clearly to their underſtanding, and that in a manner not to create ſuſpicion by any thing like ſelf-deſign, nor offend by aſſuming too much. Where we would with to reform we muſt not reproach.

When the American revolution was eſtabliſhed, I felt a diſpoſition to ſit ſerenely down and enjoy the calm. It did not appear to me that any object could afterwards ariſe great enough to make me quit tranquillity, and feel as I had felt before. But when principle, and not place, is the energetic cauſe of action, a man, I find, is every where the ſame.

I am now once more in the public world; and as I have not a right to contemplate on ſo many years of remaining life as you have, I am reſolved to labour as faſt as I can; and as I am anxious for your aid and your company, I wiſh you to haſten your principles and overtake me.

If you make a campaign the enſuing ſpring, which it is moſt probable there will be no occaſion for, I will come and join you. Should the campaign commence, I hope it will terminate in the extinction of German deſpotiſm, and in eſtabliſhing the freedom of all Germany. When France ſhall be ſurrounded with revolutions, ſhe will be in peace and ſafety, and her taxes, as well as thoſe of Germany, will conſequently become leſs.

Your ſincere,

Affectionate Friend,

THOMAS PAINE.

London, Feb. 9, 1792.

PREFACE.

WHEN I began the chapter entitled the "*Conclusion*" in the former part of the RIGHTS OF MAN, publiſhed laſt year, it was my intention to have extended it to a greater length; but in caſting the whole matter in my mind which I wiſhed to add, I found that I muſt either make the work too bulky, or contract my plan too much. I therefore brought it to a cloſe as ſoon as the ſubject would admit, and reſerved what I had further to ſay to another opportunity.

Several other reaſons contributed to produce this determination. I wiſhed to know the manner in which a work, written in a ſtyle of thinking and expreſſion different to what had been cuſtomary in England, would be received before I ventured farther. A great field was opening to the view of mankind by means of the French Revolution. Mr. Burke's outrageous oppoſition thereto brought the controverſy into England. He attacked principles which he knew (from information) I would conteſt with him, becauſe they are principles which I believe to be good, and which I have contributed to eſtabliſh, and conceive myſelf bound to defend. Had he not urged the controverſy, I had moſt probably been a ſilent man.

Another reaſon for deferring the remainder of the work was, that Mr. Burke promiſed in his firſt publication to renew the ſubject at another opportunity, and to make a compariſon of what he called the Engliſh and French conſtitutions. I therefore held myſelf in reſerve for him. He has publiſhed two works ſince, without doing this; which he certainly would not have omitted, had the compariſon been in his favour.

In his laſt work, "*His appeal from the new to the old Whigs*," he has quoted about ten pages from the *Rights of Man*, and having given himſelf the trouble of doing this, ſays, "he ſhall not attempt in the ſmalleſt degree to refute them," meaning the principles therein contained. I am enough acquainted with Mr. Burke to know, that he would if he could. But inſtead of conteſting them, he immediately after conſoles himſelf with ſaying, that "he has done his part."—He has not done his part. He has not performed his promiſe of a compariſon of conſtitutions. He ſtarted the controverſy, he gave the challenge, and has fled from it; and he is now a *caſe in point* with his own opinion, that, "*the age of chivalry is gone!*"

The title, as well as the ſubſtance of his laſt work, his "*Appeal*," is his condemnation. Principles muſt ſtand on their own merits, and if they are good they certainly will. To put them under the ſhelter of other means' authority, as Mr. Burke has done, ſerves to bring them into ſuſpicion. Mr. Burke is not very fond of dividing his honours, but in this caſe he is artfully dividing the diſgrace. But who are thoſe to whom Mr. Burke made his appeal? A ſet of childiſh thinkers and half-way politicians born in the laſt century; men who went no farther with any principle than as it ſuited their purpoſe as a party; the nation was always left out of the queſtion; and this has been the character of every party from that day to this. The nation ſees nothing in ſuch works, or ſuch politics worthy its attention. A little matter will move a party, but it muſt be ſomething great that moves a nation.

Though

Though I ſee nothing in Mr. Burke's Appeal worth taking much notice of, there is, however, one expreſſion upon which I ſhall offer a few remarks.—After quoting largely from the *Rights of Man*, and declining to conteſt the principles contained in that work, he ſays, "This will "moſt probably be done (*if ſuch writings ſhall be thought to deſerve any "other refutation than that of criminal juſtice*) by others, who may think "with Mr. Burke and with the ſame zeal.

In the firſt place, it has not yet been done by any body. Not leſs, I believe, than eight or ten pamphlets intended as anſwers to the former part of the "Rights of Man" have been publiſhed by different perſons, and not one of them, to my knowledge, has extended to a ſecond edition nor are even the titles of them ſo much as generally remembered. As I am averſe to unneceſſarily multiplying publications, I have anſwered none of them. And as I believe that a man may write himſelf out of reputation when no body elſe can do it, I am careful to avoid that rock.

But as I would decline unneceſſary publications on the one hand, ſo would I avoid every thing that might appear like ſullen pride on the other. If Mr. Burke, or any perſon on his ſide the queſtion, will produce an anſwer to the "Rights of Man," that ſhall extend to an half, or even to a fourth part of the number of copies to which the Rights of Man extended, I will reply to his work. But until this be done, I ſhall ſo far take the ſenſe of the public for my guide (and the world knows I am not a flatterer) that what they do not think worth while to read, is not worth mine to anſwer. I ſuppoſe the number of copies to which part of the *Rights of Man* extended, taking England, Scotland, and Ireland, is not leſs than between forty and fifty thouſand.

I now come to remark on the remaining part of the quotation I have made from Mr. Burke.

"If," ſays he, "ſuch writings ſhall be thought to deſerve any other "refutation than that of *criminal* juſtice."

Pardoning the pun, it muſt be *criminal* juſtice indeed that ſhould condemn a work as a ſubſtitute for not being able to refute it. The greateſt condemnation that could be paſſed upon it would be a refutation. But in proceeding by the method Mr. Burke alludes to, the condemnation would, in the final event, paſs upon the criminality of the proceſs and not upon the work, and in this caſe, I had rather be the author, than be either the judge, or the jury, that ſhould condemn it.

But to come at once to the point. I have differed from ſome profeſſional gentlemen on the ſubject of proſecutions, and I ſince find they are falling into my opinion, which I will here ſtate as fully, but as conciſely as I can.

I will firſt put a caſe with reſpect to any law, and then compare it with a government, or with what in England is, or has been, called a conſtitution.

It would be an act of deſpotiſm, or what in England is called arbitrary power, to make a law to prohibit inveſtigating the principles, good or bad, on which ſuch a law, or any other is founded.

If a law be bad, it is one thing to oppoſe the practice of it, but it is quite a different thing to expoſe its errors, to reaſon on its defects, and to ſhew cauſe why it ſhould be repealed, or why another ought to be ſubſtituted in its place. I have always held it an opinion (making it alſo my practice) that it is better to obey a bad law, making uſe at the ſame time of every argument to ſhew its errors and procure its repeal, than forcibly to violate it; becauſe the precedent of breaking a bad law might weaken the reſpect lead to a diſcretionary violation, of thoſe which are good.

The caſe is the ſame with reſpect to principles and forms of government, or to what are called conſtitutions and the parts of which they are compoſed.

It is for the good of nations, and not for the emolument or aggrandizement of particular individuals, that government ought to be eſtabliſhed, and that mankind are at the expence of ſupporting it. The defects of every government and conſtitution, both as to principle and form muſt, on a parity of reaſoning, be as open to diſcuſſion as the defects of a law, and it is a duty which every man owes to ſociety to point them out. When thoſe defects, and the means of remedying them are generally ſeen by a nation, that nation will reform its government or its conſtitution in the one caſe, as the government repealed or reformed the law in the other. The operation of government is reſtricted to the making and the adminiſtering of laws; but it is to a nation that the right of forming or reforming, generating or regenerating conſtitutions and governments belong; and conſequently thoſe ſubjects, as ſubjects of inveſtigation, are always before a country *as a matter of right*, and cannot, without invading the general rights of that country, be made ſubjects for proſecution. On this ground I will meet Mr. Burke whenever he pleaſe. It is better that the whole argument ſhould come out, than to ſeek to ſtifle it. It was himſelf that opened the controverſy, and he ought not to deſert it.

I do not believe that monarchy and ariſtocracy will continue ſeven years longer in any of the enlightened countries in Europe. If better reaſons can be ſhewn for them than againſt them, they will ſtand; if the contrary, they will not. Mankind are not now to be told they ſhall not think, or they ſhall not read; and publications that go no farther than to inveſtigate principles of government, to invite men to reaſon and to reflect, and to ſhew the errors and excellencies of different ſyſtems, have a right to appear. If they do not excite attention, they are not worth the trouble of a proſecution; and if they do, the proſecution will amount to nothing, ſince it cannot amount to a prohibition of reading. This would be a ſentence on the public, inſtead of the author, and would alſo be the moſt effectual mode of making or haſtening revolutions.

On all caſes that apply univerſally to a nation, with reſpect to ſyſtems of government, a jury of *twelve* men is not competent to decide. Where there are no witneſſes to be examined, no facts to be proved, and where the whole matter is before the whole public, and the merits or demerits of it reſting on their opinion; and where there is nothing to be known in a court, but what every body knows out of it, every twelve men is equally as good a jury as the other, and would moſt probably reverſe each other's verdict; or from the variety of their opinions, not be able to form one. It is one caſe, whether a nation approve a work, or a plan; but is quite another caſe, whether it will commit to any ſuch jury the power of determining whether that nation have a right to, or ſhall reform its government, or not. I mention thoſe caſes, that Mr. Burke may ſee I have not written on Government without reflecting on what is Law, as well as on what are Rights.—The only effectual jury in ſuch caſes would be, a convention of the whole nation fairly elected; for in all ſuch caſes the whole nation is the vicinage. If Mr. Burke will propoſe ſuch a jury, I will wave all privileges of being the citizen of any other country, and, defending its principles, abide the iſſue, provided he will do the ſame; for my opinion is, that his work and his principles would be condemned inſtead of mine.

As to the prejudices which men have from education and habit, in favour of any particular form or ſyſtem of government, thoſe prejudices have yett o ſtand the teſt of reaſon and reflection. In fact, ſuch pre-

judices

judices are nothing. No man is prejudiced in favour of a thing, knowing it to be wrong,. He is attached to it on the belief of its being right; and when he ſees it is not ſo, the prejudice will be gone We have but a defective idea of what prejudice is. It might be ſaid, that until men think for themſelves the whole is prejudice, and *not opinion*; for that only is opinion which is the reſult of reaſon and reflection. I offer this remark, that Mr. Burke may not confide too much in what has been the cuſtomary prejudices of the country.

I do not believe that the people of England have ever been fairly and candidly dealt by. They have been impoſed upon by parties, and by men aſſuming the character of leaders. It is time that the nation ſhould riſe above thoſe trifles. It is time to diſmiſs that inattention which has ſo long been the encouraging cauſe of ſtretching taxation to exceſs. It is time to diſmiſs all thoſe ſongs and toaſts which are calculated to enſlave, and operate to ſuffocate reflection. On all ſuch ſubjects men have but to think, and they will neither act wrong nor be miſled. To ſay that any people are not fit for freedom, is to make poverty their choice, and to ſay they had rather be loaded with taxes than not. If ſuch a caſe could be proved, it would equally prove, that thoſe who govern are not fit to govern them, for they are a part of the ſame nation and naſs.

But admiting governments to be changed all over Europe it certainly may be done without convulſion or revenge. It is not worth making changes or revolutions, unleſs it be for ſome great national benefit; and when this ſhall appear to a nation, the danger will be, as in America and France, to thoſe who oppoſe; and with this reflection I cloſe my Preface.

THOMAS PAINE.

London, Feb. 9, 1792.

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RIGHTS OF MAN.

PART II.

INTRODUCTION.

WHAT Archimedes ſaid of the mechanical powers, may be applied to Reaſon and Liberty: "*Had we*, ſaid he, "*a place to ſtand upon, we might raiſe the world.*"

The revolution of America preſented in politics what was only theory in mechanics. So deeply rooted were all the governments of the old world, and ſo effectually had the tyranny and the antiquity of habit eſtabliſhed itſelf over the mind, that no beginning could be made in Aſia, Africa, or Europe, to reform the political condition of man. Freedom had been hunted round the globe; reaſon was conſidered as rebellion; and the ſlavery of fear had made men afraid to think.

But ſuch is the irreſiſtible nature of truth, that all it aſks, and all it wants, is the liberty of appearing. The ſun needs no inſcription to diſtinguiſh him from darkneſs; and no ſooner did the American governments diſplay themſelves to the world, than deſpotiſm felt a ſhock, and man began to contemplate redreſs.

The independence of America, conſidered merely as a ſeparation from England, would have been a matter but of little importance, had it not been accompanied by a revolution in the principles and practice of governments. She made a ſtand, not for herſelf only, but for the world, and looked beyond the advantages herſelf could receive. Even the Heſſian, though hired to fight againſt her, may live to bleſs his defeat; and England, condemning the vicioufneſs of its government, rejoice in its miſcarriage.

As America was the only ſpot in the political world, where the principles of univerſal reformation could begin, ſo alſo was it the beſt in the natural world. An aſſemblage of circumſtances conſpired, not only to give birth, but to add gigantic maturity to its principles. The ſcene which that country preſents to the eye of a ſpectator, has ſomething in it which generates and encourages great ideas. Nature appears to him in magnitude. The mighty objects he beholds, act upon his mind by enlarging it,

it, and he partakes of the greatneſs he contemplates.---Its firſt ſettlers were emigrants from different European nations, and of diverſified profeſſions of religion, retiring from the governmental perſecutions of the old world, and meeting in the new, not as enemies, but as brothers. The wants which neceſſarily accompany the cultivation of a wilderneſs produced among them a ſtate of ſociety, which countries, long harraſſed by the quarrels and intrigues of governments, had neglected to cheriſh. In ſuch a ſituation man becomes what he ought. He ſees his ſpecies, not with the inhuman idea of a natural enemy, but as kindred; and the example ſhews to the artificial world, that man muſt go back to Nature for information.

From the rapid progreſs which America makes in every ſpecies of improvement, it is rational to conclude, that if the governments of Aſia, Africa, and Europe, had begun on a principle ſimilar to that of America, or had not been very early corrupted therefrom, that thoſe countries muſt, by this time, have been in a far ſuperior condition to what they are. Age after age has paſſed away, for no other purpoſe than to behold their wretchedneſs.---Could we ſuppoſe a ſpectator who knew nothing of the world, and who was put into it merely to make his obſervations, he would take a great part of the old world to be new, juſt ſtruggling with the difficulties and hardſhips of an infant ſettlement. He could not ſuppoſe that the hordes of miſerable poor, with which old countries abound, could be any other than thoſe who had not yet had time to provide for themſelves. Little would he think they were the conſequence of what in ſuch countries is called government.

If, from the more wretched parts of the old world, we look at thoſe which are in an advanced ſtage of improvement, we ſtill find the greedy hand of government thruſting itſelf into every corner and crevice of induſtry, and graſping the ſpoil of the multitude. Invention is continually exerciſed, to furniſh new pretences for revenue and taxation. It watches proſperity as its prey, and permits none to eſcape without a tribute.

As revolutions have begun, (and as the probability is always greater againſt a thing beginning, than of proceeding after it has begun), it is natural to expect that other revolutions will follow. The amazing and ſtill increaſing expences with which old governments are conducted, the numerous wars they engage in or provoke, the embarraſſments they throw in the way of univerſal civilization and commerce, and the oppreſſion and uſurpation they practiſe at home, have wearied out the patience, and exhauſted the property of the world. In ſuch a ſituation, and with the examples already exiſting, revolutions are to be looked for. They are become ſubjects of univerſal converſation, and may be conſidered as the *Order of the day*.

If ſyſtems of government can be introduced, leſs expenſive, and more productive of general happineſs, than thoſe which have exiſted, all attempts to oppoſe their progreſs will in the end

end be fruitleſs. Reaſon, like time, will make its own way, and prejudice will fall in a combat with intereſt. If univerſal peace, civilization, and commerce, are ever to be the happy lot of man, it cannot be accompliſhed but by a revolution in the ſyſtem of governments. All the monarchical governments are military. War is their trade, plunder and revenue their objects. While ſuch governments continue, peace has not the abſolute ſecurity of a day. What is the hiſtory of all monarchical governments, but a diſguſtful picture of human wretchedneſs, and the accidental reſpite of a few years repoſe? Wearied with war, and tired with human butchery, they ſat down to reſt, and called it peace. This certainly is not the condition that Heaven intended for man; and if *this be monarchy*, well might monarchy be reckoned among the ſins of the Jews.

The revolutions which formerly took place in the world, had nothing in them that intereſted the bulk of mankind. They extended only to a change of perſons and meaſures, but not of principles, and roſe or fell among the common tranſactions of the moment. What we now behold, may not improperly be called a "*counter revolution.*" Conqueſt and tyranny, at ſome early period, diſpoſſeſſed man of his rights, and he is now recovering them. And as the tide of all human affairs has its ebb and flow in directions contrary to each other, ſo alſo is it in this. Government founded on a *moral theory*, *on a ſyſtem of univerſal peace*, *on the indefeaſible hereditary Rights of Man*, is now revolving from weſt to eaſt, by a ſtronger impulſe than the government of the ſword revolved from eaſt to weſt. It intereſts not particular individuals, but nations, in its progreſs, and promiſes a new æra to the human race.

The danger to which the ſucceſs of revolutions is moſt expoſed, is that of attempting them before the principles on which they proceed, and the advantages to reſult from them, are ſufficiently ſeen and underſtood. Almoſt every thing appertaining to the circumſtances of a nation, has been abſorbed and confounded under the general and myſterious word *government*. Though it avoids taking to its account the errors it commits, and the miſchiefs it occaſions, it fails not to arrogate to itſelf whatever has the appearance of proſperity. It robs induſtry of its honours, by pedantickly making itſelf the cauſe of its effects; and purloins from the general character of man, the merits that appertain to him as a ſocial being.

It may therefore be of uſe, in this day of revolutions, to diſcriminate between thoſe things which are the effect of government, and thoſe which are not. This will beſt be done by taking a review of ſociety and civilization, and the conſequences reſulting therefrom, as things diſtinct from what are called governments. By beginning with this inveſtigation, we ſhall be able to aſſign effects to their proper cauſe, and analize the maſs of common errors.

CHAP. I.

Of SOCIETY and CIVILIZATION.

GREAT part of that order which reigns among mankind is not the effect of government. It has its origin in the principles of ſociety and the natural conſtitution of man. It exiſted prior to government, and would exiſt if the formality of government was aboliſhed. The mutual dependence and reciprocal intereſt which man has upon man, and all the parts of a civilized community upon each other, create that great chain of connection which holds it together. The landholder, the farmer, the manufacturer, the merchant, the tradeſman, and every occupation, proſpers by the aid which each receives from the other, and from the whole. Common intereſt regulates their concerns, and forms their law; and the laws which common uſage ordains, have a greater influence than the laws of government. In fine, ſociety performs for itſelf almoſt every thing which is aſcribed to government.

To underſtand the nature and quantity of government proper for man, it is neceſſary to attend to his character. As Nature created him for ſocial life, ſhe fitted him for the ſtation ſhe intended. In all caſes ſhe made his natural wants greater than his individual powers. No one man is capable, without the aid of ſociety, of ſupplying his own wants; and thoſe wants acting upon every individual, impel the whole of them into ſociety, as naturally as gravitation acts to a center.

But ſhe has gone further. She has not only forced man into ſociety, by a diverſity of wants, which the reciprocal aid of each other can ſupply, but ſhe has implanted in him a ſyſtem of ſocial affections, which, though not neceſſary to his exiſtence, are eſſential to his happineſs. There is no period in life when this love for ſociety ceaſes to act. It begins and ends with our being.

If we examine, with attention, into the compoſition and conſtitution of man, the diverſity of his wants, and the diverſity of talents in different men for reciprocally accommodating the wants of each other, his propenſity to ſociety, and conſequently to preſerve the advantages reſulting from it, we ſhall eaſily diſcover, that a great part of what is called government is mere impoſition.

Government is no farther neceſſary than to ſupply the few caſes to which ſociety and civilization are not conveniently competent; and inſtances are not wanting to ſhew, that every thing which government can uſefully add thereto, has been performed by the common conſent of ſociety, without government.

For upwards of two years from the commencement of the American war, and to a longer period in ſeveral of the American States, there were no eſtabliſhed forms of government. The old governments had been aboliſhed, and the country was too much

much occupied in defence, to employ its attention in eſtabliſhing new governments; yet during this interval, order and harmony were preſerved as inviolate as in any country in Europe. There is a natural aptneſs in man, and more ſo in ſociety, becauſe it embraces a greater variety of abilities and reſource, to accommodate itſelf to whatever ſituation it is in. The inſtant formal government is aboliſhed, ſociety begins to act. A general aſſociation takes place, and common intereſt produces common ſecurity.

So far is it from being true, as has been pretended, that the abolition of any formal government is the diſſolution of ſociety, that it acts by a contrary impulſe, and brings the latter the cloſer together. All that part of its organization which it had committed to its government, devolves again upon itſelf, and acts through its medium. When men, as well from natural inſtinct, as from reciprocal benefits, have habituated themſelves to ſocial and civilized life, there is always enough of its principles in practice to carry them through any changes they may find neceſſary or convenient to make in their government. In ſhort, man is ſo naturally a creature of ſociety, that it is almoſt impoſſible to put him out of it.

Formal government makes but a ſmall part of civilized life; and when even the beſt that human wiſdom can deviſe is eſtabliſhed, it is a thing more in name and idea, than in fact. It is to the great and fundamental principles of ſociety and civilization---to the common uſage univerſally conſented to, and mutually and reciprocally maintained---to the unceaſing circulation of intereſt, which, paſſing through its million channels, invigorates the whole maſs of civilized man---it is to theſe things, infinitely more than to any thing which even the beſt inſtituted government can perform, that the ſafety and proſperity of the individual and of the whole depends.

The more perfect civilization is, the leſs occaſion has it for government, becauſe the more does it regulate its own affairs, and govern itſelf; but ſo contrary is the practice of old governments to the reaſon of the caſe, that the expences of them increaſe in the proportion they ought to diminiſh. It is but few general laws that civilized life requires, and thoſe of ſuch common uſefulneſs, that whether they are enforced by the forms of government or not, the effect will be nearly the ſame. If we conſider what the principles are that firſt condenſe men into ſociety, and what the motives that regulate their mutual intercourſe afterwards, we ſhall find, by the time we arrive at what is called government, that nearly the whole of the buſineſs is performed by the natural operation of the parts upon each other.

Man, with reſpect to all thoſe matters, is more a creature of conſiſtency than he is aware, or that governments would wiſh him to believe. All the great laws of ſociety are laws of nature. Thoſe of trade and commerce, whether with reſpect to the intercourſe of individuals, or of nations, are laws of mutual and reciprocal intereſt. They are followed and obeyed becauſe it is

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the intereſt of the parties ſo to do, and not on account of any formal laws their governments may impoſe or interpoſe.

But how often is the natural propenſity to ſociety diſturbed or deſtroyed by the operations of government. When the latter, inſtead of being ingrafted on the principles of the former, aſſumes to exiſt for itſelf, and acts by partialities of favour and oppreſſion, it becomes the cauſe of the miſchiefs it ought to prevent.

If we look back to the riots and tumults, which at various times have happened in England, we ſhall find, that they did not proceed from the want of a government, but that government was itſelf the generating cauſe; inſtead of conſolidating ſociety it divided it; it deprived it of its natural coheſion, and engendered diſcontents and diſorders, which otherwiſe would not have exiſted. In thoſe aſſociations which men promiſcuouſly form for the purpoſe of trade, or of any concern, in which government is totally out of the queſtion, and in which they act merely on the principles of ſociety, we ſee how naturally the various parties unite; and this ſhews, by compariſon, that governments, ſo far from being always the cauſe or means of order, are often the deſtruction of it. The riots of 1780 had no other ſource than the remains of thoſe prejudices, which the government itſelf had encouraged. But with reſpect to England there are alſo other cauſes.

Exceſs and inequality of taxation, however diſguiſed in the means, never fail to appear in their effects. As a great maſs of the community are thrown thereby into poverty and diſcontent, they are conſtantly on the brink of commotion; and deprived, as they unfortunately are, of the means of information, are eaſily heated to outrage. Whatever the apparent cauſe of any riots may be, the real one is always want of happineſs. It ſhews, that ſomething is wrong in the ſyſtem of government, that injures the felicity by which ſociety is to be preſerved.

But as fact is ſuperior to reaſoning, the inſtance of America preſents itſelf to confirm theſe obſervations.---If there is a country in the world, where concord, according to common calculation, would be leaſt expected, it is America. Made up, as it is, of people from different nations *, accuſtomed to different forms and habits of government, ſpeaking different languages, and more different in their modes of worſhip, it would appear

* That part of America which is generally called New-England, including New-Hampſhire, Maſſachuſetts, Rhode-Iſland, and Connecticut, is peopled chiefly by Engliſh deſcendants. In the ſtate of New-York, about half are Dutch, the reſt Engliſh, Scotch, and Iriſh. In New-Jerſey, a mixture of Engliſh and Dutch, with ſome Scotch and Iriſh. In Pennſylvania, about one third are Engliſh, another Germans, and the remainder Scotch and Iriſh, with ſome Swedes. The States to the ſouthward have a greater proportion of Engliſh than the middle States, but in all of them there is a mixture; and beſides thoſe enumerated, there are a conſiderable number of French, and ſome few of all the European nations lying on the coaſt. The moſt numerous religious denomination are the Preſbyterians; but no one ſect is eſtabliſhed above another, and all men are equally citizens.

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that the union of ſuch a people was impracticable; but by the ſimple operation of conſtructing government on the principles of ſociety and the rights of man, every difficulty retires, and all the parts are brought into cordial uniſon. There the poor are not oppreſſed, the rich are not privileged. Induſtry is not mortified by the ſplendid extravagance of a court rioting at its expence. Their taxes are few, becauſe their government is juſt; and as there is nothing to render them wretched, there is nothing to engender riots and tumults.

A metaphyſical man, like Mr. Burke, would have tortured his invention to diſcover how ſuch a people could be governed. He would have ſuppoſed that ſome muſt be managed by fraud, others by force, and all by ſome contrivance; that genius muſt be hired to impoſe upon ignorance and ſhew and parade to faſcinate the vulgar. Loſt in the abundance of his reſearches, he would have reſolved and re-reſolved, and finally overlooked the plain and eaſy road that lay directly before him.

One of the great advantages of the American revolution has been, that it led to a diſcovery of the principles, and laid open the impoſition, of governments. All the revolutions till then had been worked within the atmoſphere of a court, and never on the great floor of a nation. The parties were always of the claſs of courtiers; and whatever was their rage for reformation, they carefully preſerved the fraud of the profeſſion.

In all caſes they took care to repreſent government as a thing made up of myſteries, which only themſelves underſtood; and they hid from the underſtanding of the nation, the only thing that was beneficial to know, namely, *That government is nothing more than a national aſſociation acting on the principles of ſociety.*

Having thus endeavoured to ſhew, that the ſocial and civilized ſtate of man is capable of performing within itſelf, almoſt every thing neceſſary to its protection and government, it will be proper, on the other hand, to take a review of the preſent old governments, and examine whether their principles and practice are correſpondent thereto.

CHAP. II.

Of the ORIGIN of the PRESENT OLD GOVERNMENTS.

IT is impoſſible that ſuch goverments as have hitherto exiſted in the world, could have commenced by any other means than a total violation of every principle ſacred and moral. The obſcurity in which the origin of all the preſent old governments is buried, implies the iniquity and diſgrace with which they began. The origin of the preſent government of America and France will ever be remembered, becauſe it is honourable to record it; but with reſpect to the reſt, even Flattery has conſigned them to the tomb of time, without an inſcription.

It could have been no difficult thing in the early and ſolitary ages of the world, while the chief employment of men was that of attending flocks and herds, for a banditti of ruffians to overrun a country, and lay it under contributions. Their power being thus eſtabliſhed, the chief of the band contrived to loſe the name of Robber in that of Monarch; and hence the origin of Monarchy and Kings.

The origin of the government of England, ſo far as relates to what is called its line of monarchy, being one of the lateſt, is perhaps the beſt recorded. The hatred which the Norman invaſion and tyranny begat, muſt have been deeply rooted in the nation, to have outlived the contrivance to obliterate it. Though not a courtier will talk of the curfew-bell, not a village in England has forgotten it.

Thoſe bands of robbers having parcelled out the world, and divided it into dominions, began, as is naturally the caſe, to quarrel with each other. What at firſt was obtained by violence, was conſidered by others as lawful to be taken, and a ſecond plunderer ſucceeded the firſt. They alternately invaded the dominions which each had aſſigned to himſelf, and the brutality with which they treated each other explains the original character of monarchy. It was ruffian torturing ruffian. The conqueror conſidered the conquered, not as his priſoner, but his property. He led him in triumph rattling in chains, and doomed him, at pleaſure, to ſlavery or death. As time obliterated the hiſtory of their beginning, their ſucceſſors aſſumed new appearances, to cut off the entail of their diſgrace, but their principles and objects remained the ſame. What at firſt was plunder, aſſumed the ſofter name of revenue; and the power originally uſurped, they affected to inherit.

From ſuch beginning of governments, what could be expected, but a continual ſyſtem of war and extortion? It has eſtabliſhed itſelf into a trade. The vice is not peculiar to one more than to another, but is the common principle of all. There does not exiſt within ſuch governments ſufficient ſtamina whereon to ingraft reformation; and the ſhorteſt, eaſieſt, and moſt effectual remedy, is to begin anew on the ground of the oration.

What ſcenes of horror, what perfection of iniquity, preſent themſelves in contemplating the character, and reviewing the hiſtory of ſuch governments! If we would delineate human nature with a baſeneſs of heart, and hypocriſy of countenance, that reflection would ſhudder at and humanity diſown, it is kings, courts, and cabinets, that muſt ſit for the portrait. Man, naturally as he is, with all his faults about him, is not up to the character.

Can we poſſibly ſuppoſe that if governments had originated in a right principle, and had not an intereſt in purſuing a wrong one, that the world could have been in the wretched and quarrelſome condition we have ſeen it? What inducement has the farmer, while following the plough, to lay aſide his peaceful purſuit, and go to war with the farmer of another country? or what inducement has the manufacturer? What is dominion to them, or to any claſs of men in a nation? Does it add an acre to any man's eſtate, or raiſe its value? Are not conqueſt and defeat each of the ſame price, and taxes the never-failing conſequence?—Though this reaſoning may be good to a nation, it is not ſo to a government. War is the Pharo table of governments, and nations the dupes of the games.

If there is any thing to wonder at in this miſerable ſcene of governments, more than might be expected, it is the progreſs which the peaceful arts of agriculture, manufacture and commerce have made, beneath ſuch a long accumulating load of diſcouragement and oppreſſion. It ſerves to ſhew, that inſtinct in animals does not act with ſtronger impulſe, than the principles of ſociety and civilization operate in man. Under all diſcouragements, he purſues his object, and yields to nothing but impoſſibilities.

CHAP. III.

Of the OLD and NEW SYSTEMS of GOVERNMENT.

NOTHING can appear more contradictory than the principles on which the old governments began, and the condition to which ſociety, civilization, and commerce, are capable of carrying mankind. Government on the old ſyſtem, is an aſſumption of power, for the aggrandizement of itſelf; on the new, a delegation of power, for the common benefit of ſociety. The former ſupports itſelf by keeping up a ſyſtem of war; the latter promotes a ſyſtem of peace, as the true means of enriching a nation. The one encourages national prejudices; the other promotes univerſal ſociety, as the means of univerſal commerce. The one meaſures its proſperity, by the quantity of revenue it extorts; the other proves its excellence, by the ſmall quantity of taxes it requires.

Mr. Burke has talked of old and new whigs. If he can amuſe himſelf with childiſh names and diſtinctions, I ſhall not interrupt his pleaſure. It is not to him, but to the Abbé Sieyes, that I addreſs this chapter. I am already engaged to the latter gentleman, to diſcuſs the ſubject of monarchical government; and as it naturally occurs in comparing the old and new ſyſtems, I make this the opportunity of preſenting to him my obſervations. I ſhall occaſionally take Mr. Burke in my way.

Though it might be proved that the ſyſtem of government now called the NEW, is the moſt ancient in principle of all that have exiſted, being founded on the original inherent Rights of Man; yet, as tyranny and the ſword have ſuſpended the exerciſe of thoſe rights for many centuries paſt, it ſerves better the purpoſe of diſtinction to call it the *new*, than to claim the right of calling it the old.

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The first general distinction between those two systems, is, that the one now called the old is *hereditary*, either in whole or in part; and the new is entirely *representative*. It rejects all hereditary government:

First, as being an imposition on mankind.

Secondly, As inadequate to the purposes for which government is necessary.

With respect to the first of these heads—It cannot be proved by what right hereditary government could begin: neither does there exist within the compass of mortal power, a right to establish it. Man has no authority over posterity in matters of personal right; and therefore, no man, or body of men, had, or can have, a right to set up hereditary government. Were even ourselves to come again into existence, instead of being succeeded by posterity, we have not now the right of taking from ourselves the rights which would then be ours. On what ground, then, do we pretend to take them from others?

With respect to the second head, that of being inadequate to the purposes for which government is necessary, we have only to consider what government essentially is, and compare it with the circumstances to which hereditary succession is subject.

Government ought to be a thing always in full maturity. It ought to be so constructed as to be superior to all the accidents to which individual man is subject; and therefore, hereditary succession, by being *subject to them all*, is the most irregular and imperfect of all the systems of government.

We have heard the *Rights of Man* called a *levelling* system; but the only system to which the word *levelling* is truly applicable, is the hereditary monarchical system. It is a system of *mental levelling*. It indiscriminately admits every species of character to the same authority. Vice and virtue, ignorance and wisdom, in short, every quality, good or bad, is put on the same level. Kings succeed each other, not as rationals, but as animals. It signifies not what their mental or moral characters are. Can we then be surprised at the abject state of the human mind in monarchical countries, when the government itself is formed on such an abject levelling system?---It has no fixed character. To-day it is one thing; to-morrow it is something else. It changes with the temper of every succeeding individual, and is subject to all the varieties of each. It is government through the medium of passions and accidents. It appears under all the various characters of childhood, decrepitude, dotage, a thing at nurse, in leading-strings, or in crutches. It reverses the wholesome order of nature. It occasionally puts children over men, and the conceits of non-age over wisdom and experience. In short, we cannot conceive a more ridiculous figure of government, than hereditary succession, in a lits cases, presents.

Could it be made a decree in nature, or an edict registered in heaven, and man could know it, that virtue and wisdom should invariably appertain to hereditary succession, the objections to it would

would be removed; but when we see that nature acts as if she disowned and sported with the hereditary system; that the mental characters of successors, in all countries, are below the average of human understanding; that one is a tyrant, another an ideot, a third insane, and some all three together, it is impossible to attach confidence to it, when reason in man has power o act.

It is not to the Abbé Sieyes that I need apply this reasoning; he has already saved me that trouble, by giving his own opinion upon the case. "If it be asked," says he, "what is "my opinion with respect to hereditary right, I answer, with- "out hesitation, That, in good theory, an hereditary trans- "mission of any power or office, can never accord with the "laws of a true representation. Hereditaryship is, in this sense, "as much an attaint upon principle, as an outrage upon society. "But let us," continues he, "refer to the history of all elec- "tive monarchies and principalities: Is there one in which the "elective mode is not worse than the hereditary succession?"

As to debating on which is the worst of the two, is admitting both to be bad; and herein we are agreed. The preference which the Abbé has given, is a condemnation of the thing he prefers. Such a mode of reasoning on such a subject is inadmissible, because it finally amounts to an accusation upon Providence, as if she had left to man no other choice with respect to government than between two evils, the best of which he admits to be "*an attaint upon principle, and an outrage upon society.*"

Passing over, for the present, all the evils and mischiefs which monarchy has occasioned in the world, nothing can more effectually prove its uselessness in a state of *civil government*, than making it hereditary. Would we make any office hereditary that required wisdom and abilities to fill it? and where wisdom and abilities are not necessary, such an office, whatever it may be, is superfluous or insignificant.

Hereditary succession is a burlesque upon monarchy. It puts it in the most ridiculous light, by presenting it as an office, which any child or ideot may fill. It requires some talents to be a common mechanic; but to be a king, requires only the animal figure of man---a sort of breathing automaton. This sort of superstition may last a few years more, but it cannot long resist the awakened reason and interest of man.

As to Mr. Burke, he is a stickler for monarchy, not altogether as a pensioner, if he is one, which I believe, but as a political man.

He has taken up a contemptible opinion of mankind, who, in their turn, are taking up the same of him. He considers them as a herd of beings that must be governed by fraud, effigy, and shew; and an idol would be as good a figure of monarchy with him, as a man. I will, however, do him the justice to say, that, with respect to America, he has been very complimentary. He always contended, at least in my hearing, that

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the people of America were more enlightened than thoſe of England, or of any country in Europe; and that therefore the impoſition of ſhew was not neceſſary in their governments.

Though the compariſon between hereditary and elective monarchy, which the Abbé has made, is unneceſſary to the caſe, becauſe the repreſentative ſyſtem rejects both; yet, were I to make the compariſon, I ſhould decide contrary to what he has done.

The civil wars which have originated from conteſted hereditary claims, are more numerous, and have been more dreadful, and of longer continuance, than thoſe which have been occaſioned by election. All the civil wars in France aroſe from the hereditary ſyſtem; they were either produced by hereditary claims, or by the imperfection of the hereditary form, which admits of regencies, or monarchies at nurſe. With reſpect to England, its hiſtory is full of the ſame misfortunes. The conteſts for ſucceſſion between the houſes of York and Lancaſter, laſted a whole century; and others of a ſimilar nature, have renewed themſelves ſince that period. Thoſe of 1715 and 1745, were of the ſame kind. The ſucceſſion war for the crown of Spain, embroiled almoſt half Europe. The diſturbances in Holland are generated from the hereditaryſhip of the Stadtholder. A government calling itſelf free, with an hereditary office, is like a thorn in the fleſh, that produces a fermentation which endeavours to diſcharge it.

But I might go further, and place alſo foreign wars, of whatever kind, to the ſame cauſe. It is by adding the evil of hereditary ſucceſſion to that of monarchy, that a permanent family intereſt is created, whoſe conſtant objects are dominion and revenue. Poland, though an elective monarchy, has had fewer wars than thoſe which are hereditary; and it is the only government that has made a voluntary eſſay, though but a ſmall one, to reform the condition of the country.

Having thus glanced at a few of the defects of the old, or hereditary ſyſtems of government, let us compare it with the new, or repreſentative ſyſtem.

The repreſentative ſyſtem takes ſociety and civilization for its baſis; nature, reaſon, and experience, for its guide.

Experience, in all ages, and in all countries, has demonſtrated, that it is impoſſible to controul Nature in her diſtribution of mental powers. She gives them as ſhe pleaſes. Whatever is the rule by which ſhe, apparently to us, ſcatters them among mankind, that rule remains a ſecret to man. It would be as ridiculous to attempt to fix the hereditaryſhip of human beauty, as of wiſdom. Whatever wiſdom conſtituently is, it is like a ſeedleſs plant; it may be reared when it appears, but it cannot be voluntarily produced. There is always a ſufficiency ſomewhere in the general maſs of ſociety for all purpoſes; but with reſpect to the parts of ſociety, it is continually changing its place. It riſes in one to-day, in another to-morrow, and has moſt

moſt probably viſited in rotation every family of the earth, and again withdrawn.

As this is the order of nature, the order of government muſt neceſſarily follow it, or government will, as we ſee it does, degenerate into ignorance. The hereditary ſyſtem, therefore, is as repugnant to human wiſdom, as to human rights; and is as abſurd, as it is unjuſt.

As the republic of letters brings forward the beſt literary productions, by giving to genius a fair and univerſal chance; ſo the repreſentative ſyſtem of government is calculated to produce the wiſeſt laws, by collecting wiſdom from where it can be found. I ſmile to myſelf when I contemplate the ridiculous inſignificance into which literature and all the ſciences would ſink, were they made hereditary; and I carry the ſame idea into governments. An hereditary governor is as inconſiſtent as an hereditary author. I know not whether Homer or Euclid had ſons: but I will venture an opinion, that if they had, and had left their works unfiniſhed, thoſe ſons could not have completed them.

Do we need a ſtronger evidence of the abſurdity of hereditary government, than is ſeen in the deſcendants of thoſe men, in any line of life, who once were famous? Is there ſcarcely an inſtance in which there is not a total reverſe of the character? It appears as if the tide of mental faculties flowed as far as it could in certain channels, and then forſook its courſe, and aroſe in others. How irrational then is the hereditary ſyſtem which eſtabliſhes channels of power, in company with which wiſdom refuſes to flow! By continuing this abſurdity, man is perpetually in contradiction with himſelf; he accepts, for a king, or a chief magiſtrate, or a legiſlator, a perſon whom he would not elect for a conſtable.

It appears to general obſervation, that revolutions create genius and talents; but thoſe events do no more than bring them forward. There is exiſting in man, a maſs of ſenſe lying in a dormant ſtate, and which, unleſs ſomething excites it to action, will deſcend with him, in that condition, to the grave. As it is to the advantage of ſociety that the whole of its faculties ſhould be employed, the conſtruction of government ought to be ſuch as to bring forward, by a quiet and regular operation, all that extent of capacity which never fails to appear in revolutions.

This cannot take place in the inſipid ſtate of hereditary government, not only becauſe it prevents, but becauſe it operates to benumb. When the mind of a nation is bowed down by any political ſuperſtition in its government, ſuch as hereditary ſucceſſion is, it loſes a conſiderable portion of its powers on all other ſubjects and objects. Hereditary ſucceſſion requires the ſame obedience to ignorance, as to wiſdom; and when once the mind can bring itſelf to pay this indiſcriminate reverence, it deſcends below the ſtature of mental manhood. It is fit to be great only in little things. It acts a treachery upon itſelf, and ſuffocates the ſenſations that urge the detection.

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Though the ancient governments preſent to us a miſerable picture of the condition of man, there is one which above all others exempts itſelf from the general deſcription. I mean the democracy of the Athenians. We ſee more to admire, and leſs to condemn, in that great, extraordinary people, than in any thing which hiſtory affords.

Mr. Burke is ſo little acquainted with conſtituent principles of government, that he confounds democracy and repreſentation together. Repreſentation was a thing unknown in the ancient democracies. In thoſe the maſs of the people met and enacted laws (grammatically ſpeaking) in the firſt perſon. Simple democracy was no other than the common-hall of the ancients. It ſignifies the *form*, as well as the public principle of the government. As theſe democracies increaſed in population, and the territory extended, the ſimple democratical form became unwieldy and impracticable; and as the ſyſtem of repreſentation was not known, the conſequence was, they either degenerated convulſively into monarchies, or became abſorbed into ſuch as then exiſted. Had the ſyſtem of repreſentation been then underſtood, as it now is, there is no reaſon to believe that thoſe forms of government, now called monarchical and ariſtocratical, would ever have taken place. It was the want of ſome method to conſolidate the parts of ſociety, after it became too populous, and too extenſive for the ſimple democratical form, and alſo the lax and ſolitary condition of ſhepherds and herdſmen in other parts of the world, that afforded opportunities to thoſe unnatural modes of government to begin.

As it is neceſſary to clear away the rubbiſh of errors, into which the ſubject of government has been thrown, I ſhall proceed to remark on ſome others.

It has always been the political craft of courtiers and courtgovernments, to abuſe ſomething which they called republicaniſm; but what republicaniſm was, or is, they never attempt to explain. Let us examine a little into this caſe.

The only forms of government are, the democratical, the ariſtocratical, the monarchical, and what is now called the repreſentative.

What is called a *republic*, is not any *particular form* of government. It is wholly characteriſtical of the purport, matter, or object for which government ought to be inſtituted, and on which it is to be employed, RES-PUBLICA, the public affairs, or the public good; or, literally tranſlated, the *public thing*. It is a word of a good original, referring to what ought to be the character and buſineſs of government; and in this ſenſe it is naturally oppoſed to the word *monarchy*, which has a baſe original ſignification. It means arbitrary power in an individual perſon; in the exerciſe of which, *himſelf*, and not the *res-publica*, is the object.

Every government that does not act on the principle of a *Republic*, or in other words, that does not make the *res-publica* its whole and ſole object, is not a good government. Republican government is no other than government eſtabliſhed and conducted for the intereſt of the public, as well individually as collectively. It is not neceſſarily connected with any particular form, but it moſt naturally aſſociates with the repreſentative form, as being beſt calculated to ſecure the end for which a nation is at the expence of ſupporting it.

Various forms of government have affected to ſtyle themſelves a republic. Poland calls itſelf a republic, which is an hereditary ariſtocracy, with what is called an elective monarchy. Holland calls itſelf a republic, which is chiefly ariſtocratical, with an hereditary ſtadtholderſhip. But the government of America, which is wholly on the ſyſtem of repreſentation, is the only real republic in character and in practice, that now exiſts. Its government has no other object than the public buſineſs of the nation, and therefore it is properly a republic; and the Americans have taken care that THIS, and no other, ſhall always be the object of their government, by their rejecting every thing hereditary, and eſtabliſhing government on the ſyſtem of repreſentation only.

Thoſe who have ſaid that a republic is not a *form* of government calculated for countries of great extent, miſtook, in the firſt place, the *buſineſs* of a government, for a *form* of government; for the *res-publica* equally appertains to every extent of territory and population. And, in the ſecond place, if they meant any thing with reſpect to *form*, it was the ſimple democratical form, ſuch was the mode of government in the ancient democracies, in which there was no repreſentation. The caſe, therefore, is not, that a republic cannot be extenſive, but that it cannot be extenſive on the ſimple democratical form; and the queſtion naturally preſents itſelf, *What is the beſt form of government for conducting the* RES-PUBLICA, *or the* PUBLIC BUSINESS *of a nation, after it becomes too extenſive and populous for the ſimple democratical form?*

It cannot be monarchy, becauſe monarchy is ſubject to an objection of the ſame amount to which the ſimple democratical form was ſubject.

It is probable that an individual may lay down a ſyſtem of principles, on which government ſhall be conſtitutionally eſtabliſhed to any extent of territory. This is no more than an operation of the mind, acting by its own powers. But the practice upon thoſe principles, as applying to the various and numerous circumſtances of a nation, its agriculture, manufacture, trade, commerce, &c. &c. requires a knowledge of a different kind, and which can be had only from the various parts of ſociety. It is an aſſemblage of practical knowledge, which no one individual can poſſeſs; and therefore the monarchical form is as much limited, in uſeful practice, from the incompetency of knowledge, as was the democratical form, from the multiplicity of population. The one degenerates, by extenſion, into confuſion; the other, into ignorance and incapacity, of which all the great monarchies are an evidence. The monarchical form, therefore,

therefore, could not be a ſubſtitute for the democratical, becauſe it has equal inconveniences.

Much leſs could it when made hereditary. This is the moſt effectual of all forms to preclude knowledge. Neither could the high democratical mind have voluntarily yielded itſelf to be governed by children and ideots, and all the motley inſignificance of character, which attends ſuch a mere animal ſyſtem, the diſgrace and the reproach of reaſon and of man.

As to the ariſtocratical form, it has the ſame vices and defects with the monarchical except that the chance of abilities is better from the proportion of numbers, but there is ſtill no ſecurity for the right uſe and application of them *.

Referring, then, to the original ſimple democracy, it affords the true data from which government on a large ſcale can begin. It is incapable of extenſion, not from its principle, but from the inconvenience of its form; and monarchy and ariſtocracy, from their incapacity. Retaining, then, democracy as the ground, and rejecting the corrupt ſyſtems of monarchy and ariſtocracy, the repreſentative ſyſtem naturally preſents itſelf; remedying at once the defects of the ſimple democracy as to form, and the incapacity of the other two with reſpect to knowledge.

Simple democracy was ſociety governing itſelf without the aid of ſecondary means. By ingrafting repreſentation upon democracy, we arrive at a ſyſtem of government capable of embracing and confederating all the various intereſts and every extent of territory and population; and that alſo with advantages as much ſuperior to hereditary government, as the republic of letters is to hereditary literature.

It is on this ſyſtem that the American government is founded. It is repreſentation ingrafted upon democracy. It has fixed the form by a ſcale parallel in all caſes to the extent of the principle. What Athens was in miniature, America will be in magnitude. The one was the wonder of the ancient world; the other is becoming the admiration, the model of the preſent. It is the eaſieſt of all the forms of government to be underſtood, and the moſt eligible in practice; and excludes at once the ignorance and inſecurity of the hereditary mode, and the inconvenience of the ſimple democracy.

It is impoſſible to conceive a ſyſtem of government capable of acting over ſuch an extent of territory, and ſuch a circle of intereſts, as is immediately produced by the operation of repreſentation. France, great and populous as it is, is but a ſpot in the capaciouſneſs of the ſyſtem. It adapts itſelf to all poſſible caſes. It is preferable to ſimple democracy even in ſmall territories. Athens, by repreſentation, would have outrivalled her own democracy.

* For a character of ariſtocracy, the reader is referred to *Rights of Man*, Part I. page 70.

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That which is called government, or rather that which we ought to conceive government to be, is no more than ſome common center, in which all the parts of ſociety unite. This cannot be accompliſhed by any method ſo conducive to the various intereſts of the community, as by the repreſentative ſyſtem. It concentrates the knowledge neceſſary to the intereſt of the parts, and of the whole. It places government in a ſtate of conſtant maturity. It is, as has been already obſerved, never young, never old. It is ſubject neither to nonage, nor dotage. It is never in the cradle, nor on crutches. It admits not of a ſeparation between knowledge and power, and is ſuperior, as government always ought to be, to all the accidents of individual man, and is therefore ſuperior to what is called monarchy.

A nation is not a body, the figure of which is to be repreſented by the human body; but is like a body contained within a circle, having a common centre, in which every radius meets; and that center is formed by repreſentation. To connect repreſentation with what is called monarchy, is eccentric government. Repreſentation is of itſelf the delegated monarchy of a nation, and cannot debaſe itſelf by dividing it with another.

Mr. Burke has two or three times, in his parliamentary ſpeeches, and in his publications, made uſe of a jingle of words that convey no ideas. Speaking of government, he ſays, "It is better to have monarchy for its baſis, and republicaniſm "for its corrective, than republicaniſm for its baſis, and monar-"chy for its corrective."—If he means that it is better to correct folly with wiſdom, than wiſdom with folly, I will no otherwiſe contend with him, than that it would be much better to reject the folly entirely.

But what is this thing which Mr. Burke calls monarchy? Will he explain it? All men can underſtand what repreſentation is; and that it muſt neceſſarily include a variety of knowledge and talents. But, what ſecurity is there for the ſame qualities on the part of monarchy? or, when this monarchy is a child, where then is the wiſdom? What does it know about government? Who then is the monarch, or where is the monarchy? If it is to be performed by regency, it proves it to be a farce. A regency is a mock ſpecies of republic, and the whole of monarchy deſerves no better deſcription. It is a thing as various as imagination can paint. It has none of th ſtable character that government ought to poſſeſs. Every ſucceſſion is a revolution, and every regency a counter-revolution. The whole of it is a ſcene of perpetual court cabal and intrigue, of which Mr. Burke is himſelf an inſtance. To render monarchy conſiſtent with government, the next in ſucceſſion ſhould not be born a child, but a man at once, and that man a Solomon. It is ridiculous that nations are to wait, and government be interrupted, till boys grow to be men.

Whether I have too little ſenſe to ſee, or too much to be impoſed upon; whether I have too much or too little pride, or

of any thing elſe, I leave out of the queſtion; but certain it is, that what is called monarchy, always appears to me a ſilly, contemptible thing. I compare it to ſomething kept behind a curtain, about which there is a great deal of buſtle and fuſs, and a wonderful air of ſeeming ſolemnity; but when, by any accident, the curtain happens to be open, and the company ſee what it is, they burſt into laughter.

In the repreſentative ſyſtem of government, nothing of this can happen. Like the nation itſelf, it poſſeſſes a perpetual ſtamina, as well of body as of mind, and preſents itſelf on the open theatre of the world in a fair and manly manner. Whatever are its excellences or its defects, they are viſible to all. It exiſts not by fraud and myſtery; it deals not in cant and ſophiſtry; but inſpires a language, that, paſſing from heart to heart, is felt and underſtood.

We muſt ſhut our eyes againſt reaſon, we muſt baſely degrade our underſtanding, not to ſee the folly of what is called monarchy. Nature is orderly in all her works; but this is a mode of government that counteracts nature. It turns the progreſs of the human faculties upſide down. It ſubjects age to be governed by children, and wiſdom by folly.

On the contrary, the repreſentative ſyſtem is always parallel with the order and immutable laws of nature, and meets the reaſon of man in every part. For example:

In the American federal government, more power is delegated to the Preſident of the United States, than to any other individual member of congreſs. He cannot, therefore, be elected to this office under the age of thirty-five years. By this time the judgment of man becomes matured, and he has lived long enough to be acquainted with men and things, and the country with him.—But on the monarchical plan, (excluſive of the numerous chances there are againſt every man born into the world, of drawing a prize in the lottery of human faculties), he next in ſucceſſion, whatever he may be, is put at the head of a nation, and of a government, at the age of eighteen years. Does this appear like an act of wiſdom? Is it conſiſtent with the proper dignity and the manly character of a nation? Where is the propriety of calling ſuch a lad the father of the people?—In all other caſes, a perſon is a minor until the age of twenty one years. Before this period, he is not truſted with the management of an acre of land, or with the heritable property of a flock of ſheep, or an herd of ſwine; but, wonderful to tell! he may, at the age of eighteen years, be truſted with a nation.

That monarchy is all a bubble, a mere court artifice to procure money, is evident, (at leaſt to me), in every character in which it can be viewed. It would be impoſſible, on the rational ſyſtem of repreſentative government, to make out a bill of expences to ſuch an enormous amount as this deception admits. Government is not of itſelf a very chargeable inſtitution.

The whole expence of the federal government of America, founded, as I have already ſaid, on the ſyſtem of repreſentation, and extending over a country nearly ten times as large as England, is but ſix hundred thouſand dollars, or one hundred and thirty-five thouſand pounds ſterling.

I preſume, that no man in his ſober ſenſes, will compare the character of any of the kings of Europe with that of General Waſhington. Yet, in France, and alſo in England, the expence of the civil liſt only, for the ſupport of one man, is eight times greater than the whole expence of the federal government in America. To aſſign a reaſon for this, appears almoſt impoſſible. The generality of people in America, eſpecially the poor, are more able to pay taxes, than the generality of people either in France or England.

But the caſe is, that the repreſentative ſyſtem diffuſes ſuch a body of knowledge throughout a nation, on the ſubject of government, as to explode ignorance and preclude impoſition. The craft of courts cannot be acted on that ground. There is no place for myſtery; no where for it to begin. Thoſe who are not in the repreſentation, know as much of the nature of buſineſs as thoſe who are. An affectation of myſterious importance would there be ſcouted. Nations can have no ſecrets; and the ſecrets of courts, like thoſe of individuals, are always their defects.

In the repreſentative ſyſtem, the reaſon for every thing muſt publicly appear. Every man is a proprietor in government, and conſiders it a neceſſary part of his buſineſs to underſtand. It concerns his intereſt, becauſe it affects his property. He examines the coſt, and compares it with the advantages; and above all, he does not adopt the ſlaviſh cuſtom of following what in other governments are called LEADERS.

It can only be by blinding the underſtanding of man, and making him believe that government is ſome wonderful myſterious thing, that exceſſive revenues are obtained. Monarchy is well calculated to enſure this end. It is the popery of government; a thing kept up to amuſe the ignorant, and quiet them into taxes.

The government of a free country, properly ſpeaking, is no in the perſons, but in the laws. The enacting of thoſe requires no great expence; and when they are adminiſtered, the whole of civil government is performed—the reſt is all court contrivance.

CHAP. IV.

Of CONSTITUTIONS.

THAT men mean diſtinct and ſeparate things when they ſpeak of conſtitutions and of governments, is evident; why, are thoſe terms diſtinctly and ſeparately uſed? A

conſtitution is not the act of a government, but of a people conſtituting a government; and government without a conſtitution, is power without a right.

All power exerciſed over a nation, muſt have ſome beginning. It muſt be either delegated, or aſſumed. There are no other ſources. All delegated power is truſt, and all aſſumed power is uſurpation. Time does not alter the nature and quality of either.

In viewing this ſubject, the caſe and circumſtances of America preſent themſelves as in the beginning of a world; and our enquiry into the origin of government is ſhortened, by referring to the facts that have ariſen in our own day. We have no occaſion to roam for information into the obſcure field of antiquity, nor hazard ourſelves upon conjecture. We are brought at once to the point of ſeeing government begin, as if we had lived in the beginning of time. The real volume, not of hiſtory, but of facts, is directly before us, unmutilated by contrivance, or the errors of tradition.

I will here conciſely ſtate the commencement of the American conſtitutions; by which the difference between conſtitutions and governments will ſufficiently appear.

It may not be improper to remind the reader, that the United States of America conſiſt of thirteen ſeparate ſtates, each of which eſtabliſhed a government for itſelf, after the declaration of independence, done the fourth of July 1776. Each ſtate acted independently of the reſt, in forming its government; but the ſame general principle pervades the whole. When the ſeveral ſtate governments were formed, they proceeded to form the federal government, that acts over the whole in all matters which concern the intereſt of the whole, or which relate to the intercourſe of the ſeveral ſtates with each other, or with foreign nations. I will begin with giving an inſtance from one of the ſtate governments, (that of Pennſylvania), and then proceed to the federal government.

The ſtate of Pennſylvania, though nearly of the ſame extent of territory as England, was then divided into only twelve counties. Each of thoſe counties had elected a committee at the commencement of the diſpute with the Engliſh government; and as the city of Philadelphia, which alſo had its committee, was the moſt central for intelligence, it became the center of communication to the ſeveral county committees. When it became neceſſary to proceed to the formation of a government, the committee of Philadelphia propoſed a conference of all the county committees, to be held in that city, and which met the latter end of July 1776.

Though theſe committees had been elected by the people, they were not elected expreſsly for the purpoſe, nor inveſted with the authority of forming a conſtitution; and as they could not, conſiſtently with the American idea of rights, aſſume ſuch a power, they could only confer upon the matter, and put it into a train of operation. The conferees, therefore, did no more than ſtate the caſe, and recommend to the ſeveral counties to elect ſix repreſentatives for each county, to meet in convention at Philadelphia, with powers to form a conſtitution, and propoſe it for public conſideration.

This convention, of which Benjamin Franklin was preſident, having met and deliberated, and agreed upon a conſtitution, they next ordered it to be publiſhed, not as a thing eſtabliſhed, but for the conſideration of the whole people, their approbation or rejection, and then adjourned to a ſtated time. When the time of adjournment was expired, the convention re-aſſembled; and as the general opinion of the people in approbation of it was then known, the conſtitution was ſigned, ſealed, and proclaimed on the *authority of the people*; and the original inſtrument depoſited as a public record. The convention then appointed a day for the general election of the repreſentatives who were to compoſe the government, and the time it ſhould commence; and having done this, they diſſolved, and returned to their ſeveral homes and occupations.

In this conſtitution were laid down, firſt, a declaration of rights. Then followed the form which the government ſhould have, and the powers it ſhould poſſeſs—the authority of the courts of judicature, and of juries—the manner in which elections ſhould be conducted, and the proportion of repreſentatives to the number of electors—the time which each ſucceeding aſſembly ſhould continue, which was one year—the mode of levying, and of accounting for the expenditure, of public money—of appointing public officers, &c. &c. &c.

No article of this conſtitution could be altered or infringed at the diſcretion of the government that was to enſue. It was to that government a law. But as it would have been unwiſe to preclude the benefit of experience, and in order alſo to prevent the accumulation of errors, if any ſhould be found, and to preſerve an uniſon of government with the circumſtances of the ſtate at all times, the conſtitution provided, that, at the expiration of every ſeven years, a convention ſhould be elected, for the expreſs purpoſe of reviſing the conſtitution, and making alterations, additions, or abolitions therein, if any ſuch ſhould be found neceſſary.

Here we ſee a regular proceſs—a government iſſuing out of a conſtitution, formed by the people in their original character; and that conſtitution ſerving, not only as an authority, but as a law of controul to the government. It was the political bible of the ſtate. Scarcely a family was without it. Every member of the government had a copy; and nothing was more common when any debate aroſe on the principle of a bill, or on the extent of any ſpecies of authority, than for the members to take the printed conſtitution out of their pocket, and read the chapter with which ſuch matter in debate was connected.

Having thus given an inſtance from one of the ſtates, I will ſhew the proceedings by which the federal conſtitution of the United States aroſe and was formed.

Congreſs, at its two firſt meetings, in September 1774, and May 1775, was nothing more than a deputation from the legiſlatures of the ſeveral provinces, afterwards ſtates; and had no other authority than what aroſe from common conſent, and the neceſſity of its acting as a public body. In every thing which related to the internal affairs of America, congreſs went no farther than to iſſue recommendations to the ſeveral provincial aſſemblies, who at diſcretion adopted them or not. Nothing on the part of congreſs was compulſive; yet, in this ſituation, it was more faithfully and affectionately obeyed, than was any government in Europe. This inſtance, like that of the national aſſembly in France, ſufficiently ſhews, that the ſtrength of government does not conſiſt in any thing *within* itſelf, but in the attachment of a nation, and the intereſt which the people feel in ſupporting it. When this is loſt, government is but a child in power; and though, like the old government of France, it may harraſs individuals for a while, it but facilitates its own fall.

After the declaration of independence, it became conſiſtent with the principle on which repreſentative government is founded, that the authority of congreſs ſhould be defined and eſtabliſhed. Whether that authority ſhould be more or leſs than congreſs then diſcretionally exerciſed, was not the queſtion. It was merely the rectitude of the meaſure.

For this purpoſe, the act, called the act of confederation, (which was a ſort of imperfect federal conſtitution), was propoſed, and, after long deliberation, was concluded in the year 1781. It was not the act of congreſs, becauſe it is repugnant to the principles of repreſentative government that a body ſhould give power to itſelf. Congreſs firſt informed the ſeveral ſtates of the powers which it conceived were neceſſary to be inveſted in the union, to enable it to perform the duties and ſervices required from it; and the ſtates ſeverally agreed with each other, and concentrated in congreſs thoſe powers.

It may not be improper to obſerve, that in both thoſe inſtances (the one of Pennſylvania, and the other of the United States), there is no ſuch thing as the idea of a compact between the people on one ſide, and the government on the other. The compact was that of the people with each other, to produce and conſtitute a government. To ſuppoſe that any government can be a party in a compact with the whole people, is to ſuppoſe it to have exiſtence before it can have a right to exiſt. The only inſtance in which a compact can take place between the people and thoſe who exerciſe the government, is, that the people ſhall pay them, while they chuſe to employ them.

Govern-

Government is not a trade which any man or body of men has a right to ſet up and exerciſe for his own emolument, but is altogether a truſt, in right of thoſe by whom that truſt is delegated, and by whom it is always reſumeable. It has of itſelf no rights; they are altogether duties.

Having thus given two inſtances of the original formation of a conſtitution, I will ſhew the manner in which both have been changed ſince their firſt eſtabliſhment.

The powers veſted in the governments of the ſeveral ſtates, by the ſtate conſtitutions, were found, upon experience, to be too great; and thoſe veſted in the federal government, by the act of confederation, too little. The defect was not in the principle, but in the diſtribution of power.

Numerous publications, in pamphlets and in the newſpapers, appeared, on the propriety and neceſſity of new modelling the federal government. After ſome time of public diſcuſſion, carried on through the channel of the preſs, and in converſations, the ſtate of Virginia, experiencing ſome inconvenience with reſpect to commerce, propoſed holding a continental conference; in conſequence of which, a deputation from five or ſix of the ſtate aſſemblies met at Anapolis in Maryland, in 1786. This meeting, not conceiving itſelf ſufficiently authoriſed to go into the buſineſs of a reform, did no more than ſtate their general opinions of the propriety of the meaſure, and recommend that a convention of all the ſtates ſhould be held the year following.

This convention met at Philadelphia in May 1787, of which General Waſhington was elected preſident. He was not at that time connected with any of the ſtate governments, or with congreſs. He delivered up his commiſſion when the war ended, and ſince then had lived a private citizen.

The convention went deeply into all the ſubjects; and having, after a variety of debate and inveſtigation, agreed among themſelves upon the ſeveral parts of a federal conſtitution, the next queſtion was, the manner of giving it authority and practice.

For this purpoſe, they firſt directed, that the propoſed conſtitution ſhould be publiſhed. Secondly, that each ſtate ſhould elect a convention, expreſsly for the purpoſe of taking it into conſideration, and of ratifying or rejecting it; and that as ſoon as the approbation and ratification of any nine ſtates ſhould be given, that thoſe ſtates ſhould proceed to the election of their proportion of members to the new federal government; and that the operation of it ſhould then begin, and the former federal government ceaſe.

The ſeveral ſtates proceeded accordingly to elect their conventions. Some of thoſe conventions ratified the conſtitution by very large majorities, and two or three unanimouſly. In others there were much debate and diviſion of opinion. In the

Maſſachuſetts convention, which met at Boſton, the majority was not above nineteen or twenty, in about three hundred members; but ſuch is the nature of repreſentative government, that it quietly decides all matters by majority. After the debate in the Maſſachuſetts convention was cloſed, and the vote taken, the objecting members roſe, and declared, "*That though they had argued and voted againſt it, becauſe certain parts appeared to them in a different light to what they appeared to other members; yet, as the vote had decided in favour of the conſtitution as propoſed, they ſhould give it the ſame practical ſupport as if they had voted for it.*"

As ſoon as nine ſtates had concurred, (and the reſt followed in the order their conventions were elected), the old fabric of the federal government was taken down, and the new one erected, of which general Waſhington is preſident.—In this place I cannot help remarking, that the character and ſervices of this gentleman are ſufficient to put all thoſe men called kings to ſhame. While they are receiving from the ſweat and labours of mankind, a prodigality of pay, to which neither their abilities nor their ſervices can entitle them, he is rendering every ſervice in his power, and refuſing every pecuniary reward. He accepted no pay as commander in chief; he accepts none as preſident of the United States.

After the new federal conſtitution was eſtabliſhed, the ſtate of Pennſylvania, conceiving that ſome parts of its own conſtitution required to be altered, elected a convention for that purpoſe. The propoſed alterations were publiſhed, and the people concurring therein, they were eſtabliſhed.

In forming thoſe conſtitutions, or in altering them, little or no inconvenience took place. The ordinary courſe of things was not interrupted, and the advantages have been much. It is always the intereſt of a far greater number of people in a nation to have things right, than to let them remain wrong; and when public matters are open to debate, and the public judgment free, it will not decide wrong, unleſs it decides too haſtily.

In the two inſtances of changing the conſtitutions, the governments then in being were not actors either way. Government has no right to make itſelf a party in any debate reſpecting the principles or modes of forming, or of changing, conſtitutions. It is not for the benefit of thoſe who exerciſe the powers of government, that conſtitutions, and the governments iſſuing from them, are eſtabliſhed. In all thoſe matters, the right of judging and acting are in thoſe who pay, and not in thoſe who receive.

A conſtitution is the property of a nation, and not of thoſe who exerciſe the government. All the conſtitutions of America are declared to be eſtabliſhed on the authority of the people. In France, the word nation is uſed inſtead of the people; but in

in both caſes, a conſtitution is a thing antecedent to the government, and always diſtinct therefrom.

In England, it is not difficult to perceive that every thing has a conſtitution, except the nation. Every ſociety and aſſociation that is eſtabliſhed, firſt agreed upon a number of original articles, digeſted into form, which are its conſtitution. It then appointed its officers, whoſe powers and authorities are deſcribed in that conſtitution, and the government of that ſociety then commenced. Thoſe officers, by whatever name they are called, have no authority to add to, alter, or abridge the original articles. It is only to the conſtituting power that this right belongs.

From the want of underſtanding the difference between a conſtitution and a government, Dr. Johnſon, and all the writers of his deſcription, have always bewildered themſelves. They could not but perceive, that there muſt neceſſarily be a *controuling* power exiſting ſomewhere, and they placed this power in the diſcretion of the perſons exerciſing the government, inſtead of placing it in a conſtitution formed by the nation. When it is in a conſtitution, it has the nation for its ſupport, and the natural and the political controuling powers are together. The laws which are enacted by governments, controul men only as individuals, but the nation, through its conſtitution, controuls the whole government, and has a natural ability ſo to do. The final controuling power, therefore, and the original conſtituting power, are one and the ſame power.

Dr. Johnſon could not have advanced ſuch a poſition in any country where there was a conſtitution; and he is himſelf an evidence, that no ſuch thing as a conſtitution exiſts in England. —But it may be put as a queſtion, not improper to be inveſtigated, That if a conſtitution does not exiſt, how came the idea of its exiſtence ſo generally eſtabliſhed?

In order to decide this queſtion, it is neceſſary to conſider a conſtitution in both its caſes:—Firſt, as creating a government and giving it powers. Secondly, as regulating and reſtraining the powers ſo given.

If we begin with William of Normandy, we find that the government of England was originally a tyranny, founded on an invaſion and conqueſt of the country. This being admitted, it will then appear, that the exertion of the nation, at different periods, to abate that tyranny, and render it leſs intolerable, has been credited for a conſtitution.

Magna Charta, as it was called, (it is now like an almanack of the ſame date,) was no more than compelling the government to renounce a part of its aſſumptions. It did not create and give powers to government in the manner a conſtitution does; but was, as far as it went, of the nature of a re-conqueſt, and not of a conſtitution; for could the nation have totally expelled the uſurpation, as France has done its deſpotiſm, it would then have had a conſtitution to form

[Here follows, on page 52 of the original edition, four paragraphs, making about eighteen lines of the same close printing as in this edition. They are a continuation of the argument which shews the manner in which restrictions upon power originally assumed have been mistaken for a constitution. But as those paragraphs are put into the information, and will publicly appear with the pleadings thereon, when the prosecution shall be brought to an issue, they are not verbally recited here, except the first of them, which is added in the annexed note, for the purpose of shewing the spirit of the prosecuting party, and the sort of matter which has been selected from the work for prosecution *.—— *N. B.* The whole of the several paragraphs, taken from the work for this purpose, does not amount to two pages of the same printing as in this edition, and where they occur in the original edition they will be noticed in this.—After the before mentioned four paragraphs the work proceeds as follows.]

I cannot believe that any nation, reasoning on its own rights, would have thought of calling those things *a constitution*, if the cry of constitution had not been set up by the government. It has got into circulation like the words *bore* and *quoz*, by being chalked up in the speeches of parliament, as those words were on window-shutters and door-posts; but whatever the constitution may be in other respects, it has undoubtedly been *the most productive machine of taxation that was ever invented.* The taxes in France, under the new constitution, are not quite thirteen shillings per head †, and the taxes in England, under what is called its present constitution, are forty-eight shillings and sixpence per head, men, women, and children, amounting to nearly seventeen millions sterling, besides the expence of collection, which is upwards of a million more.

In a country like England, where the whole of the civil government is executed by the people of every town and country, by means of parish officers, magistrates, quarterly sessions, juries, and assize; without any trouble to what is called the government, or any other expence to the revenue than the salary of the judges, it is astonishing how such a mass of taxes can be employed. Not even the internal defence of the country is paid out of the revenue. On all occasions, whether real or contrived, recourse is continually had to new loans and new taxes. No wonder, then, that a machine of government so advantageous to the advocates of a court, should be so triumphantly extolled! No wonder, that St. James's or St. Stephen's should echo with the continual cry of constitution! No wonder, that the French revolution should be reprobated, and the *res-publica* treated with reproach! The *red book* of England, like the red book of France, will explain the

I will now, by way of relaxation, turn a thought or two to Mr. Burke. I ask his pardon for neglecting him so long.

"America," says he, (in his speech on the Canada constitution bill) "never dreamed of such absurd doctrine as the *Rights* "*of Man.*"

Mr. Burke is such a bold presumer, and advances his assertions and his premises with such a deficiency of judgment, that, without troubling ourselves about principles of philosophy or politics, the mere logical conclusions they produce, are ridiculous. For instance,

If governments, as Mr. Burke asserts, are not founded on the Rights of MAN, and are founded on *any rights* at all, they consequently must be founded on the rights of *something* that is *not man.* What then is that something?

Generally speaking, we know of no other creatures that inhabit the earth than man and beast; and in all cases, where only two things offer themselves, and one must be admitted, a negation proved on any one, amounts to an affirmative on the other; and therefore, Mr. Burke, by proving against the Rights of *Man*, proves in behalf of the *beast*; and consequently proves that government is a beast: and as difficult things sometimes explain each other, we now see the origin of keeping wild beasts in the Tower; for they certainly can be of no other use than to shew the origin of the government. They are in the place of a constitution. O John Bull, what honours thou hast lost by not being a wild beast. Thou mightest, on Mr. Burke's system, have been in the Tower for life.

If Mr. Burke's arguments have not weight enough to keep one serious, the fault is less mine than his; and as I am willing to make an apology to the reader for the liberty I have taken, I hope Mr. Burke will also make his for giving the cause.

Having thus paid Mr. Burke the compliment of remembering him, I return to the subject.

From the want of a constitution in England to restrain and re-

* The paragraph alluded to, and which follows immediately after the paragraph beginning with *Magna Charta*, is in these words:

"The history of the Edwards and the Henries, and up to the commencement of the Stuarts, exhibits as many instances of tyrranny as could be acted within the limits to which the nation had restricted it. The Stuarts endeavoured to pass those limits, and their fate is well known. In all those instances we see nothing of a constitution but only of restrictions on assumed power.'

Query. Does the prosecuting party mean to deny that instances of tyranny were acted by the Edward, and the Henries? Does he mean to deny that the Stuarts endeavoured to pass the limits which the nation had proscribed? Does he mean to prove it libellous in any person to say that they did?

† The whole amount of the assessed taxes of France, for the present year, is three hundred millions of livres, which is twelve millions and a half sterling; and the incidental taxes are estimated at three millions, making in the whole fifteen millions and a half; which, among twenty-four millions of people, is not quite thirteen shillings per head. France has lessoned her taxes since the revolution, nearly nine millions sterling annually. Before the revolution, the city of Paris paid a duty of upwards of thirty per cent. on all articles brought into the city. This tax was collected at the city gates. It was taken off on the first of last May, and the gates taken down.

* What was called the *livre rouge*, or the red book, in France, was not exactly similar to the court calender in England; but it sufficiently shewed how a great part of the taxes was lavished.

gulate the wild impulſe of power, many of the laws are irrational and tyrannical, and the adminiſtration of them vague and problematical.

Almoſt every caſe now muſt be determined by ſome precedent, be that precedent good or bad, or whether it properly applies or not; and the practice is become ſo general, as to ſuggeſt a ſuſpicion, that it proceeds from a deeper policy than at firſt ſight appears.

Since the revolution of America, and more ſo ſince that of France, this preaching up the doctrine of precedents, drawn from times and circumſtances antecedent to thoſe events, has been the ſtudied practice of the Engliſh government. The generality of thoſe precedents are founded on principles and opinions, the reverſe of what they ought; and the greater diſtance of time they are drawn from, the more they are to be ſuſpected. But by aſſociating thoſe precedents with a ſuperſtitious reverence for ancient things, as monks ſhew relics and call them holy, the generality of mankind are deceived into the deſign. Governments now act as if they were afraid to awaken a ſingle reflection in man. They are ſoftly leading him to the ſepulchre of precedents, to deaden his faculties and call his attention from the ſcene of revolutions. They feel that he is arriving at knowledge faſter than they wiſh, and their policy of precedents is the barometer of their fears. This political popery, like the eccleſiaſtical popery of old, has had its day, and is haſtening to its exit. The ragged relic and the antiquated precedent, the monk and the monarch, will moulder together.

Government by precedent, without any regard to the principle of the precedent, is one of the vileſt ſyſtems that can be ſet up. In numerous inſtances, the precedent ought to operate as a warning, and not as an example, and requires to be ſhunned inſtead of imitated; but inſtead of this, precedents are taken in the lump, and put at once for conſtitution and for law.

Either the doctrine of precedents is policy to keep a man in a ſtate of ignorance, or it is a practical confeſſion that wiſdom degenerates in governments as governments increaſe in age, and can only hobble along by the ſtilts and crutches of precedents. How is it that the ſame perſons who would proudly be thought wiſer than their predeceſſors, appear at the ſame time only as the ghoſts of departed wiſdom? How ſtrangely is antiquity treated! To anſwer ſome purpoſes it is ſpoken of as the times of darkneſs and ignorance, and to anſwer others, it is put for the light of the world.

If the doctrine of precedents is to be followed, the expences of government need not continue the ſame. Why pay men extravagantly, who have but little to do? If every thing that can happen is already in precedent, legiſlation is at an end, and precedent, like a dictionary, determines every caſe. Either, therefore, government has arrived at its dotage, and requires to be renovated, or all the occaſions for exerciſing its wiſdom have occurred.

We now ſee all over Europe, and particularly in England, the curious phænomenon of a nation looking one way, and a government the other—the one forward and the other backward. If governments are to go on by precedent, while nations go on by improvement, they muſt at laſt come to a final ſeparation; and the ſooner, and the more civilly they determine this point, the better *.

Having thus ſpoken of conſtitutions generally, as things diſtinct from actual governments, let us proceed to conſider the parts of which a conſtitution is compoſed.

Opinions differ more on this ſubject, than with reſpect to the whole. That a nation ought to have a conſtitution, as a rule for the conduct of its government, is a ſimple queſtion in which all men, not directly courtiers, will agree. It is only on the component parts that queſtions and opinions multiply.

But this difficulty, like every other, will diminiſh when put into a train of being rightly underſtood.

The firſt thing is, that a nation has a right to eſtabliſh a conſtitution.

Whether it exerciſes this right in the moſt judicious manner at firſt, is quite another caſe. It exerciſes it agreeably to the judgment it poſſeſſes; and by continuing to do ſo, all errors will at laſt be exploded.

When this right is eſtabliſhed in a nation, there is no fear that it will be employed to its own injury. A nation can have no intereſt in being wrong.

Though all the conſtitutions of America are on one general principle, yet no two of them are exactly alike in their component parts, or in the diſtribution of the powers which they give to the actual governments. Some are more, and others leſs complex.

In forming a conſtitution, it is firſt neceſſary to conſider what are the ends for which government is neceſſary? Secondly, what are the beſt means, and the leaſt expenſive, for accompliſhing thoſe ends?

Government is nothing more than a national aſſociation; and the object of this aſſociation is the good of all, as well individually as collectively. Every man wiſhes to purſue his occupation, and to enjoy the fruits of his labours, and the produce of his property in peace and ſafety, and with the leaſt poſſible expence.

* In England the improvements in agriculture, uſeful arts, manufactures, and commerce, have been made in oppoſition to the genius of its government, which is that of following precedents. It is from the enterprize and induſtry of the individuals, and their numerous aſſociations, in which, tritely ſpeaking, government is neither pillow nor bolſter, that theſe improvements have proceeded. No man thought about government, or who was *in*, or who was *out*, when he was planning or executing thoſe things; and all he had to hope, with reſpect to government, was, that it would let him alone. Three or four very ſilly miniſterial news-papers are continually offending againſt the ſpirit of national improvement, by aſcribing it to a miniſter. They may with as much truth aſcribe this book to a miniſter.

When

When these things are accomplished, all the objects for which government ought to be established are answered.

It has been customary to consider government under three distinct general heads. The legislative, the executive, and the judicial.

But if we permit our judgment to act unincumbered by the habit of multiplied terms, we can perceive no more than two divisions of power, of which civil government is composed, namely, that of legislating or enacting laws, and that of executing or administering them. Every thing, therefore, appertaining to civil government, classes itself under one or other of these two divisions.

So far as regards the execution of the laws, that which is called the judicial power, is strictly and properly the executive power of every country. It is that power to which every individual has appeal, and which causes the laws to be executed; neither have we any other clear idea with respect to the official execution of the laws. In England, and also in America and France, this power begins with the magistrate, and proceeds up through all the courts of judicature.

I leave to courtiers to explain what is meant by calling monarchy the executive power. It is merely a name in which acts of government are done; and any other, or none at all, would answer the same purpose. Laws have neither more nor less authority on this account. It must be from the justness of their principles, and the interest which a nation feels therein, that they derive support; if they require any other than this, it is a sign that something in the system of government is imperfect. Laws difficult to be executed cannot be generally good.

With respect to the organization of the *legislative power*, different modes have been adopted in different countries. In America it is generally composed of two houses. In France it consists but of one, but in both countries it is wholly by representation.

The case is, that mankind (from the long tyranny of assumed power) have had so few opportunities of making the necessary trials on modes and principles of government, in order to discover the best, *that government is but now beginning to be known*, and experience is yet wanting to determine many particulars.

The objections against two houses, are, first, that there is an inconsistency in any part of a whole legislature, coming to a final determination by vote on any matter, whilst *that matter*, with respect to *that whole*, is yet only in a train of deliberation, and consequently open to new illustrations.

Secondly, That by taking the vote on each, as a separate body, it always admits of the possibility, and is often the case in practice, that the minority governs the majority, and that, in some instances, to a degree of great inconsistency.

Thirdly, That two houses arbitrarily checking or controuling each other is inconsistent; because it cannot be proved, on the principles of just representation, that either should be wiser or better than the other. They may check in the wrong as well as in

in the right,—and therefore, to give the power where we cannot give the wisdom to use it, nor be assured of its being rightly used, renders the hazard at least equal to the precaution.

The objection against a single house is, that it is always in a condition of committing itself too soon.—But it should at the same time be remembered, that when there is a constitution which defines the power, and establishes the principles within which a legislature shall act, there is already a more effectual check provided, and more powerfully operating, than any other check can be. For example.

Were a bill to be brought into any of the American legislatures, similar to that which was passed into an act by the English parliament, at the commencement of George the First, to extend the duration of the assemblies to a longer period than they now sit, the check is in the constitution, which in effect says, *Thus far shalt thou go and no further.*

But in order to remove the objection against a single house, (that of acting with too quick an impulse,) and at the same time to avoid the inconsistencies, in some cases absurdities, arising from two houses, the following method has been proposed as an improvement upon both.

First, To have but one representation.

Secondly, To divide that representation, by lot, into two or three parts.

Thirdly, That every proposed bill, shall be first debated in those parts by succession, that they may become the hearers of each other, but without taking any vote. After which the whole representation, to assemble for a general debate and determination by vote.

To this proposed improvement has been added another, for the purpose of keeping the representation in a state of constant renovation; which is, that one-third of the representation of each county, shall go out at the expiration of one year, and the number replaced by new elections.—Another third at the expiration of the second year replaced in like manner, and every third year to be a general election *.

But in whatever manner the separate parts of a constitution may be arranged, there is *one* general principle that distinguishes freedom from slavery, which is, that all *hereditary government over a people is to them a species of slavery, and representative government is freedom.*

Considering government in the only light in which it should be considered, that of a NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; it ought to be so constructed as not to be disordered by any accident happening among the parts; and, therefore, no extraordinary power, capable of producing such an effect, should be lodged in the hands of any individual. The death, sickness, absence, or defection, any

* As to the state of representation in England, it is too absurd to be reasoned upon. Almost all the represented parts are decreasing in population, and the unrepresented parts are increasing. A general convention of the nation is necessary to take the whole state of its government into consideration.

any one individual in a government, ought to be a matter of no more conſequence, with reſpect to the nation, than if the ſame circumſtance had taken place in a member of the Engliſh Parliament, or the French National Aſſembly.

Scarcely any thing preſents a more degrading character of national greatneſs, than its being thrown into confuſion by any thing happening to, or acted by, an individual; and the ridiculouſneſs of the ſcene is often increaſed by the natural inſignificance of the perſon by whom it is occaſioned. Were a government ſo conſtructed, that it could not go on unleſs a gooſe or gander were preſent in the ſenate, the difficulties would be juſt as great and as real on the flight or ſickneſs of the gooſe, or the gander, as if it were called a King. We laugh at individuals for the ſilly difficulties they make to themſelves, without perceiving, that the greateſt of all ridiculous things are acted in go*

All the conſtitutions of America are on a plan that excludes the childiſh embarraſſments which occur in monarchical countries. No ſuſpenſion of government can there take place for a moment, from any circumſtance whatever. The ſyſtem of repreſentation provides for every thing, and is the only ſyſtem in which nations and governments can always appear in their pro-

As extraordinary power ought not to be lodged in the hands of any individual, ſo ought there to be no appropriations of public money to any perſon, beyond what his ſervices in a ſtate may be worth. It ſignifies not whether a man be called a preſident, a king, an emperor, a ſenator, or by any other name, which propriety or folly may deviſe, or arrogance aſſume; it is only a certain ſervice he can perform in the ſtate; and the ſervice of any ſuch individual in the rotine of office, whether ſuch office be called monarchical, preſidential, ſenatorial, or by any other name or title, can never exceed the value of ten thouſand pounds a year. All the great ſervices that are done in the world are performed by volunteer characters, who accept nothing for them; but the rotine of office is always regulated to ſuch a general ſtandard of abilities as to be within the compaſs of numbers in every country to perform, and therefore cannot merit very extraordinary re-

* It is related that in the canton of Berne, in Switzerland, it had been cuſtomary, from time immemorial, to keep a bear at the public expence, and the people had been taught to believe, that if they had not a bear they ſhould all be undone. It happened ſome years ago, that the bear, then in being, was taken ſick, and died too ſuddenly to have his place immediately ſupplied with another. During this interregnum the people diſcovered, that the corn grew, and the vintage flouriſhed, and the ſun and moon continued to riſe and ſet, and every thing went on the ſame as before, and taking courage from theſe circumſtances, they reſolved not to keep any more bears; for, ſaid they, "a bear is a very voracious expenſive animal, "and we are obliged to pull out his claws, leſt he ſhould hurt the citizens."

The ſtory of the bear of Berne was related in ſome of the French newſpapers, at the time of the flight of Louis XVI. and the application of it to monarchy could not be miſtaken in France; but it ſeems, that the ariſtocracy of Berne applied it to themſelves and have ſince prohibited the reading of French news-papers.

abilities

compence. *Government*, ſays Swift, *is a plain thing, and fitted to the capacity of many heads.*

It is inhuman to talk of a million ſterling a year, paid out of the public taxes of any country, for the ſupport of any individual, whilſt thouſands who are forced to contribute thereto, are pining with want, and ſtruggling with miſery. Government does not conſiſt in a contraſt between priſons and palaces, between poverty and pomp; it is not inſtituted to rob the needy of his mite, and increaſe the wretchedneſs of the wretched.—But of this part of the ſubject I ſhall ſpeak hereafter, and confine myſelf at preſent to political obſervations.

When extraordinary power and extraordinary pay are allotted to any individual in a government, he becomes the centre, round which every kind of corruption generates and forms. Give to any man a million a year, and add thereto the power of creating and diſpoſing of places, at the expence of a country, and the liberties of that country are no longer ſecure. What is called the ſplendor of a throne is no other than the corruption of the ſtate. It is made up of a band of paraſites, living in luxurious indolence, out of the public taxes.

When once ſuch a vicious ſyſtem is eſtabliſhed it becomes the guard and protection of all inferior abuſes. The man who is in the receipt of a million a year is the laſt perſon to promote a ſpirit of reform, leſt, in the event, it ſhould reach to himſelf. It is always his intereſt to defend inferior abuſes, as ſo many outworks to protect the citadel; and in this ſpecies of political fortification, all the parts have ſuch a common dependence that it is never to be expected they will attack each other *.

Monarchy would not have continued ſo many ages in the world, had it not been for the abuſes it protects. It is the maſter-fraud, which ſhelters all others. By admitting a participa-

* It is ſcarcely poſſible to touch on any ſubject, that will not ſuggeſt an alluſion to ſome corruption in governments. The ſimile of "*fortifications*," unfortunately involves with it a circumſtance, which is directly in point with the matter above alluded to.

Among the numerous inſtances of abuſe which have been acted or protected by governments, ancient or modern, there is not a greater than that of quartering a man and his heirs upon the public, to be maintained at his expence.

Humanity dictates a proviſion for the poor; but by what right, moral or political, does any government aſſume to ſay, that the perſon called the Duke of Richmond, ſhall be maintained by the public? Yet, if common report is true, not a beggar in London can purchace his wretched pittance of coal, without paying towards the civil liſt of the duke of Richmond. Were the whole produce of this impoſition but a ſhilling a year, the iniquitous principle would be ſtill the ſame; but when it amounts, as it is ſaid to do, to no leſs than twenty thouſands pounds *per ann.* the enormity is too ſerious to be permitted to remain.—This is one of the effects of monarchy and ariſtocracy.

In ſtating this caſe, I am led by no perſonal diſlike. Though I think it mean in any man to live upon the public, the vice originates in the government; and ſo general is it become, that whether the parties are in the miniſtry or in the oppoſition it makes no difference: they are ſure of the guarantee of each other.

tion of the ſpoil, it makes itſelf friends; and when it ceaſes to do this, it will ceaſe to be the idol of courtiers.

As the principle on which conſtitutions are now formed rejects all hereditary pretenſions to government, it alſo rejects all that catalogue of aſſumptions known by the name of prerogatives.

If there is any government where prerogatives might with apparent ſafety be entruſted, to any individual, it is in the fœderal government of America. The Preſident of the United States of America is elected only for four years. He is not only reſponſible in the general ſenſe of the word, but a particular mode is laid down in the conſtitution for trying him. He cannot be elected under thirty-five years of age; and he muſt be a native of the country.

In a compariſon of theſe caſes with the government of England the difference when applied to the latter amounts to an abſurdity. In England the perſon who exerciſes prerogative is often a foreigner; always half a foreigner, and always married to a foreigner. He is never in full natural or political connection with the country, is not reſponſible for any thing, and becomes of age at eighteen years; yet ſuch a perſon is permitted to form foreign alliances, without even the knowledge of the nation, and to make war and peace without its conſent.

But this is not all. Though ſuch a perſon cannot diſpoſe of the government, in the manner of a teſtator, he dictates the marriage connections, which, in effect, accompliſhes a great part of the ſame end. He cannot directly bequeath half the government to Pruſſia, but he can form a marriage partnerſhip that will produce always the ſame thing. Under ſuch circumſtances, it is happy for England that ſhe is not ſituated on the continent, or ſhe might, like Holland, fall under the dictatorſhip of Pruſſia. Holland, by marriage, is as effectually governed by Pruſſia, as if the old tyranny of bequeathing the government had been the means.

The preſidency in America, (or, as it is ſometimes called, the executive,) is the only office from which a foreigner is excluded, and in England it is the only one to which he is admitted. A foreigner cannot be a member of parliament, but he may be what is called a king. If there is any reaſon for excluding foreigners, it ought to be from thoſe offices where miſchief can moſt be acted, and where by uniting every bias of intereſt and attachment, the truſt is beſt ſecured.

But as nations proceed in the great buſineſs of forming conſtitutions, they will examine with more preciſion into the nature and buſineſs of that department which is called the executive. What the legiſlative and judicial departments are, every one can ſee; but but with reſpect to what, in Europe, is called the executive, as diſtinct from thoſe two, it is either a political ſuperfluity or a chaos of unknown things.

Some kind of official department to which reports ſhall be made from the different parts of a nation, or from abroad, to be laid before the national repreſentatives, is all that is neceſſary; but there is no conſiſtency in calling this the executive; neither can it be conſidered in any other light than as inferior to the legiſlative

tive. The ſovereign authority in any country is the power of making laws, and every thing elſe is an official department.

Next to the arrangement of the principles and the organization of the ſeveral parts of a conſtitution, is the proviſion to be made for the ſupport of the perſons to whom the nation ſhall confide the adminiſtration of the conſtitutional powers.

A nation can have no right to the time and ſervices of any perſon at his own expence, whom it may chuſe to employ or entruſt in any department whatever; neither can any reaſon be given for making proviſion for the ſupport of any one part of a government and not for the other.

But, admitting that the honour of being entruſted with any part of a government, is to be conſidered a ſufficient reward, it ought to be ſo to every perſon alike. If the members of the legiſlature of any country are to ſerve at their own expence, that which is called the executive, whether monarchical, or by any other name, ought to ſerve in like manner. It is inconſiſtent to pay the one, and accept the ſervice of the other gratis.

In America, every department in the government is decently provided for; but no one is extravagantly paid. Every member of Congreſs, and of the aſſemblies, is allowed a ſufficiency for his expences. Whereas in England, a moſt prodigal proviſion is made for the ſupport of one part of the government, and none for the other, the conſequence of which is, that the one is furniſhed with the means of corruption, and the other is put into the condition of being corrupted. Leſs than a fourth part of ſuch expence, applied as it is in America, would remedy a great part of the corruption.

Another reform in the American conſtitution, is the exploding all oaths of perſonality. The oath of allegiance in America is to the nation only. The putting any individual as a figure for a nation is improper. The happineſs of a nation is the ſuperior object, and therefore the intention of an oath of allegiance ought not to be obſcured by being figuratively taken, to, or in the name of, any perſon. The oath, called the civic oath, in France, viz. "*the nation, the law, and the king*," is improper. If taken at all, it ought to be as in America, to the nation only. The law may or may not be good; but, in this place, it can have no other meaning, than as being conducive to the happineſs of the nation, and therefore is included in it. The remainder of the oath is improper on the ground, that all perſonal oaths ought to be aboliſhed. They are the remains of tyranny on one part, and ſlavery on the other; and the name of the CREATOR ought not to be introduced to witneſs the degradation of his creation; or if taken, as is already mentioned, as figurative of the nation, it is in this place redundant. But whatever apology may be made for oaths at the firſt eſtabliſhment of a government, they ought not to be permitted afterwards. If a government requires the ſupport of oaths, it is a ſign that it is not worth ſupporting, and ought not to be ſupported. Make government what it ought to be, and it will ſupport itſelf.

To

To conclude this part of the ſubject:—One of the greateſt improvements that has been made for the perpetual ſecurity and progreſs of conſtitutional liberty, is the proviſion which the new conſtitutions make for occaſionly reviſing, altering and amending them.

The principle upon which Mr. Burke formed his political creed, that "*of binding and controuling poſterity to the end of time, and "of renouncing and abdicating the rights of all poſterity, for ever,*" is now become too deteſtable to be made a ſubject of debate; and therefore, I paſs it over with no other notice than expoſing it.

Government is but now beginning to be known. Hitherto it has been the mere exerciſe of power, which forbad all effectual enquiry into rights, and grounded itſelf wholly on poſſeſſion. While the enemy of liberty was its judge, the progreſs of its principles muſt have been ſmall indeed.

The conſtitutions of America, and alſo that of France, have either affixed a period for their reviſion, or laid down the mode by which improvements ſhall be made. It is perhaps impoſſible to eſtabliſh any thing that combines principles with opinions and practice, which the progreſs of circumſtances, through a length of years, will not in ſome meaſure derange, or render inconſiſtent; and, therefore, to prevent inconveniences accumulating, till they diſcourage reformations or provoke revolutions, it is beſt to provide the means of regulating them as they occur. The Rights of Man are the rights of all generations of men, and cannot be monopolized by any. That which is worth following, will be followed for the ſake of its worth; and it is in this that its ſecurity lies, and not in any conditions with which it may be encumbered. When a man leaves property to his heirs, he does not connect it with an obligation that they ſhall accept it. Why then ſhould we do otherwiſe with reſpect to conſtitutions?

The beſt conſtitution that could now be deviſed, conſiſtent with the condition of the preſent moment, may be far ſhort of that excellence which a few years may afford. There is a morning of reaſon riſing upon man on the ſubject of government, that has not appeared before. As the barbariſm of the preſent old governments expires, the moral condition of nations with reſpect to each other will be changed. Man will not be brought up with the ſavage idea of conſidering his ſpecies as his enemy, becauſe the accident of birth gave the individuals exiſtence in countries diſtinguiſhed by different names: and as conſtitutions have always ſome relation to external as well as to domeſtic circumſtances, the means of benefiting by every change, foreign or domeſtic, ſhould be a part of every conſtitution.

We already ſee an alteration in the national diſpoſition of England and France towards each other, which, when we look back to only a few years, is itſelf a revolution. Who could have foreſeen, or who would have believed, that a French National Aſſembly would ever have been a popular toaſt in England, or that a friendly alliance of the two nations ſhould become the wiſh of either. It ſhews, that man, were he not corrupted by governments, is naturally the friend of man, and that human nature is not of itſelf vicious. The ſpirit of jealouſy and ferocity, which the governments of the two countries inſpired, and which they rendered ſubſervient to the purpoſe of taxation, is now yielding to the dictates of reaſon, intereſt, and humanity. The trade of courts is beginning to be underſtood, and the affectation of myſtery, with all the artificial ſorcery by which they impoſed upon mankind, is on the decline. It has received its death-wound; and though it may linger, it will expire.

Government ought to be as much open to improvement as any thing which appertains to man, inſtead of which it has been monopolized from age to age, by the moſt ignorant and vicious of the human race. Need we any other proof of their wretched management, than the exceſs of debts and taxes with which every nation groans, and the quarrels into which they have participated the world?

Juſt emerging from ſuch a barbarous condition, it is too ſoon to determine to what extent of improvement government may yet be carried. For what we can forſee, all Europe may form but one great republic, and man be free of the whole.

CHAP. V.

WAYS and MEANS of improving the condition of Europe, interſperſed with Miſcellaneous Obſervations.

IN contemplating a ſubject that embraces with equatorial magnitude the whole region of humanity, it is impoſſible to confine the purſuit in one ſingle direction. It takes ground on every character and condition that appertains to man, and blends the individual, the nation, and the world.

From a ſmall ſpark, kindled in America, a flame has ariſen, not to be extinguiſhed. Without conſuming, like the *Ultima Ratio Regum*, it winds its progreſs from nation to nation, and conquers by a ſilent operation. Man finds himſelf changed, he ſcarcely perceives how. He acquires a knowledge of his rights by attending juſtly to his intereſt, and diſcovers in the event that the ſtrength and powers of deſpotiſm conſiſt wholly in the fear of reſiſting it, and that, in order "*to be free, it is ſufficient that he wills it.*"

Having in all the preceding parts of this work endeavoured to eſtabliſh a ſyſtem of principles as a baſis, on which governments ought to be erected; I ſhall proceed in this, to the ways and means of rendering them into practice. But in order to introduce this part of the ſubject with more propriety, and ſtronger effect, ſome preliminary obſervations deducible from, or connected with, thoſe principles are neceſſary.

Whatever the form or conſtitution of government may be, it ought to have no other object than the *general* happineſs. When, inſtead of this, it operates to create and encreaſe wretchedneſs in any of the parts of ſociety, it is on a wrong ſyſtem, and reformation is neceſſary.

Cuſtomary

Cuſtomary language has claſſed the condition of man under the two deſcriptions of civilized and uncivilized life. To the one it has aſcribed felicity and affluence; to the other hardſhip and want. But however our imagination may be impreſſed by painting and compariſon, it is nevertheleſs true, that a great portion of mankind, in what are called civilized countries, are in a ſtate of poverty and wretchedneſs, far below the condition of an Indian. I ſpeak not of one country, but of all. It is ſo in England, it is ſo all over Europe. Let us enquire into the cauſe.

It lies not in any natural defect in the principles of civilization, but in preventing thoſe principles having an univerſal operation; the conſequence of which is, a perpetual ſyſtem of war and expence, that drains the country, and defeats the general felicity of which civilization is capable.

All the European governments (France now excepted) are conſtructed not on the principle of univerſal civilization, but on the reverſe of it. So far as thoſe governments relate to each other, they are in the ſame condition as we conceive of ſavage uncivilized life; they put themſelves beyond the law as well of GOD as of man, and are, with reſpect to principle and reciprocal conduct, like ſo many individuals in a ſtate of nature.

The inhabitants of every country, under the civilization of laws, eaſily civilize together, but governments being yet in an uncivilized ſtate, and almoſt continually at war, they pervert the abundance which civilized life produces to carry on the uncivilized part to a greater extent. By thus engrafting the barbariſm of government upon the internal civilization of a country, it draws from the latter, and more eſpecially from the poor, a great portion of thoſe earnings, which ſhould be applied to their own ſubſiſtence and comfort.—Apart from all reflections of morality and philoſophy, it is a melancholy fact, that more than one-fourth of the labour of mankind is annually conſumed by this barbarous ſyſtem.

What has ſerved to continue this evil, is the pecuniary advantage, which all the governments of Europe have found in keeping up this ſtate of uncivilization. It affords to them pretences for power, and revenue, for which there would be neither occaſion nor apology, if the circle of civilization were rendered compleat. Civil government alone, or the government of laws, is not productive of pretences for many taxes; it operates at home, directly under the eye of the country, and precludes the poſſibility of much impoſition. But when the ſcene is laid in the uncivilized contention of governments, the field of pretences is enlarged, and the country, being no longer a judge, is open to every impoſition, which governments pleaſe to act.

Not a thirtieth, ſcarcely a fortieth, part of the taxes which are raiſed in England are either occaſioned by, or applied to, the purpoſes of civil government. It is not difficult to ſee, that the whole which the actual government does in this reſpect, is to enact laws, and that the country adminiſters and executes them,

at its own expence, by means of magiſtrates, juries, ſeſſions, and aſſize, over and above the taxes which it pays.

In this view of the caſe, we have two diſtinct characters of government; the one the civil government of laws, which operates at home, the other the court or cabinet government, which operates abroad, on the rude plan of uncivilized life; the one attended with little charge, the other with boundleſs extravagance; and ſo diſtinct are the two, that if the latter were to ſink, as it were by a ſudden opening of the earth, and totally diſappear, the former would not be deranged. It would ſtill proceed, becauſe it is the common intereſt of the nation that it ſhould, and all the means are in the practice.

Revolutions, then, have for their object, a change in the moral condition of governments, and with this change the burthen of public taxes will leſſen, and civilization will be left to the enjoyment of that abundance, of which it is now deprived.

In contemplating the whole of this ſubject, I extend my views into the department of commerce. In all my publications, where the matter would admit, I have been an advocate for commerce, becauſe I am a friend to its effects. It is a pacific ſyſtem, operating to cordialize mankind, by rendering nations, as well as individuals, uſeful to each other. As to mere theoretical reformation, I have never preached it up. The moſt effectual proceſs is that of improving the condition of man by means of his intereſt; and it is on this ground I take my ſtand.

If commerce were permitted to act to the univerſal extent it is capable, it would extirpate the ſyſtem of war, and produce a revolution in the uncivilized ſtate of governments. The invention of commerce has ariſen ſince thoſe governments began, and is the greateſt approach towards univerſal civilization, that has yet been made by any means not immediately flowing from moral principles.

Whatever has a tendency to promote the civil intercourſe of nations, by an exchange of benefits, is a ſubject as worthy of philoſophy as of politics. Commerce is no other than the traffic of two individuals, multiplied on a ſcale of numbers; and by the ſame rule that nature intended the intercourſe of two, ſhe intended that of all. For this purpoſe ſhe has diſtributed the materials of manufactures and commerce, in various and diſtant parts of a nation of the world; and as they cannot be procured by war ſo cheaply or ſo commodiouſly as by commerce, ſhe has rendered the latter the means of extirpating the former.

As the two are nearly the oppoſites of each other, conſequently, the uncivilized ſtate of European governments is injurious to commerce. Every kind of deſtruction or embarraſſment ſerves to leſſen the quantity, and it matters but little in what part of the commercial world the reduction begins. Like blood, it cannot be taken from any of the parts, without being taken from the whole maſs in circulation, and all partake of the loſs. When the ability in any nation to buy is deſtroyed, it equally involves the ſeller. Could the government of England deſtroy the com-

merce of all other nations, ſhe would moſt effectually ruin her own.

It is poſſible that a nation may be the carrier for the world, but ſhe cannot be the merchant. She cannot be the ſeller and the buyer of her own merchandiſe. The ability to buy muſt reſide out of herſelf; and, therefore, the proſperity of any commercial nation is regulated by the proſperity of the reſt. If they are poor ſhe cannot be rich, and her condition, be it what it may, is an index of the height of the commercial tide in other nations.

That the principles of commerce, and its univerſal operation may be underſtood, without underſtanding the practice, is a poſition that reaſon will not deny; and it is on this ground only that I argue the ſubject. It is one thing in the counting-houſe, in the world it is another. With reſpect to its operation it muſt neceſſarily be contemplated as a reciprocal thing; that only one half its powers reſides within the nation, and that the whole is as effectually deſtroyed by deſtroying the half that reſides without, as if the deſtruction had been committed on that which is within; for neither can act without the other.

When in the laſt, as well as in former wars, the commerce of England ſunk, it was becauſe the general quantity was leſſened every where: and it now riſes, becauſe commerce is in a riſing ſtate in every nation. If England, at this day, imports and exports more than at any former period, the nations with which ſhe trades muſt neceſſarily do the ſame; her imports are their exports, and *vice verſa*.

There can be no ſuch thing as a nation flouriſhing alone in commerce; ſhe can only participate; and the deſtruction of it in any part muſt neceſſarily affect all. When, therefore, governments are at war, the attack is made upon the common ſtock of commerce, and the conſequence is the ſame as if each had attacked his own.

The preſent increaſe of commerce is not to be attributed to miniſters, or to any political contrivances, but to its own natural operations in conſequence of peace. The regular markets had been deſtroyed, the channels of trade broken up, the high road of the ſeas infeſted with robbers of every nation, and the attention of the world called to other objects. Thoſe interruptions have ceaſed, and peace has reſtored the deranged condition of things to their proper order *.

It is worth remarking, that every nation reckons the balance of trade in its own favour; and therefore ſomething muſt be irregular in the common ideas upon this ſubject.

The fact, however, is true, according to what is called a balance; and it is from this caſe that commerce is univerſally ſupported. Every nation feels the advantage, or it would abandon the practice: but the deception lies in the mode of making up the accounts, and in attributing what are called profits to a wrong cauſe.

Mr. Pitt has ſometimes amuſed himſelf, by ſhewing what he called a balance of trade from the cuſtom-houſe books. This mode of calculation, not only affords no rule that is true, but one that it is falſe.

In the firſt place. Every cargo that departs from the cuſtom-houſe, appears on the books as an export; and, according to the cuſtom-houſe balance, the loſſes at ſea, and by foreign failures, are all reckoned on the ſide of profit, becauſe they appear as exports.

Secondly, Becauſe the importation by the ſmuggling trade does not appear on the cuſtom-houſe books, to arrange againſt the exports.

No balance, therefore, as applying to ſuperior advantages, can be drawn from thoſe documents; and if we examine the natural operation of commerce, the idea is fallacious; and if true, would ſoon be injurious. The great ſupport of commerce conſiſts in the balance being a level of benefits among all nations.

Two merchants of different nations trading together, will both become rich, and each makes the balance in his own favour; conſequently, they do not get rich out of each other; and it is the ſame with reſpect to the nations in which they reſide. The caſe muſt be, that each nation muſt get rich out of its own means, and increaſes that riches by ſomething which it procures from another in exchange.

If a merchant in England ſends an article of Engliſh manufacture abroad, which coſts him a ſhilling at home, and imports ſomething which ſells for two, he makes a balance of one ſhilling in his own favour: but this is not gained out of the foreign nation or the foreign merchant, for he alſo does the ſame by the article he receives, and neither has a balance of advantage upon the other. The original value of the two articles in their proper countries were but two ſhillings; but by changing their places, they acquire a new idea of value, equal to double what they had at firſt, and that increaſed value is equally divided.

There is no otherwiſe a balance on foreign than on domeſtic commerce. The merchants of London and Newcaſtle trade on the ſame principles, as if they reſided in different nations, and make their balances in the ſame manner: yet London does not get rich out of Newcaſtle, any more than Newcaſtle out of London: but coals, the merchandize of Newcaſtle, have an additional value at London, and London merchandize has the ſame at Newcaſtle.

Though the principle of all commerce is the ſame, the domeſtic, in a national view, is the part the moſt beneficial; becauſe the whole of the advantages, on both ſides, reſts within the nation; whereas, in foreign commerce, it is only a participation of one half.

* In America, the increaſe of commerce is greater in proportion than in England. It is, at this time, at leaſt one half more than at any period prior to the revolution. The greateſt number of veſſels cleared out of the port of Philadelphia, before the commencement of the war, was between eight and nine hundred. In the year 1788, the number was upwards of twelve hundred. As the ſtate of Penſylvania is eſtimated as an eight part of the United States in population, the whole number of veſſels muſt now be nearly ten thouſand.

The moſt unprofitable of all commerce is that connected with foreign dominion. To a few individuals it may be beneficial, merely becauſe it is commerce; but to the nation it is a loſs. The expence of maintaining dominion more than abſorbs the profits of any trade. It does not increaſe the general quantity in the world, but operates to leſſen it; and as a greater maſs would be afloat by relinquiſhing dominion, the participation without the expence would be more valuable than a greater quantity with it.

But it is impoſſible to engroſs commerce by dominion; and therefore it is ſtill more fallacious. It cannot exiſt in confined channels, and neceſſarily breaks out by regular or irregular means, that defeat the attempt: and to ſucceed would be ſtill worſe. France, ſince the revolution, has been more than indifferent as to foreign poſſeſſions; and other nations will become the ſame, when they inveſtigate the ſubject with reſpect to commerce.

To the expence of dominion is to be added that of navies, and when the amount of the two are ſubſtracted from the profits of commerce, it will appear, that what is called the balance of trade, even admitting it to exiſt, is not enjoyed by the nation, but abſorbed by the government.

The idea of having navies for the protection of commerce is deluſive. It is putting the means of deſtruction for the means of protection. Commerce needs no other protection than the reciprocal intereſt which every nation feels in ſupporting it—it is common ſtock—it exiſts by a balance of advantages to all; and the only interruption it meets, is from the preſent uncivilized ſtate of governments, and which it is its common intereſt to reform *.

Quitting this ſubject, I now proceed to other matters.—As it is neceſſary to include England in the proſpect of a general reformation, it is proper to enquire into the defects of its government. It is only by each nation reforming its own, that the whole can be improved, and the full benefit of the reformation enjoyed. Only partial advantages can flow from partial reforms.

France and England are the only two countries in Europe where a reformation in government could have ſucceſsfully begun. The one ſecure by the ocean, and the other by the immenſity of its internal ſtrength, could defy the malignancy of foreign deſpotiſm. But it is with revolutions as with commerce, the advantages increaſe by their becoming general, and double to either what each would receive alone.

As a new ſyſtem is now opening to the view of the world, the European courts are plotting to counteract it. Alliances, contrary

* When I ſaw Mr. Pitt's mode of eſtimating the balance of trade, in one of his parliamentary ſpeeches, he appeared to me to know nothing of the nature and intereſt of commerce; and no man has more wantonly tortured it than himſelf. During a period of peace, it has been havocked with the calamities of war. Three times has it been thrown into ſtagnation, and the veſſels unmanned by impreſſing, within leſs than four years of peace.

trary to all former ſyſtems, are agitating, and a common intereſt of courts is forming againſt the common intereſt of man. This combination draws a line that runs throughout Europe, and preſents a cauſe entirely new, as to exclude all calculations from former circumſtances. While deſpotiſm warred with deſpotiſm man had no intereſt in the conteſt; but in a cauſe that unites the ſoldier with the citizen, and nation with nation, the deſpotiſm of courts, though it feels the danger, and mediates revenge, is afraid to ſtrike.

No queſtion has ariſen within the records of hiſtory that preſſed with the importance of the preſent. It is not whether this or that party ſhall be in or not, or whig or tory, or high or low ſhall prevail; but whether man ſhall inherit his rights, and univerſal civilization take place? Whether the fruits of his labours ſhall be enjoyed by himſelf, or conſumed by the profligacy of governments? Whether robbery ſhall be baniſhed from courts, and wretchedneſs from countries?

When, in countries that are called civilized, we ſee age going to the workhouſe and youth to the gallows, ſomething muſt be wrong in the ſyſtem of government. It would ſeem, by the exterior appearance of ſuch countries, that all was happineſs; but their lies hidden from the eye of common obſervation, a maſs of wretchedneſs that has ſcarcely any other chance, than to expire in poverty or infamy. Its entrance into life is marked with the preſage of its fate; and until this is remedied, it is in vain to puniſh.

Civil government does not conſiſt in executions; but in making that proviſion for the inſtruction of youth, and the ſupport of age, as to exclude, as much as poſſible, profligacy from the one, and deſpair from the other. Inſtead of this, the reſources of a country are laviſhed upon kings, upon courts, upon hirelings, impoſtors, and proſtitutes; and even the poor themſelves, with all their wants upon them, are compelled to ſupport the fraud that oppreſſes them.

Why is it, that ſcarcely any are executed but the poor? The fact is a proof, among other things, of a wretchedneſs in their condition. Bred up without morals, and caſt upon the world without a proſpect, they are the expoſed ſacrifice of vice and legal barbarity. The millions that are ſuperfluouſly waſted upon governments, are more than ſufficient to reform thoſe evils, and to benefit the condition of every man in a nation, not included, within the purlieus of a court. This I hope to make appear in the progreſs of this work.

It is the nature of compaſſion to aſſociate with misfortune. In taking up this ſubject I ſeek no recompence—I fear no conſequence. Fortified with that proud integrity, that diſdains to triumph or to yeild, I will advocate the Rights of Man.

It is to my advantage that I have ſerved an apprenticeſhip to life. I know the value of moral inſtruction, and I have ſeen the danger of the contrary.

At an early period, little more than ſixteen years of age, raw

and adventurous, and heated with the falſe heroiſm of a maſter * who had ſerved in a man of war, I began the carver of my own fortune, and entered on board the Terrible Privateer, Captain Death. From this adventure I was happily prevented by the affectionate and moral remonſtrance of a good father, who, from his own habits of life, being of the Quaker profeſſion, muſt begin to look upon me as loſt. But the impreſſion, much as it affected at the time, began to wear away, and I entered afterwards in the King of Pruſſia Privateer, Capt. Mendez, and went with her to ſea. Yet, from ſuch a beginning, and with all the inconvenience of early life againſt me, I am proud to ſay, that with a perſeverance undiſmayed by difficulties, a diſintereſtedneſs that compelled reſpect, I have not only contributed to raiſe a new empire in the world, founded on a new ſyſtem of government, but I have arrived at an eminence in polical literature, the moſt difficult of all lines to ſucceed and excel in, which ariſtocracy, with all its aids, has not been able to reach or to rival.

Knowing my own heart, and feeling myſelf, as I now do, ſuperior to all the ſkirmiſh of party the inveteracy of intereſted or miſtaken opponents, I anſwer not to falſehood or abuſe, but proceed to the defects of the Engliſh government †.

* Rev. William Knowles, maſter of the grammar ſchool of Thetford, in Norfolk.

† Politics and ſelf-intereſt have been ſo uniformly connected, that the world, from being ſo often deceived, has a right to be ſuſpicious of public characters: but with regard to myſelf, I am perfectly eaſy on this head. I did not, at my firſt ſetting out in public life, nearly ſeventeen years ago, turn my thoughts to ſubjects of government from motives of intereſt; and my conduct from that moment to this, proves the fact. I ſaw an opportunity, in which I thought I could do ſome good, and I followed exactly what my heart dictated. I neither read books, nor ſtudied other people's opinions. I thought for myſelf. The caſe was this:

During the ſuſpenſion of the old governments in America, both prior to, and at the breaking out of hoſtilities, I was ſtruck with the order and decorum with which every thing was conducted: and impreſſed with the idea, that a little more than what ſociety naturally performed, was all the government that was neceſſary; and that monarchy and ariſtocracy were frauds and impoſitions upon mankind. On theſe principles I publiſhed the pamphlet *Common Senſe*. The ſucceſs it met with was beyond any thing ſince the invention of printing. I gave the copy-right up to every ſtate in the union, and the demand ran to not leſs than one hundred thouſand copies. I continued the ſubject in the ſame manner, under the title of the *Criſis*, till the complete eſtabliſhment of the revolution.

After the declaration of independence, Congreſs unanimouſly, and unknown to me, appointed me ſecretary in the foreign department. This was agreeable to me, becauſe it gave me the opportunity of ſeeing into the abilities of foreign courts, and their manner of doing buſineſs. But a miſunderſtanding ariſing between congreſs and me, reſpecting one of their commiſſioners then in Europe, Mr. Silas Deane, I reſigned the office, and declined, at the ſame time, the pecuniary offers made me by the miniſters of France and Spain, M. Gerard and Don Juan Mirralles.

I had by this time ſo completely gained the ear and confidence of America, and my own independence was become ſo viſible, as to give me a range in political writing, beyond, perhaps, what any man ever poſſeſſed in

I begin with charters and corporations.

It is a perverſion of terms to ſay, that a charter gives rights. It operates by a contrary effect, that of taking rights away. In any country; and what is more extraordinary, I held it undiminiſhed to the end of the war, and enjoy it in the ſame manner to the preſent moment. As my object was not myſelf, I ſet out with the determination, and happily with the diſpoſition, of not being moved by praiſe or cenſure, friendſhip or calumny, nor of being drawn from my purpoſe by any perſonal altercation; and the man who cannot do this, is not fit for a public character.

When the war ended, I went from Philadelphia to Borden-Town, on the eaſt bank of the Delaware, where I have a ſmall place. Congreſs was at this time at Prince-Town, fifteen miles diſtant; and General Waſhington had taken his head-quarters at Rocky-Hill, within the neighbourhood of Congreſs, for the purpoſe of reſigning up his commiſſion, (the object for which he accepted it being accompliſhed,) and of retiring to private life. While he was on this buſineſs, he wrote me the letter, which I here ſubjoin.

Rocky-Hill, Sept. 10, 1783.

I have learned ſince I have been at this place, that you are at Borden-Town. Whether for the ſake of retirement or œconomy, I know not. Be it for either, for both, or whatever it may, if you will come to this place, and partake with me, I ſhall be exceedingly happy to ſee you at it.

Your preſence may remind Congreſs of your paſt ſervices to this country; and if it is in my power to impreſs them, command my beſt exertions with freedom, as they will be rendered chearfully by one who entertains a lively ſenſe of the importance of your works, and who, with much pleaſure, ſubſcribes himſelf, Your ſincere friend,

G. WASHINGTON.

During the war, in the latter end of the year 1780, I formed to myſelf a deſign of coming over to England; and communicated it to General Greene, who was then in Philadelphia, on his route to the ſouthward, General Waſhington being then at too great a diſtance to communicate with immediately. I was ſtrongly impreſſed with the idea, that if I could get over to England, without being known, and only remain in ſafety till I could get out a publication, that I could open the eyes of the country with reſpect to the madneſs and ſtupidity of its government. I ſaw that the parties in parliament had pitted themſelves as far as they could go, and could make no new impreſſions on each other. General Greene entered fully into my views; but the affair of Arnold and André happening juſt after, he changed his mind, and, under ſtrong apprehenſions for my ſafety, wrote very preſſingly to me from Annapolis, in Maryland, to give up the deſign, which, with ſome reluctance, I did. Soon after this I accompanied Col. Lawrens, ſon of Mr. Lawrens, who was then in the Tower, to France, on buſineſs from Congreſs. We landed at L'Orient; and while I remained there, he being gone forward, a circumſtance occurred, that renewed my former deſign. An Engliſh packet from Falmouth to New-York, with the government diſpatches on board, was brought into L'Orient. That a packet ſhould be taken, is no extraordinary thing; but that the diſpatches ſhould be taken with it, will ſcarcely be credited, as they are always ſlung at the cabin window, in a bag loaded with cannon-ball, and ready to be ſunk at a moment. The fact, however, is as I have ſtated it, for the diſpatches came into my hands, and I read them. The capture, as I was informed, ſucceeded by the following ſtratagem:—The captain of the Madame privateer, who ſpoke Engliſh, on coming up with the packet, paſſed himſelf for the captain of an Engliſh

Rights are inherently in all the inhabitants; but charters, by annulling thoſe rights in the majority, leave the right by excluſion in the hands of a few. If charters were conſtructed ſo as to expreſs in direct terms, "*that every inhabitant, who is not a member "of a corporation, ſhall not exerciſe the right of voting,*" ſuch charters would, in the face, be charters, not of rights, but of excluſion. The effect is the ſame under the form they now ſtand; and the only perſons on whom they operate, are the perſons whom they exclude. Thoſe whoſe rights are guaranted, by not being taken away, exerciſe no other rights, than as members of the community they are entitled to without a charter; and, therefore, all charters have no other than an indirect negative operation. They do not give rights to A, but they make a difference in favour of A by taking away the right of B, and conſequently are inſtruments of injuſtice.

But charters and corporations have a more extenſive evil effect, than what relates merely to elections. They are ſources of endleſs contentions in the places where they exiſt; and they leſſen the common rights of national ſociety. A native of England, under the operation of theſe charters and corporations, cannot be ſaid to be an Engliſhman in the full ſenſe of the word. He is not free of the nation, in the ſame manner that a Frenchman is free of France, and an American of America. His rights are circumſcribed to the town, and, in ſome caſes, to the pariſh of his birth; and all other parts, though in his native land, are to him as a foreign country. To acquire a reſidence in theſe, he muſt undergo a local naturalization by purchaſe, or he is forbidden or expelled the place. This ſpecies of feudality is kept up to aggrandize the corporations at the ruin of towns; and the effect is viſible.

The generality of corporation towns are in a ſtate of ſolitary decay, and prevented from further ruin, only by ſome circumſtance in their ſituation, ſuch as a navigable river, or a plentiful ſurrounding country. As population is one of the chief ſources of wealth, (for without it land itſelf has no value,) every thing which operates to prevent it muſt leſſen the value of property; and as corporations have not only this tendency, but directly this effect, they cannot but be injurious. If any policy were to be followed, inſtead of that of general freedom to every perſon

frigate, and invited the captain of the packet on board, which, when done, he ſent ſome of his own hands back, and ſecured the mail. But be the circumſtance of the capture what it may, I ſpeak with certainty as to the government diſpatches. They were ſent up to Paris, to Count Vergennes, and when Col. Lawrens and myſelf returned to America, we took the originals to Congreſs.

By theſe diſpatches I ſaw into the ſtupidity of the Engliſh cabinet, far more than I otherwiſe could have done, and I renewed my former deſign. But Col. Lawrens was ſo unwilling to return alone: more eſpecially, as among other matters, we had a charge of upwards of two hundred thouſand pounds ſterling in money, that I gave into his wiſhes, and finally gave up my plan. But I am now certain, that if I could have executed it, that it would not have been altogether unſucceſsful.

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to ſettle where he choſe, (as in France or America,) it would be more conſiſtent to give encouragement to new comers, than to preclude their admiſſion by exacting premiums from them *.

The perſons moſt immediately intereſted in the abolition of corporations, are the inhabitants of the towns where corporations are eſtabliſhed. The inſtances of Mancheſter, Birmingham, and Sheffield, ſhew, by contraſt, the injury which thoſe Gothic inſtitutions are to property and commerce. A few examples may be found, ſuch as that of London, whoſe natural and commercial advantage, owing to its ſituation on the Thames, is capable of bearing up againſt the political evils of a corporation; but in almoſt all other caſes the fatality is to viſible to be douted or denied.

Though the whole nation is not ſo directly affected by the depreſſion of poverty in corporation towns as the inhabitants themſelves, it partakes of the conſequence. By leſſening the value of property, the quantity of national commerce is curtailed. Every man is a cuſtomer in proportion to his ability; and as all parts of a nation trade with each other, whatever affects any of the parts, muſt neceſſarily communicate to the whole.

As one of the houſes of the Engliſh parliament is, in a great meaſure, made up of elections from theſe corporations; and as it is unnatural that a pure ſtream ſhould flow from a foul fountain, its vices are but a continuation of the vices of its origin. A man of moral honour and good political principles, cannot ſubmit to the mean drudgery and diſgraceful arts, by which ſuch elections are carried. To be a ſucceſsful candidate, he muſt be deſtitute of the qualities that conſtitute a juſt legiſlator; and being thus diſciplined to corruption by the mode of entering into parliament, it is not to be expected that the repreſentative ſhould be better than the man.

Mr. Burke, in ſpeaking of the Engliſh repreſentation, has advanced as bold a challenge as ever was given in the days of chivalry. "Our repreſentation," ſays he, "has been found *per-* "*fectly adequate to all the purpoſes* for which a repreſentation of the "people can be deſired or deviſed. I defy," continues he, "the "enemies of our conſtitution to ſhew the contrary."——

This declaration from a man who has been in conſtant oppoſition to all the meaſures of parliament the whole of his political life, a year or two excepted, is moſt extraordinary; and, com-

* It is difficult to account for the origin of charter and corporation towns, unleſs we ſuppoſe them to have ariſen out of, or been connected with, ſome ſpecies of garriſon ſervice. The times in which they began juſtify this idea. The generality of thoſe towns have been garriſons; and the corporations were charged with the care of the gates of the towns, when no military garriſon was preſent. Their refuſing or granting admiſſion to ſtrangers, which has produced the cuſtom of giving, ſelling, and buying freedom, has more of the nature of garriſon authority than civil government. Soldiers are free of all corporations throughout the nation, by the ſame propriety that every ſoldier is free of every garriſon, and no other perſons are. He can follow any employment, with the permiſſion of his officers, in any corporation town throughout the nation.

paring

paring him with himſelf, admits of no other alternative, than that he acted againſt his judgment as a member, or has declared contrary to it as an author.

But it is not in the repreſentation only that defects lie, and therefore I proceed in the next place to the ariſtocracy.

What is called the Houſe of Peers, is conſtituted on a ground very ſimilar to that, againſt which there is a law in other caſes. It amounts to a combination of perſons in one common intereſt. No reaſon can be given, why an houſe of legiſlation ſhould be compoſed entirely of men whoſe occupation conſiſts in letting landed property, than why it ſhould be compoſed of thoſe who hire, or of brewers, or bakers, or any other ſeparate claſs of men.

Mr. Burke calls this houſe, "*the great ground and pillar of ſecurity to the landed intereſt.*" Let us examine this idea.

What pillar of ſecurity does the landed intereſt require more than any other intereſt in the ſtate, or what right has it to a diſtinct and ſeparate repreſentation from the general intereſt of a nation? The only uſe to be made of this power, (and which it has always made,) is to ward off taxes from itſelf, and throw the burthen upon ſuch articles of conſumption by which itſelf would be leaſt affected.

That this has been the conſequence, (and will always be the conſequence of conſtructing governments on combinations,) is evident with reſpect to England, from the hiſtory of its taxes.

Notwithſtanding taxes have encreaſed and multiplied upon every article of common conſumption, the land-tax, which more particularly affects this "pillar," has diminiſhed. In 1788, the amount of the land-tax was £.1,950,000, which is half a million leſs than it produced almoſt an hundred years ago *, notwithſtanding the rentals are in many inſtances doubled ſince that period.

Before the coming of the Hanoverians, the taxes were divided in nearly equal proportioons between the land and articles of conſumption, the land bearing rather the largeſt ſhare: but ſince that æra, nearly thirteen millions annually of new taxes have been thrown upon conſumption. The conſequence of which has been a conſtant encreaſe in the number and wretchedneſs of the poor, and in the amount of poor-rates. Yet here again the burthen does not fall in equal proportions on the ariſtocracy with the reſt of the community. Their reſidences, whether in town or country, are not mixed with the habitations of the poor. They live apart from diſtreſs, and the expence of relieving it. It is in manufacturing towns and labouring villages that thoſe burthens preſs the heavieſt; in many of which it is one claſs of poor ſupporting another.

Several of the moſt heavy and productive taxes are ſo contrived, as to give an exemption to this pillar, thus ſtanding in its own defence. The tax upon beer brewed for ſale does not affect the ariſtocracy, who brew their own beer free of this duty. It falls only on thoſe who have not conveniency or ability to brew,

* See Sir John Sinclair's Hiſtory of the Revenue. The land-tax in 1646 was £.2,473,499.

and

and who muſt purchaſe it in ſmall quantities. But what will mankind think of the juſtice of taxation, when they know, that this tax alone, from which the ariſtocracy are from circumſtances exempt, is nearly equal to the whole of the land-tax, being in the year 1788, and it is not leſs now, £.1,666,152, and with its proportion of the taxes on malt and hops, it exceeds it.—That a ſingle article, thus partially conſumed, and that chiefly by the working part, ſhould be ſubject to a tax, equal to that on the whole rental of a nation, is, perhaps, a fact not to be paralelled in the hiſtories of revenues.

This is one of the conſequences reſulting from an houſe of legiſlation, compoſed on the ground of a combination of common intereſt; for whatever their ſeparate politics as to parties may be, in this they are united. Whether a combination acts to raiſe the price of any article for ſale, or the rate of wages; or whether it acts to throw taxes from itſelf upon another claſs of the community, the principle and the effect are the ſame; and if the one be illegal, it will be difficult to ſhew that the other ought to exiſt.

It is to no uſe to ſay, that taxes are firſt propoſed in the houſe of commons; for as the other houſe has always a negative, it can always defend itſelf; and it would be ridiculous to ſuppoſe that its acquieſcence in the meaſures to be propoſed were not underſtood before hand. Beſides which, it has obtained ſo much influence by borough-traffic, and ſo many of its relations and connections are diſtributed on both ſides of the commons, as to give it, beſides an abſolute negative in one houſe, a preponderancy in the other, in all matters of common concern.

It is difficult to diſcover what is meant by the *landed intereſt*, if it does not mean a combination of ariſtocratical land-holders, oppoſing their own pecuniary intereſt to that of the farmer, and every branch of trade, commerce, and manufacture. In all other reſpects it is the only intereſt that needs no partial protection. It enjoys the general protection of the world. Every individual, high or low, is intereſted in the fruits of the earth; men, women, and children, of all ages and degrees, will turn out to aſſiſt the farmer, rather than a harveſt ſhould not be got in; and they will not act thus by any other property. It is the only one for which the common prayer of mankind is put up, and the only one that can never fail from the want of means. It is the intereſt, not of the policy, but of the exiſtence of man, and when it ceaſes, he muſt ceaſe to be.

No other intereſt in a nation ſtands on the ſame united ſupport. Commerce, manufacturers, arts, ſciences, and every thing elſe, compared with this, are ſupported but in parts. Their proſperity or their decay has not the ſame univerſal influence. When the vallies laugh and ſing, it is not the farmer only, but all creation that rejoice. It is a proſperity that excludes all envy; and this cannot be ſaid of any thing elſe.

Why then does Mr. Burke talk of his houſe of peers, as the pillar of the landed intereſt? Were that pillar to ſink into the earth, the ſame landed property would continue, and the ſame

ploughing, ſowing, and reaping would go on. The ariſtocracy are not the farmers who work the land, and raiſe the produce, but are the mere conſumers of the rent; and when compared with the active world are the drones, a ſeraglio of males, who neither collect the honey nor form the hive, but exiſt only for lazy enjoyment.

Mr. Burke, in his firſt eſſay, called ariſtocracy, "*the Corinthian capital of poliſhed ſociety.*" Towards compleating the figure, he has now added the *pillar*; but ſtill the baſe is wanting; and whenever a nation chuſe to act a Samſon, not blind, but bold, down go the temple of Dagon, the Lords, and the Philiſtines.

If a houſe of legiſlation is to be compoſed of men of one claſs, for the purpoſe of protecting a diſtinct intereſt, all the other intereſts ſhould have the ſame. The inequality, as well as the burthen of taxation, ariſes from admitting it in one caſe, and not in all. Had there been an houſe of farmers, there had been no game laws; or an houſe of merchants and manufacturers, the taxes had neither been ſo unequal nor ſo exceſſive. It is from the power of taxation being in the hands of thoſe who can throw ſo great a part of it from their own ſhoulders, that it has raged without a check.

Men of ſmall or moderate eſtates are more injured by the taxes being thrown on articles of conſumption, than they are eaſed by warding it from landed property, for the following reaſons:

Firſt, They conſume more of the productive taxable articles, in proportion to their property, than thoſe of large eſtates.

Secondly, Their reſidence is chiefly in towns, and their property in houſes; and the encreaſe of the poor-rates, occaſioned by taxes on conſumption, is in much greater proportion than the land-tax has been favoured. In Birmingham, the poor-rates are not leſs than ſeven ſhillings in the pound. From this, as already obſerved, the ariſtocracy are in a great meaſure exempt.

Theſe are but a part of the miſchiefs flowing from the wretched ſcheme of an houſe of peers.

As a combination, it can always throw a conſiderable portion of taxes from itſelf; and as an hereditary houſe, accountable to nobody, it reſembles a rotten borough, whoſe conſent is to be courted, by intereſt. There are but few of its members, who are not in ſome mode or other participaters, or diſpoſers of the public money. One turns a candle-holder, or a lord in waiting; another a lord of the bed-chamber, a groom of the ſtole, or any inſignificant nominal office, to which a ſalary is annexed, paid out of the public taxes, and which avoids the direct appearance of corruption. Such ſituations are derogatory to the character of man; and where they can be ſubmitted to, honour cannot reſide.

To all theſe are to be added the numerous dependants, the long liſt of younger branches and diſtant relations, who are provided for at the public expence: in ſhort, were an eſtimation to be made of the charge of ariſtocracy to a nation, it will be found nearly equal to that of ſupporting the poor. The Duke of Richmond alone (and there are caſes ſimilar to his) takes away as much

much for himſelf as would maintain two thouſand poor and aged perſons. Is it, then, any wonder, that under ſuch a ſyſtem of government, taxes and rates have multiplied to their preſent extent?

In ſtating theſe matters, I ſpeak an open and diſintereſted language, dictated by no paſſion but that of humanity. To me, who have not only refuſed offers, becauſe I thought them improper, but have declined rewards I might with reputation have accepted, it is no wonder that meanneſs and impoſition appear diſguſtful. Independance is my happineſs, and I view things as they are, without regard to place or perſon; my country is the world, and my religion is to do good.

Mr. Burke, in ſpeaking of the ariſtocratical law of primogeniture, ſays, "it is the ſtanding law of our landed inheritance; and "which, without queſtion, has a tendency, and I think," continues he, "a happy tendency, to preſerve a character of weight "and conſequence."

Mr. Burke may call this law what he pleaſes, but humanity and impartial reflection will denounce it a law of brutal injuſtice. Were we not accuſtomed to the daily practice, and did we only hear of it as the law of ſome diſtant part of the world, we ſhould conclude that the legiſlators of ſuch countries had not yet arrived at a ſtate of civilization.

As to its preſerving a character of *weight and conſequence*, the caſe appears to me directly the reverſe. It is an attaint upon character; a ſort of privateering on family property. It may have weight among dependant tenants, but it gives none on a ſcale of national, and much leſs of univerſal character. Speaking for myſelf, my parents were not able to give me a ſhilling, beyond what they gave me in education; and to do this they diſtreſſed themſelves; yet, I poſſeſs more of what is called conſequence, in the world, than any one in Mr. Burke's catalogue of ariſtocrats.

Having thus glanced at ſome of the defects of the two houſes of parliament, I proceed to what is called the crown, upon which I ſhall be very conciſe.

[Here follows, on page 107 of the original edition, two paragraphs, making together about eleven lines of the ſame printing as in this edition. Thoſe two ſhort paragraphs are taken into the information as proſecutable matter; but on what ground ſuch a proſecution can be ſupported I am at a loſs to diſcover. Every part of which a government is compoſed muſt be alike fully open to examination and inveſtigation; and where this is not the caſe the country is not in a ſtate of freedom; for it is only by the free and rational exerciſe of this right, that errors, impoſitions, and abſurdities can be detected and remedied either in the parts ſeverally, or in the whole.—If there is any part in a government on which the exerciſe of this right ought to be more fully inſiſted upon by a nation than on another part, it is on that part for which the nation pays the moſt money, and which, in England, is called the crown.—After the two paragraphs here alluded to and which will appear on the trial, the work proceeds as follows]

It has been cuſtomary to call the crown the executive power, and the cuſtom is continued, though the reaſon has ceaſed.

It was called the *executive*, becauſe the perſon whom it ſignified uſed, formerly, to ſit in the character of a judge, in adminiſtering or executing the laws. The tribunals were then a part of the court. The power, therefore, which is now called the judicial, is what was called the executive; and, conſequently, one or other of the terms is redundant, and one of the offices uſeleſs. When we ſpeak of the crown now, it means nothing; it ſignifies neither a judge nor a general: beſides which it is the laws that govern, and not the man. The old terms are kept up, to give an appearance of conſequence to empty forms: and the only effect they have is that of increaſing expences.

Before I proceeded to the means of rendering governments more conducive to the general happineſs of mankind, than they are at preſent, it will not be improper to take a review of the progreſs of taxation in England.

It is a general idea, that when taxes are once laid on, they are never taken off. However true this may have been of late, it was not always ſo. Either, therefore, the people of former times were more watchful over government than thoſe of the preſent, or government was adminiſtered with leſs extravagance.

It is now ſeven hundred years ſince the norman conqueſt, and the eſtabliſhment of what is called the crown. Taking this portion of time in ſeven ſeparate periods of one hundred years each, the amount of the annual taxes, at each period, will be as follows:—

Annual amount of taxes levied by William the Conquerer, beginning in the year 1066	£.400,000
Annual amount of taxes at one hundred years from the conqueſt, (1166)	200,000
Annual amount of taxes at two hundred years from the conqueſt, (1266)	150,000
Annual amount of taxes at three hundred years from the conqueſt, (1366)	130,000
Annual amount of taxes at four hundred years from the conqueſt, (1466)	100,000

Theſe ſtatements, and thoſe which follow, are taken from Sir John Sinclair's Hiſtory of the Revenue; by which it appears, that taxes continued decreaſing for four hundred years, at the expiration of which time they were reduced three-fourths, viz. from four hundred thouſand pounds to one hundred thouſand. the people of England of the preſent day, have a traditionary and hiſtorical idea of the bravery of their anceſtors; but whatever their virtues or their vices might have been, they certainly were a people who would not be impoſed upon, and who kept government in awe as to taxation, if not as to principle. Though they were not able to expel the monarchial uſurpation, they reſtricted it to a republican œconomy of taxes.

Let us now review the remaining three hundred years.

Annual

Annual amount of taxes at five hundred years from the conqueſt, (1566)	£.500,000
Annual amount of taxes at ſix hundred years from the conqueſt, (1666)	1,800,000
Annual amount of taxes at the preſent time, (1791)	17,000,000

The difference between the firſt four hundred years and the laſt three, is ſo aſtoniſhing, as to warrant an opinion, that the national character of the Engliſh has changed. It would have been impoſſible to have dragooned the former Engliſh, into the exceſs of taxation that now exiſts; and when it is conſidered that the pay of the army, the navy, and of all the revenue officers, is the ſame now as it was above a hundred years ago, when the taxes were not above a tenth part of what they are at preſent, it appears impoſſible to account for the enormous increaſe and expenditure, on any other ground, than extravagance, corruption, and intrigue*.

* Several of the court newſpapers have of late made frequent mention of Wat Tyler. That his memory ſhould be traduced by court ſycophants, and all thoſe who live on the ſpoil of a public, is not to be wondered at. He was however, the means of checking the rage and injuſtice of taxation in his time, and the nation owed much to his valour. The hiſtory is conciſely this:—In the time of Richard the ſecond, a poll-tax was levied, of one ſhilling per head, upon every perſon in the nation, of whatever eſtate or condition, on poor as well as rich, above the age of fifteen years. If any favour was ſhewn in the law, it was to the rich rather than to the poor: as no perſon could be charged more than twenty ſhillings for himſelf, family, and ſervants, though ever ſo numerous; while all other families, under the number of twenty, were charged per head. Poll-taxes had always been odious; but this being alſo oppreſſive and unjuſt, it excited, as it naturally muſt, univerſal deteſtation among the poor and middle claſſes. The perſon known by the name of Wat Tyler, whoſe proper name was Walter, and a tyler by trade, lived at Deptford. The gatherer of the poll-tax, on coming to his houſe, demanded tax for one of his daughters, whom Tyler declared was under the age of fifteen. The tax-gatherer inſiſted on ſatisfying himſelf, and began an indecent examination of the girl, which enraging the father, he ſtruck him with a hammer, that brought him to the ground, and was the cauſe of his death.

This circumſtance ſerved to bring the diſcontents to an iſſue. The inhabitants of the neighbourhood eſpouſed the cauſe of Tyler, who in a few days was joined, according to ſome hiſtories, by upwards of fifty thouſand men, and choſen their chief. With this force he marched to London, to demand an abolition of the tax, and a redreſs of their grievances. The court, finding itſelf in a forlorn condition, and unable to make reſiſtance, agreed, with Richard at its head, to hold a conference with Tyler in Smithfield, making many fair profeſſions, courtier like, of its diſpoſitions to redreſs the oppreſſions. While Richard and Tyler were in converſation on theſe matters, each being on horſeback. Walworth then mayor of London, and one of the creatures of the court, watched an opportunity, and like a cowardly aſſaſſin, ſtabbed Tyler with a dagger; and two or three others falling upon him, he was inſtantly ſacrificed.

Tyler appears to have been an intrepid, diſintereſted man, with reſpect to himſelf. All his propoſals made to Richard, were on a more juſt and public ground, than thoſe which had been made to John by the Barons; and notwithſtanding the ſycophancy of hiſtorians, and men like Mr. Burke, who ſeek to gloſs over a baſe action of the court by traducing Tyler, his fame will outlive their falſehood, If the Barons merited a monument to be erected in Runnymede, Tyler merits one in Smithfield.

With the revolution of 1688, and more ſo ſince the Hanover ſucceſſion, came the deſtructive ſyſtem of continental intrigues, and the rage for foreign wars and foreign dominion; ſyſtems of ſuch ſecure myſtery that the expences admit of no accounts; a ſingle line ſtands for millions. To what exceſs taxation might have extended, had not the French revolution contributed to break up the ſyſtem, and put an end to pretences, is impoſſible to ſay. Viewed, as that revolution ought to be, as the fortunate means of leſſening the load of taxes of both countries, it is of as much importance to England as to France; and, if properly improved to all the advantages of which it is capable, and to which it leads, deſerve as much celebration in one country as the other.

In purſuing this ſubject, I ſhall begin with the matter that firſt preſents itſelf, that of leſſening the burthen of taxes; and ſhall then add ſuch matters and propoſitions, reſpecting the three countries of England, France, and America, as the proſpect of things appears to juſtify: I mean, an alliance of the three, for the purpoſes that will be mentioned in their proper place.

What has happened may happen again. By the ſtatement before ſhewn of the progreſs of taxation, it is ſeen, that taxes have been leſſened to a fourth part of what they had formerly been. Though the preſent circumſtances do not admit of the ſame reduction, yet it admits of ſuch a beginning, as may accompliſh that in leſs time, than in the former caſe.

The amount of taxes for the year, ending at Michaelmas 1788, was as follows:

Land-tax,	£. 1,950,000
Cuſtoms,	3,789,274
Exciſe, (including old and new malt,)	6,751,727
Stamps,	1,278,214
Miſcellaneous taxes and incidents,	1,803,755
	£. 15,572,970

Since the year 1778, upwards of one million, new taxes have been laid on, beſides the produce from the lotteries; and as the taxes have in general been more productive ſince than before, the amount may be taken, in round numbers, at 17,000,000.

N. B. The expence of collection and the drawbacks, which together amount to nearly two millions, are paid out of the groſs amount: and the above is the nett ſum paid into the exchequer.

This ſum of ſeventeen millions is applied to two different purpoſes; the one to pay the intereſt of the national debt, the other to the current expences of each year. About nine millions are appropriated to the former; and the remainder, being nearly eight millions, to the latter. As to the million, ſaid to be applied to the reduction of the debt, it is ſo much like paying with one hand and taking out with the other, as not to merit much notice.

It happened, fortunately for France, that ſhe poſſeſſed national domains

domains for paying off her debt, and thereby leſſening her taxes: but as this is not the caſe in England, her reduction of taxes can only take place by reducing the current expences, which may now be done to the amount of four or five millions annually, as will hereafter appear. When this is accompliſhed, it will more than counterbalance the enormous charge of the American war; and the ſaving will be from the ſame ſource from whence the evil aroſe.

As to the national debt, however heavy the intereſt may be in taxes; yet, as it ſerves to keep alive a capital, uſeful to commerce, it balances by its affects a conſiderable part of its own weight; and as the quantity of gold and ſilver in England is, by ſome means or other, ſhort of its proper proportion *, (being not more than twenty millions, whereas it ſhould be ſixty,) it would, beſides the injuſtice, be bad policy to extinguiſh a capital that ſerves to ſupply that defect. But with reſpect to the current expence, whatever is ſaved therefrom is gain. The exceſs may ſerve to keep corruption alive, but it has no re-action on credit and commerce, like the intereſt of the debt.

It is now very probable, that the Engliſh government (I do not mean the nation) is unfriendly to the French revolution. Whatever ſerves to expoſe the intrigue and leſſen the influence of courts, by leſſening taxation, will be unwelcome to thoſe who feed upon the ſpoil. Whilſt the clamour of French intrigue, arbitrary power, popery, and wooden ſhoes ſhould be kept up, the nation was eaſily allured and alarmed into taxes. Thoſe days are now paſt; deception, it is to be hoped, has reaped its laſt harveſt, and better times are in proſpect for both countries, and for the world.

Taking it for granted, that an alliance may be formed between England, France, and America, for the purpoſes hereafter to be mentioned, the national expences of France and England may conſequently be leſſened. The ſame fleets and armies, will no longer be neceſſary to either, and the reduction can be made ſhip for ſhip on each ſide. But to accompliſh theſe objects, the governments muſt neceſſarily be fitted to a common and correſpondent principle. Confidence can never take place, while an hoſtile diſpoſition remains in either, or where myſtery and ſecrecy on one ſide, is oppoſed to candour and openneſs on the other.

Theſe matters admitted, the national expences might be put back, *for the ſake of a precedent*, to what they were at ſome period when France and England were not enemies. This conſequently, muſt be prior to the Hanover ſucceſſion, and alſo to the revolution of 1688 †. The firſt inſtance that preſents itſelf, antece-

* Foreign intrigue, foreign wars, and foreign dominions, will in a great meaſure account for the deficiency.

† On page 116 of the original edition of this work is a note in which ſimilar remarks are made on the characters of William and Mary, the one fighting againſt his uncle, and the other againſt her own father, as have been made by other writers. Dr. Johnſon, I believe, even while he was a penſioner of the preſent court, expreſſes himſelf in ſtronger terms of diſap-

dent to those dates, is in the very wasteful and profligate times of Charles the Second, at which time England and France acted as allies. If I have chosen a period of great extravagance, it will serve to shew modern extravagance, in a still worse light; especially as the pay of the navy, the army, and the revenue officers has not encreased since that time.

The peace establishment was then as follows:—See Sir John Sinclair's History of the Revenue.

Navy,	300,000
Army,	212,000
Ordnance,	40,000
Civil List,	462,115
	£.1,014,115

The parliament, however, settled the whole annual peace establishment at 1,200,000 *. If we go back to the time of Elizabeth, the amount of all the taxes was but half a million, yet the nation sees nothing during that period, that reproaches it with want of consequence.

All circumstances then taken together, arising from the French revolution, from the approching harmony and reciprocal interest of the two nations, the abolition of court intrigue on both sides, and the progress of knowledge in the science of government, the annual expenditure might be put back to one million and a half, viz.

probation than I have done. Why a change of policy has now taken place, of prosecuting at this time, what was permitted and apparently encouraged at another time, the persons concerned can best explain. In the same note it is also stated that William charged six hundred thousand pounds for the expences of the Dutch fleet that brought him from Holland, and that George the first purchased the Duchies of Bremen and Verden, with two hundred and fifty thousand pounds, which he got from England, and added them to his Hanoverian dominions for his own use. The note in which these matters are contained are put into the prosecution; but for what purpose I do not discover.

The bill of costs delivered in for the Dutch fleet, as stated in Sir John Sinclair's History of Revenue (Part the third, page 40) was 686,500l. and was reduced to 600,000 by parliament. And in 1701 the house of commons came to a resolution, by which it appears that William was not very scrupulous or very careful in his expenditure of English money. The resolution is as follows:---"That it is notorious that many millions of money "had been given to his majesty (meaning the said William) for the ser- "vice of the public, which remain yet unaccounted for." See the Journal.

As to the purchase of Bremen and Verden, with the money obtained from England, by George the first, the Journals of Parliament prove the fact, and the opposition it met with will shew the manner in which it was very generally considered by the faction.

* Charles, like his predecessors and successors, finding that war was the harvest of governments, engaged in a war with the Dutch, the expence of which encreased the annual expenditure to £.1,800,000, as stated under the date of 1666; but the peace establishment was but £.1,200,000.

Navy

Navy,	500,000
Army,	500,000
Expences of government,	500,000
	£. 1,500,000

Even this sum is six times greater than the expences of government are in America, yet the civil internal government in England, (I mean that administered by means of quarter sessions, juries, and assize, and which, in fact, is nearly the whole, and performed by the nation,) is less expence upon the revenue, than the same species and portion of government is in America.

It is time that nations should be rational, and not be governed like animals, for the pleasure of their riders. To read the history of kings, a man would be almost inclined to suppose that government consisted in stag-hunting, and that every nation paid a million a year to a huntsman. Man ought to have pride, or shame enough to blush at being thus imposed upon, and when he feels his proper character, he will. Upon all subjects of this nature, there is often passing in the mind, a train of ideas he has not not yet accustomed himself to encourage and communicate. Restrained by something that puts on the character of prudence, he acts the hypocrite upon himself as well as to others. It is, however, curious to observe how soon this spell can be dissolved. A single expression, boldly conceived and uttered, will sometimes put a whole company into their proper feelings; and whole nations are acted upon in the same manner.

As to the offices of which any civil government may be composed, it matters but little by what names they are described. In the routine of business, as before observed, whether a man be stiled a president, a king, an emperor, a senator, or any thing else, it is impossible that any service he can perform, can merit from a nation more than ten thousand pounds a year; and as no man should be paid beyond his services, so every man of a proper heart will not accept more. Public money ought to be touched with the most scrupulous consciousness of honour. It is not the produce of riches only, but of the hard earnings of labour and poverty. It is drawn even from the bitterness of want and misery. Not a beggar passes, or perishes in the streets, whose mite is not in that mass.

Were it possible that the Congress of America, could be so lost to their duty, and to the interest of their constituents, as to offer General Washington, as president of America, a million a year, he would not, and he could not, accept it. His sense of honour is of another kind. It has cost England almost seventy millions sterling, to maintain a family imported from abroad, of very inferior capacity to thousands in the nation; and scarcely a year has passed that has not produced some new mercenary application. Even the physicians bills have been sent to the public to be paid. No wonder that jails are crowded, and taxes and poor-rates encreased. Under such systems, nothing is to be looked for but

what

what has already happened; and as to reformation, whenever it come, it muſt be from the nation, and not from the government.

To ſhew that the ſum of five hundred thouſand pounds is more than ſufficient to defray all the expences of government, excluſive of navies, and armies, the following eſtimate is added for any country of the ſame extent as England.

In the firſt place, three hundred repreſentatives, fairly elected, are ſufficient for all the purpoſes to which legiſlation can apply, and preferable to a larger number. They may be divided into two or three houſes, or meet in one, as in France, or in any manner a conſtitution ſhall direct.

As repreſentation is always conſidered, in free countries, as the moſt honourable of all ſtations, the allowance made to it is merely to defray the expence with the repreſentatives incur by that ſervice, and not to it is an office.

If an allowance, at the rate of five hundred pound *per ann.* be made to every repreſentative, deducting for non-attendance, the expence, if the whole number attended for ſix months, each year, would be		£. 75,000
The official departments cannot reaſonably exceed the following number, with the ſalaries annexed:		
Three offices, at ten thouſand pounds each,		30,000
Ten ditto,	at £. 5000 each	50,000
Twenty ditto,	at £. 2000 each	40,000
Forty ditto,	at £. 1000 each	40,000
Two hundred ditto,	at £. 500 each	100,000
Three hundred ditto,	at £. 200 each	60,000
Five hundred ditto,	at £. 100 each	50,000
Seven hundred ditto,	at £. 75 each	52,500
		£. 497,500

If a nation, chuſe, it can deduct four *per cent.* from all offices, and make one of twenty thouſand *per ann.*

All revenue officers are paid out of the monies they collect, and therefore, are not in this eſtimation.

The foregoing is not offered as an exact detail of offices, but to ſhew the number and rate of ſalaries which five hundred thouſand pounds will ſupport; and it will, on experience, be found impractible to find buſineſs ſufficient to juſtify even this expence. As to the manner in which office buſineſs is now performed, the Chiefs, in ſeveral offices, ſuch as the poſt office, and certain offices in the exchequer, &c. do little more than ſign their names three or four times a year; and the whole duty is performed by under clerks.

Taking, therefore, one million and an half as a ſufficient peace eſtabliſhment for all the honeſt purpoſes of government, which is three hundred thouſand pounds more than the peace eſtabliſhment in the profligate and prodigal times of Charles the Second, (notwithſtanding, as has been already obſerved, the pay and ſalaries of

of the army, navy, and the revenue officers, continue the ſame as at that period,) there will remain a ſurplus of upward of ſix millions out of the preſent current expences. The queſtion then will be, how to diſpoſe of this ſurplus.

Whoever has obſerved the manner in which trade and taxes twiſt themſelves together, muſt be ſenſible of the impoſſibility of ſeparating them ſuddenly.

Firſt. Becauſe the articles now on hand are already charged with the duty, and the reduction cannot take place on the preſent ſtock.

Secondly. Becauſe, on all thoſe articles on which the duty is charged in the groſs, ſuch as per barrel, hogſhead, hundred weight, or tun, the abolition of the duty does not admit of being divided down ſo as fully to relieve the conſumer, who purchaſes by the pint, or the pound. The laſt duty laid on ſtrong beer and ale, was three ſhillings *per* barrel, which, if taken off, would leſſen the purchaſe, only half a farthing *per* pint, and conſequently, would not reach to practical relief.

This being the condition of a great part of the taxes, it will be neceſſary to look for ſuch others as are free from this embarraſment, and where the relief will be direct and viſible, and capable of immediate opperation.

In the firſt place, then, the poor-rates are a direct tax which every houſe-keeper, feels, and who knows alſo, to a farthing, the ſum which he pays. The national amount of the whole of the poor-rates is not poſitively known, but can be procured. Sir John Sinclair, in his Hiſtory of the Revenue, has ſtated it at £.2,100,587. A conſiderable part of which is expended in litigations, in which the poor, inſtead of being relieved, are tormented. The expence, however, is the ſame to the pariſh from whatever cauſe it ariſes.

In Birmingham, the amount of the poor-rates is fourteen thouſand pounds a year. This, though a large ſum, is moderate, compared with the population. Birmingham is ſaid to contain ſeventy thouſand ſouls, and on a proportion of ſeventy thouſand to fourteen thouſand pounds poor-rates, the national amount of poor-rates, taking the population of England at ſeven millions, would be but one million four hundred thouſand pounds. It is, therefore, moſt probable, that the population of Birmingham is over-rated. Fourteen thouſand pounds is the proportion upon fifty thouſand ſouls, taking two millions of poor-rates as the national amount.

Be it, however what it may, it is no other than the conſequence of the exceſſive burthen of taxes, for at the time when the taxes were very low, the poor were able to maintain themſelves; and there were no poor-rates *. In the preſent ſtate of things, a labouring man, with a wife and two or three children, does not pay leſs than between ſeven and eight pounds a year in taxes. He is

* Poor-rates began about the time of Henry VIII. when the taxes began to encreaſe, and they have encreaſed as the taxes encreaſed ever ſince.

not

not ſenſible of this, becauſe it is diſguiſed to him in the articles which he buys, and he thinks only of their dearneſs; but as the taxes take from him, at leaſt, a fourth part of his yearly earnings, he is conſequently diſabled from providing for a family, eſpecially, if himſelf, or any of them are afflicted with ſickneſs.

The firſt ſtep, therefore, of practical relief, would be to aboliſh the poor-rates entirely, and in lieu thereof, to make a remiſſion of taxes of the poor of double the amount of the preſent poor-rates, viz. four millions annually out of the ſurplus taxes. By this meaſure, the poor will be benefited two millions, and the houſekeepers two millions. This alone would be equal to a reduction of one hundred and twenty millions of the national debt, and conſequently equal to the whole expence of the American war.

It will then remain to be conſidered, which is the moſt effectual mode of diſtributing this remiſſion of four millions.

It is eaſily ſeen, that the poor are generally compoſed of large families of children, and old people paſt their labour. If theſe two claſſes are provided for, the remedy will ſo far reach to the full extent of the caſe, that what remains will be incidental, and, in a great meaſure, fall within the compaſs of benefit clubs, which, though of humble invention, merit to be ranked among the beſt of modern inſtitutions.

Admitting England to contain ſeven million of ſouls; if one fifth thereof are of that claſs of poor which need ſupport, the number will be one million four hundred thouſand. Of this number, one hundred and forty thouſand will be aged poor, as will be hereafter, ſhewn, and for which a diſtinct proviſion will be propoſed.

There will then remain one million two hundred and ſixty thouſand, which, at five ſouls to each family, amount to two hundred and fifty-two thouſand families, rendered poor from the expence of children and the weight of taxes.

The number of children under fourteen years of age, in each of thoſe families, will be found to be about five to every two families; ſome having two, and others three; ſome one, and others, four; ſome none, and others five; but it rarely happens that more than five are under fourteen years of age, and after this age they are capable of ſervice or of being apprenticed.

Allowing five children (under fourteen years) to every two families.

The number of children will be - - - - -	630,000
The number of parents were they all living, would be -	504,000

It is certain, that if the children are provided for, the parents are relieved of conſequence, becauſe it is from the expence of bringing up children that their poverty ariſes.

Having thus aſcertained the greateſt number that can be ſuppoſed to need ſupport on account of young families, I proceed to the mode of relief or diſtribution, which is,

To pay as a remiſſion of taxes to every poor family, out of the ſurplus taxes, and in room of poor-rates, four pounds a year for every child under fourteen years of age; enjoining the parents of

of ſuch children to ſend them to ſchool, to learn reading, writing, and common arithmetic; the miniſters of every pariſh, of every denomination, to certify jointly to an office, for that purpoſe, that this duty is performed.

The amount of this expence will be,

For ſix hundred and thirty thouſand children, at four pounds *per ann.* each £,2,520,000

By adopting this method, not only the poverty of the parents will be relieved, but ignorance will be baniſhed from the riſing generation, and the number of poor will hereafter becomes leſs, becauſe their abilities, by the aid of education, will be greater. Many a youth, with good natural genius, who is apprenticed to a mechanical trade, ſuch as a carpenter, joiner, millwright, ſhipwright, blackſmith, &c. is prevented getting forward the whole of his life, from the want of a little common education when a boy.

I now proceed to the caſe of the aged.

I divide age into two claſſes. Firſt, the approach of age beginning at fifty. Secondly, old age commencing at ſixty.

At fifty, though the mental faculties of man are in full vigour, and his judgment better than at any preceeding date, the bodily powers for laborious life are on the decline. He cannot bear the ſame quantity of fatigue as at an earlier period. He begins to earn leſs, and is leſs capable of enduring wind and weather; and in thoſe more retired employments where much ſight is required, he fails apace, and ſees himſelf, like an old horſe, beginning to be turned adrift.

At ſixty his labour ought to be over at leaſt from direct neceſſity. It is painful to ſee old age working itſelf to death, in what are called civilized countries, for daily bread.

To form ſome judgment of the number of thoſe above fifty years of age, I have ſeveral times counted the perſons I meet in the ſtreets of London, men, women, and children, and have generally found that the average is about one in ſixteen or ſeventeen. If it be ſaid that the aged perſons do not come much in the ſtreets, ſo neither do infants; and a great proportion of grown children are in ſchools, and in work-ſhops as apprentices. Taking then ſixteen for a deviſor, the whole number of perſons in England, of fifty years and upwards of both ſexes, rich and poor, will be four hundred and twenty thouſand.

The perſons to be provided for out of this groſs number will be, huſbandmen, common labourers, journeymen of every trade and their wives, ſailors, and diſbanded ſoldiers, worn out ſervants of both ſexes, and poor widows.

There will be alſo a conſiderable number of middling tradeſmen, who having lived decently in the former part of life, begin, as age approaches, to loſe their buſineſs, and at laſt fall to decay.

Beſides theſe, there will be conſtantly thrown off from the revolutions of that wheel, which no man can ſtop, nor regulate, a number from every claſs of life connected with commerce and adventure.

To

To provide for all those accidents, and whatever else may befal, I take the number of persons, who at one time or other of their lives, after fifty years of age, may feel it necessary or comfortable to be better supported, than they can support themselves, and that not as a matter of grace and favour, but of right, at one third of the whole number, which is one hundred and forty thousand, as stated in page 68, and for whom a distinct provision was proposed to be made. If there be more, society, notwithstanding the shew and pomposity of government, is in a deplorable condition in England.

Of this one hundred and forty thousand, I take one half, seventy thousand, to be of the age of fifty and under sixty, and the other half to be sixty years and upwards.—Having thus ascertained the probable proportion of the number of aged persons, I proceed to the mode of rendering their condition comfortable, which is,

To pay every such person of the age of fifty years, and until he arrive at the age of sixty, the sum of six pounds *per ann.* out of the surplus taxes; and ten pounds *per ann.* during life after the age of sixty. The expence of which will be,

Seventy thousand persons at 6l. per ann.	- -	420,000
Seventy thousand ditto at 10l. per ann.	- -	700,000
	£.	1,12,000

This support, as already remarked, is not of the nature of a charity, but of a right. Every person in England, male and female, pays on an average in taxes, two pounds eight shillings and sixpence *per ann.* from the day of his (or her) birth; and, if the expence of collection be added, he pays two pounds eleven shillings and sixpence; consequently, at the end of fifty years he has paid one hundred and twenty eight pounds fifteen shillings; and at sixty, one hundred and fifty-four pounds ten shillings. Converting, therefore, his (or her) individual tax into a tontine, the money he shall receive after fifty years, is but little more than the legal interest of the nett money he has paid; the rest is made up from those whose circumstances do not require them to draw such support, and the capital in both defrays the expences of government. It is on this ground that I have extended the probable claims to one third of the number of aged persons in the nation.—Is it then better that the lives of one hundred and forty thousand aged persons be rendered comfortable, or that a million a year of public money be expended on any one individual, and him often of the most worthless or insignificant character? Let reason and justice, let honour and humanity, let even hypocrisy, sycophancy and Mr. Burke, let George, let Louis, Leopold, Frederic, Catharine, Cornwallis, or Tippoo Saib, answer the question *.

* Reckoning the taxes by families, five to a family, each family pays on an average 12l. 17s. 6d. per ann. to this sum are to be added the poor-rates. Though all pay taxes in the articles they consume, all do not pay-poor-rates. About two millions are exempted, some as not being house keepers, others as no

The sum thus remitted to the poor will be,

To two hundred and fifty-two thousand poor families, containing six hundred and thirty thousand children,	-	2,520,000
To one hundred and forty thousand aged persons,	-	1,120,000
	£.	3,64,000

There will then remain three hundred and sixty thousand pounds out of the four millions, part of which may be applied as follows:

After all the above cases are provided for, there will still be a number of families, who though not properly of the class of poor, yet find it difficult to give education to their children; and such children, under such a case, would be in a worse condition than if their parents were actually poor. A nation under a well-regulated government, should permit none to remain uninstructed. It is monarchial and aristocratical government only that requires ignorance that supports.

Suppose then four hundred thousand children to be in this condition, which is a greater number than ought to be supposed, after the provisions already made, the method will be,

To allow for each of those children ten shillings a year for the expence of schooling, for six years each, which will give them six months schooling each year, and half a crown a year for paper and spelling books.

The expence of this will be annually * £.250,000.

There will then remain one hundred and ten thousand pounds.

Notwithstanding the great modes of relief which the best insti-

not being able, and the poor themselves who receive the relief. The average, therefore, of poor-rates on the remaining number, is forty shillings for every family of five persons, which makes the whole average amount of taxes and rates, 14l. 17s. 6d. For six persons 17l. 17s. For seven persons, 20l. 16s. 6d.

The average of taxes in America, under the new or representative system of government, including the interest of the debt contracted in the war, and taking the population at four millions of souls, which it now amounts to, and it is daily encreasing, is five shillings per head, men, women, and children. The difference, therefore, between the two governments, is as under.

	England.	America.
For a family of five persons - -	£. 14 17 6	£. 1 5 0
For a family of six persons - -	17 17 0	1 10 0
For a family of seven persons - -	20 16 6	1 15 0

* Public schools do not answer the general purpose of the poor. They are chiefly in corporation towns, from which the country towns and villages are excluded; or, if admitted, the distance occasions a great loss of time. Education, to be useful to the poor, should be on the spot; and the best method I believe, to accomplish this, is to enable the parents to pay the expence themselves. There are always persons of both sexes to be found in every village, especially when growing into years, capable of such an undertaking. Twenty children, at ten shillings each, (and that not more than six months each year) would be as much as some livings amount to in the remote parts of England; and there are often distressed clergymen's widows to whom such an income would be acceptable. Whatever is given on this account to children answers two purposes, to them it is education, to those who educate them it is a livelihood.

tuted and beſt principled government may deviſe, there will ſtill be a number of ſmaller caſes, which it is good policy as well as beneficence in a nation to conſider.

Were twenty ſhillings to be given immediately on the birth of a child, to every women who ſhould make the demand, and none will make it whoſe circumſtances do not require it, it might relieve a great deal of inſtant diſtreſs.

There are about two hundred thouſand births yearly in England; and if claimed, by one fourth,

The amount would be - - - - - £50,000

And twenty ſhillings to every new-married couple who ſhould claim in like manner. This would not exceed the ſum of £20,000

Alſo twenty thouſand pounds to be appropriated to defray the funeral expences of perſons, who, travelling for work, may die at a diſtance from their friends. By relieving pariſhes from this charge, the ſick ſtranger will be better treated.

I ſhall finiſh this part of the ſubject with a plan adapted to the particular condition of a metropolis, ſuch as London.

Caſes are continually occuring in a metropolis, different to thoſe which occur in the country, and for which a different, or rather an additional mode of relief is neceſſary. In the country, even in large towns, people have a knowledge of each other, and diſtreſs never riſes to that extreme height it ſometimes does in a metropolis. There is no ſuch thing in the country as perſons, in the literal ſenſe of the word, ſtarved to death, or dying with cold from the want of a lodging. Yet ſuch caſes, and others equally as miſerable, happen in London.

Many a youth comes up to London full of expactations, and with little or no money, and unleſs he get immediate employment, he is already half undone; and boys bred up in London, without any means of a livelihood, and as it often happens of diſſolute parents, are in ſtill worſe condition; and ſervants long out of place are not much better off. In ſhort, a world of little caſes are continually ariſing, which buſy or affluent life knows not of, to open the firſt door to diſtreſs. Hunger is not among the poſtponeable wants, and a day, even a few hours, in ſuch a condition, is often the criſis of a life of ruin.

Theſe circumſtances, which are the general cauſe of the little thefts and pilferings that lead to greater, may be prevented. There yet remain twenty thouſand pounds out of the four millions of ſurplus taxes, which, with another fund hereafter to be mentioned, amounting to about twenty thouſand pounds more, cannot be better applied than to this purpoſe. The plan then will be,

Firſt, To erect two or more buildings, or take ſome already erected, capable of containing at leaſt ſix thouſand perſons, and to have in each of theſe places as many kinds of employment as can be contrived, ſo that every perſon who ſhall come may find ſomething which he or ſhe can do.

Secondly, To receive all who ſhall come, without enquiring who or what they are. The only condition to be, that for ſo much

much, or ſo many hours work, each perſon ſhall receive ſo many meals of wholeſome food, and a warm lodging, at leaſt as good as a barrack. That a certain portion of what each perſon's work ſhall be worth ſhall be reſerved, and given to him, or her, on their going away; and that each perſon ſhall ſtay as long, or as ſhort time, or come as often as he chuſe, on theſe conditions.

If each perſon ſtaid three months, it would aſſiſt by rotation twenty-four thouſand perſons annually, though the real number, at all times, would be but ſix thouſand. By eſtabliſhing an aſylum of this kind, perſons to whom temporary diſtreſſes occur, would have an opportunity to recruit themſelves, and be enabled to look out for better employment.

Allowing that their labour paid but one half the expence of ſupporting them, after reſerving a portion of their earnings for themſelves, the ſum of forty thouſand pounds additional would defray all other charges for even a greater number than ſix thouſand.

The fund very properly convertible to this purpoſe, in addition to the twenty thouſand pounds, remaining of the former fund, will be the produce of the tax upon coals, ſo iniquitouſly and wantonly applied to the ſupport of the Duke of Richmond. It is horrid that any man, more eſpecially at the price coals now are, ſhould live on the diſtreſſes of a community; and any government permitting ſuch an abuſe, deſerves to be diſmiſſed. This fund is ſaid to be about twenty thouſand pounds *per annum*.

I ſhall now conclude this plan with enumerating the ſeveral particulars, and then proceed to other matters.

The enumeration is as follows:

Firſt, Abolition of two million poor-rates.

Secondly, Proviſion for two hundred and fifty-two thouſand poor families.

Thirdly, Education for one million and thirty thouſand children.

Fourthly, Comfortable proviſion for one hundred and forty thouſand aged perſons.

Fifthly, Donation of twenty ſhillings each for fifty thouſand births.

Sixthly, Donation of twenty ſhillings each for twenty thouſand marriages.

Seventhly, Allowance of twenty thouſand pounds for the funeral expences of perſons travelling for work, and dying at a diſtance from their friends.

Eightly, Employment, at all times, for the caſual poor in the cities of London and Weſtminſter.

By the operation of this plan, the poor laws, thoſe inſtruments of civil torture, will be ſuperceded, and the waſteful expence of litigation prevented. The hearts of the humane will not be ſhocked by ragged and hungry children, and perſons of ſeventy and eighty years of age begging for bread. The dying poor will not be dragged from place to place to breathe their laſt, as a repriſal of pariſh upon pariſh. Widows will have a mainte-

nance for their children, and not be carted away, on the death of their huſbands, like culprits and criminals; and children will no longer be conſidered as encreaſing the diſtreſſes of their parents. The haunts of the wretched will be known, becauſe it will be to their advantage; and the number of petty crimes, the offſpring of diſtreſs and poverty, will be leſſened. The poor, as well as the rich, will then be intereſted in the ſupport of government, and the cauſe and apprehenſion of riots and tumults will ceaſe.—Ye who ſit in eaſe, and ſolace yourſelves in plenty, and ſuch there are in Turky and Ruſſia, as well as in England, and who ſay to yourſelves, "Are we not well off," have ye thought of theſe things? When ye do, ye will ceaſe to ſpeak and feel for yourſelves alone.

The plan is eaſy in practice. It does not embarraſs trade by a ſudden interruption in the order of taxes, but effects the relief by changing the application of them; and the money neceſſary for the purpoſe can be drawn from the exciſe collections, which are made eight times a year in every market town in England.

Having now arranged and concluded this ſubject, I proceed to the next.

Taking the preſent current expences at ſeven millions and an half, which is the leaſt amount they are now at, there will remain (after the ſum of one million and an half be taken for the new current expences, and four millions for the before-mentioned ſervice) the ſum of two millions; part of which to be applied as follows:

Though fleets and armies, by an alliance with France, will, in a great meaſure, become uſeleſs, yet the perſons who have devoted themſelves to thoſe ſervices, and have thereby unfitted themſelves for other lines of life, are not to be ſufferers by the means that make others happy. They are a different deſcription of men to thoſe who form or hang about a court.

A party of the army will remain at leaſt for ſome years, and alſo of the navy, for which a proviſion is already made in the former part of this plan of one million, which is almoſt half a million more than the peace eſtabliſhment of the army and navy in the prodigal times of Charles the Second.

Suppoſe then fifteen thouſand ſoldiers to be diſbanded, and that an allowance be made to each of three ſhillings a week during life, clear of all deductions, to be paid in the ſame manner as the Chelſea College penſioners are paid, and for them to return to their trades and their friends; and alſo that an addition of fifteen thouſand ſixpences per week be made to the pay of the ſoldiers who ſhall remain; the annual expence will be,

To the pay of fifteen thouſand diſbanded ſoldiers, at three ſhillings per week	£.	117,000
Additional pay to the remaining ſoldiers,		19,500
Carried forward		136,500

Suppoſe

Brought over		136,500
Suppoſe that the pay to the officers of the diſbanded corps be of the ſame amount as the ſum allowed, to the men,		117,000
		253,500
To prevent bulky eſtimations, admit the ſame ſum to the diſbanded navy as to the army, and the ſame increaſe of pay,		253,500
Total		507,000

Every year ſome part of this ſum of half a million (I omit the odd ſeven thouſand pounds for the purpoſe of keeping the account unembarraſſed) will fall in, and the whole of it in time, as it is on the ground of life annuities, except the encreaſed pay of twenty-nine thouſand pounds. As it falls in, a part of the taxes may be taken off; for inſtance, when thirty thouſand pounds fall in, the duty on hops may be wholly taken off; and as other parts fall in, the duties on candles and ſoap may be leſſened, till at laſt they will totally ceaſe.

There now remains at leaſt one million and an half of ſurplus taxes.

The tax on houſes and windows is one of thoſe direct taxes which, like the poor-rates, is not confounded with trade; and, when taken off, the relief will be inſtantly felt. This tax falls heavy on the middling claſs of people.

The amount of this tax by the returns of 1788, was,

Houſes and windows by the act of 1766,	385,459	11	7
Ditto ditto by the act of 1779,	130,739	14	5
Total	516,199	6	0½

If this tax be ſtruck off, there will then remain about one million of ſurplus taxes, and as it is always proper to keep a ſum in reſerve, for incidental matters, it may be beſt not to extend reductions further, in the firſt inſtance, but to conſider what may be accompliſhed by other modes of reform.

Among the taxes moſt heavily felt is the commutation-tax. I ſhall, therefore, offer a plan for its abolition, by ſubſtituting another in its place, which will affect three objects at once:

Firſt, that of removing the burthen to where it can beſt be borne.

Secondly, Reſtoring juſtice among families by a diſtribution of property.

Thirdly, Extirpating the overgrown influence ariſing from the unnatural law of primogeniture, and which is one of the principal ſources of corruption at elections.

The amount of the commutation tax by the returns of 1788, was,	£.	771,657 9 8

When taxes are propoſed, the country is amuſed by the plauſible language of taxing luxuries. One thing is called a luxury

at one time, and something else at another; but the real luxury does not consist in the article, but in the means of procuring it, and this is always kept out of sight.

I know not why any plant or herb of the field should be a greater luxury in one country than another, but an overgrown estate in either is a luxury at all times, and as such is the proper object of taxation. It is, therefore, right to take those kind tax-making gentlemen up on their own word, and argue on the principle themselves have laid down, that of *taxing luxuries*. If they, or their champion Mr. Burke, who, I fear, is growing out of date, like the man in armour, can prove that an estate of twenty, thirty, or forty thousand pounds a year is not a luxury, I will give up the argument.

Admitting that any annual sum, say for instance, one thousand pounds, is necessary or sufficient for the support of a family, consequently the second thousand is of the nature of a luxury, the third still more so, and by proceeding on, we shall at last arrive at a sum that may not improperly be called a prohibitable luxury. It would be impolitic to set bounds to property acquired by industry, and therefore it is right to place the prohibition beyond the probable acquisition to which industry can extend; but there ought to be a limit to property, or the accumulation of it, by bequest. It should pass in some other line. The richest in every nation have poor relations, and those often very near in consanguinity.

The following table of progressive taxation is constructed on the above principles, and as a substitute for the commutation-tax. It will reach the point of prohibition by a regular operation, and thereby supercede the aristocratical law of primogeniture.

TABLE I.

A tax on all estates of the clear yearly value of fifty pounds, after deducting the land-tax, and up

	s.	d.	
To £. 500	0	3	per pound
From 500 to 1000	0	6	per pound
On the second thousand	0	9	per pound
On the third ditto	1	0	per pound
On the fourth ditto	1	6	per pound
On the fifth ditto	2	0	per pound
On the sixth ditto	3	0	per pound
On the seventh ditto	4	0	per pound
On the eighth ditto	5	0	per pound
On the ninth ditto	6	0	per pound
On the tenth ditto	7	0	per pound
On the eleventh ditto	8	0	per pound
On the twelfth	9	0	per pound
On the thirteenth ditto	10	0	per pound
On the fourteenth ditto	11	0	per pound
On the fifteenth ditto	12	0	per pound
On the sixteenth ditto	13	0	per pound
On the seventeenth ditto	14	0	per pound
On the eighteenth ditto	15	0	pound

On

On the nineteenth ditto	16	0	per pound
On the twentieth ditto	17	0	per pound
On the twenty-first ditto	18	0	per pound
On the twenty-second ditto	19	0	per pound
On the twenty-third ditto	20	0	per pound

The foregoing table shews the progression per pound on every progressive thousand. The following table shews the amount of the tax on every thousand separately, and in the last column, the total amount of all the separate sums collected.

TABLE II.

		d.		l.	s.	d.
An estate of	£. 50 per ann.	at 3	per pound pays	0	12	6
	100	3		1	5	0
	200	3		2	10	0
	300	3		3	15	0
	400	3		5	0	0
	500	3		7	5	0

After 500l.—the tax of sixpence per pound takes place on the second 500.—consequently an estate of 1000l. *per ann.* pays 21l. 15s. and so on.

		l.	s.	d.		l.	s.	Total amount. l.	s.
For the	1st	500 at	0	3	per pound	7	5	21	15
	2d	500 at	0	6		14	10		
	2d	1000 at	0	9		37	10	59	5
	3d	1000 at	1	0		50	0	109	5
	4th	1000 at	1	6		75	0	184	5
	5th	1000 at	2	0		100	0	284	5
	6th	1000 at	3	0		150	0	434	5
	7th	1000 at	4	0		200	0	634	5
	8th	1000 at	5	0		250	0	880	5
	9th	1000 at	6	0		300	0	1180	5
	10th	1000 at	7	0		350	0	1530	5
	11th	1000 at	8	0		400	0	1930	5
	12th	1000 at	9	0		450	0	2380	5
	13th	1000 at	10	0		500	0	2880	5
	14th	1000 at	11	0		550	0	3430	5
	15th	1000 at	12	0		600	0	4030	5
	16th	1000 at	13	0		650	0	4680	5
	17th	1000 at	14	0		700	0	5380	5
	18th	1000 at	15	0		750	0	6130	5
	19th	1000 at	16	0		800	0	6930	5
	20th	1000 at	17	0		850	0	7780	5
	21st	1000 at	18	0		900	0	8680	5
	22d	1000 at	19	0		950	0	9630	5
	23d	1000 at	20	0		1000	0	10630	5

At the twenty-third thousand the tax becomes twenty shillings in the pound, and consequently every thousand beyond that sum can produce no profit but by dividing the estate. Yet formidable as this tax appears, it will not, I believe, produce so much as the commutation tax; should it produce more, it ought to be

lowered to that amount upon eſtates under two or three thouſand a year.

On ſmall and middling eſtates it is lighter (as it is intended to be) than the commutation tax. It is not till after ſeven or eight thouſand a year that it begins to be heavy. The object is not ſo much the produce of the tax, as the juſtice of the meaſure. The ariſtocracy has ſcreened itſelf too much, and this ſerves to reſtore a part of the loſt equilibrium.

As an inſtance of its ſcreening itſelf, it is only neceſſary to look back to the firſt eſtabliſhment of the exciſe laws, at what is called the Reſtoration, or the coming of Charles the Second. The ariſtocratical intereſt then in power, commuted the feudal ſervices itſelf was under by laying a tax on beer brewed for *ſale*; that is, they compounded with Charles for an exemption from thoſe ſervices for themſelves and their heirs, by a tax to be paid by other people. The ariſtocracy do not purchaſe beer brewed for ſale, but brew their own beer free of the duty, and if any commutation at that time were neceſſary, it ought to have been at the expence of thoſe for whom the exemptions from thoſe ſervices were intended *; inſtead of which it was thrown on an entire different claſs of men.

But the chief object of this progreſſive tax (beſides the juſtice of rendering taxes more equal than they are) is, as already ſtated, to extirpate the overgrown influence ariſing from the unnatural law of primogeniture, and which is one of the principal ſources of corruption at elections.

It would be attended with no good conſequences to enquire how ſuch vaſt eſtates as thirty, forty, or fifty thouſand a year could commence, and that at a time when commerce and manufactures were not in a ſtate to admit of ſuch acquiſitions. Let it be ſufficient to remedy the evil by putting them in a condition of deſcending again to the community, by the quiet means of apportioning them among all the heirs and heireſſes of thoſe families. This will be the more neceſſary, becauſe hitherto the ariſtocracy have quartered their younger children and connections upon the public in uſeleſs poſts, places, and offices, which when aboliſhed will leave them deſtitute, unleſs the law of primogeniture be alſo aboliſhed or ſuperceded.

A progreſſive tax will, in a great meaſure, effect this object, and that as a matter of intereſt to the parties moſt immediately concerned, as will be ſeen by the following table; which ſhews the nett produce upon every eſtate, after ſubtracting the tax. By this it will appear, that after an eſtate exceeds thirteen or fourteen thouſand a year, the remainder produces but little profit to the holder, and conſequently will paſs either to the younger children, or to other kindred.

* The tax on beer brewed for ſale, from which the ariſtocracy are exempt, is almoſt one million more than the preſent commutation tax, being by the returns of 1788, 1,666,152l. and conſequently they ought to take on themſelves the amount of the commutation tax, as they are already exempted from one which is almoſt one million greater.

TABLE

TABLE III.

Shewing the nett produce of every eſtate from one thouſand to twenty-three thouſand pounds a year.

No. of thouſands per ann.	Total tax ſubtracted.	Nett produce.
£.	£.	£.
1000	21	979
2000	59	1941
3000	109	2891
4000	184	3816
5000	284	4716
6000	434	5566
7000	634	6366
8000	880	7120
9000	1100	7820
10,000	1530	8470
11,000	1930	9070
12,000	2380	9620
13,000	2880	10,120
14,000	3430	10,570
15,000	4030	10,970
16,000	4680	11,320
17,000	5380	11,620
18,000	6130	11,870
19,000	6930	12,170
20,000	7780	12,220
21,000	8680	12,320
22,000	9630	12,370
23,000	10,630	12,370

N. B. The odd ſhillings are dropped in this table.

According to this table, an eſtate cannot produce more than 12,370l. clear of the land tax and the progreſſive tax, and therefore the dividing ſuch eſtates will follow as a matter of family intereſt. An eſtate of 23,000l. a year, divided into five eſtates of four thouſand each, and one of three, will be charged only 1129l. which is but five *per cent.* but if held by one poſſeſſor will be charge 10 630l.

Although an enquiry into the origin of thoſe eſtates be unneceſſary, the continuation of them in their preſent ſtate is another ſubject. It is a matter of national concern. As hereditary eſtates, the law has created the evil, and it ought alſo to provide the remedy. Primogeniture ought to be aboliſhed, not only becauſe it is unnatural and unjuſt, but becauſe the country ſuffers by its operation. By cutting off (as before obſerved) the younger children from their proper portion of inheritance, the public is loaded with the expence of maintaining them; and the freedom of elections violated by the overbearing influence which this unjuſt monopoly of family property produces. Nor is this all. It occaſions a waſte of national property. A conſiderable part of the land of the country is rendered unproductive by the great extent of parks and chaſes which this law ſerves to keep up, and this at a time when the annual production of grain is not equal

tot ne national conſumption *.—In ſhort, the evils of the ariſtocratical ſyſtem are ſo great and numerous, ſo inconſiſtent with every thing that is juſt, wiſe, natural, and beneficent, that when they are conſidered, there ought not to be a doubt that many, who are now claſſed under that deſcription, will wiſh to ſee ſuch a ſyſtem aboliſhed.

What pleaſure can they derive from contemplating the expoſed condition, and almoſt certain beggary of their younger offspring? Every ariſtocratical family has an appendage of family beggars hanging round it, which in a few ages, or a few generations, are ſhook off, and conſole themſelves with telling their tale in alms-houſes, work-houſes, and priſons. This is the natural conſequence of ariſtocracy. The peer and the beggar are often of the ſame family. One extreme produces the other: to make one rich many muſt be made poor; neither can the ſyſtem be ſupported by other means.

There are two claſſes of people to whom the laws of England are particularly hoſtile, and thoſe the moſt helpleſs; younger children and the poor. Of the former I have juſt ſpoken; of the latter I ſhall mention one inſtance out of the many that might be produced, and with which I ſhall cloſe this ſubject.

Several laws are in exiſtence for regulating and limiting workmen's wages. Why not leave them as free to make their own bargains, as the law-makers are to let their farms and houſes? Perſonal labour is all the property they have. Why is that little, and the little freedom they enjoy to be infringed? But the injuſtice will appear ſtronger, if we conſider the operation and effect of ſuch laws. When wages are fixed by what is called law, the legal wages remain ſtationary, while every thing elſe is progreſſion; and as thoſe who make that law, ſtill continue to lay on new taxes by other laws, they encreaſe the expence of living by one law, and take away the means by another.

But if thoſe gentlemen law-makers and tax-makers thought it right to limit the poor pittance which perſonal labour can produce, and on which a whole family is to be ſupported, they certainly muſt feel themſelves happily indulged in a limitation on their own part, of not leſs than twelve thouſand a year, and that of property they never acquired, (nor probably any of their anceſtors) and of which they have made ſo ill a uſe.

Having now finiſhed this ſubject, I ſhall bring the ſeveral particulars into one view, and then proceed to other matters.

The firſt EIGHT ARTICLES are brought forward from page 65.

1. Abolition of two million poor-rates.

2. Proviſion for two hundred and fifty-two thouſand poor families, at the rate of four pounds per head for each child under fourteen years of age; which, with the addition of two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds, provides alſo education for one million and thirty thouſand children.

* See the reports on the corn trade.

3. Ann

3. Annuity of ſix pounds (per ann.) each for all poor perſons, decayed tradeſmen, or others (ſuppoſed ſeventy thouſand) of the age of fifty years, and until ſixty.

4. Annuity of ten pounds each for life for all poor perſons, decayed tradeſmen, and others ſuppoſed ſeventy thouſand) of the age of ſixty years.

5. Donation of twenty ſhillings each for fifty thouſand births.

6. Donation of twenty ſhillings each for twenty thouſand marriages.

7. Allowance of twenty thouſand pounds for the funeral expences of perſons travelling for work, and dying at a diſtance from their friends.

8. Employment at all times for the caſual poor in the cities of London and Weſtminſter.

SECOND ENUMERATION.

9. Abolition of the tax on houſes and windows.

10. Allowance of three ſhillings per week for life to fifteen thouſand diſbanded ſoldiers, and a proportionable allowance to the officers of the diſbanded corps.

11. Encreaſe of pay to the remaining ſoldiers of 19,500l. annually.

12. The ſame allowance to the diſbanded navy, and the ſame encreaſe of pay, as to the army.

13. Abolition of the commutation tax.

14. Plan of a progreſſive tax, operating to extirpate the unjuſt and unnatural law of primogeniture, and the vicious influence of the ariſtocratical ſyſtem *.

There yet remains, as already ſtated, one million of ſurplus taxes. Some part of this will be required for circumſtances that do not immediately preſent themſelves, and ſuch part as ſhall not

* When enquiries are made into the condition of the poor, various degrees of diſtreſs will moſt probably be found, to render a different arrangement preferable to that which is already propoſed. Widows with families will be in greater want than where there are huſbands living. There is alſo a difference in the expence of living in different countries, and more ſo in fuel.

	£.
Suppoſe then fifty thouſand extraordinary caſes, at the rate of 10l. per family per ann.	500,000
100,000 Families, at 8l. per family per ann.	800,000
100,000 Families, at 7l. per family per ann.	700,000
104,000 Families, at 5l. per family per ann.	520,000
And inſtead of ten ſhillings per head for the education of other children, to allow fifty ſhillings per family for that purpoſe to fifty thouſand families	250,000
	2,770,000
140,000 Aged perſons as before,	1,120,000
	3,890,000

This arrangement amounts to the ſame ſum as ſtated in page 63, including the 250,000l. for education; but it provides (including the aged people) for four hundred and four thouſand families, which is almoſt one third of all the families in England.

be wanted, will admit a further reduction of taxes equal to tha amount.

Among the claims that juſtice requires to be made, the condition of the inferior revenue officers will merit attention. It is a reproach to any government to waſte ſuch an immenſity of revenue in ſinecures and nominal and unneceſſary places and offices, and not allow even a decent livelihood to thoſe on whom the labour falls. The ſalary of the inferior officers of the revenue has ſtood at the petty pittance of leſs than fifty pounds a year for upwards of one hundred years. It ought to be ſeventy. About one hundred and twenty thouſand pounds applied to this purpoſe, will put all thoſe ſalaries in a decent condition.

This was propoſed to be done almoſt twenty years ago, but the treaſury-board then in being ſtartled at it, as it might lead to ſimilar expectations from the army and navy; and the event was, that the King, or ſomebody for him, applied to parliament to have his own ſalary raiſed an hundred thouſand a year, which being done, every thing elſe was laid aſide.

With reſpect to another claſs of men, the inferior clergy, I forbear to enlarge on their condition; but all partialities and prejudices for, or againſt, different modes and forms of religion aſide, common juſtice will determine, whether there ought to be an income of twenty or thirty pounds a year to one man, and of ten thouſand to another. I ſpeak on this ſubject with the more freedom, becauſe I am known not to be a Preſbyterian; and therefore the cant cry of court ſycophants, about church and meeting, kept up to amuſe and bewilder the nation, cannot be raiſed againſt me.

Ye ſimple men, on both ſides the queſtion, do ye not ſee through this courtly craft? If ye can be kept diſputing and wrangling about church and meeting, ye juſt anſwer the purpoſe of every courtier, who lives the while on the ſpoil of the taxes, and laughs at your credulity. Every religion is good that teaches man to be good; and I know of none that inſtructs him to be bad.

All the before-mentioned calculations, ſuppoſe only ſixteen millions and an half taxes paid into the exchequer, after the expence of collection and drawbacks at the cuſtom-houſe and exciſe-office are deducted; whereas the ſum paid into the exchequer is very nearly, if not quite, ſeventeen millions. The taxes raiſed in Scotland and Ireland are expended in thoſe countries, and therefore their ſavings will come out of their own taxes; but if any part be paid into the Engliſh exchequer, it might be remitted. This will not make one hundred thouſand pounds a year difference.

There now remains only the national debt to be conſidered. In the year 1789, the intereſt, excluſive of the tontine, was 9,150,138l. How much the capital has been reduced ſince that time the miniſter beſt knows. But after paying the intereſt, abolliſhing the tax on houſes and windows, the commutation tax, and the poor rates; and making all the proviſions for the poor,

for the education of children, the ſupport of the aged, the diſbanded part of the army and navy, and encreaſing the pay of the remainder, there will be a ſurplus of one million.

The preſent ſcheme of paying off the national debt appears to me, ſpeaking as an indifferent perſon, to be an ill-concerted, if not a fallacious job. The burthen of the national debt conſiſts not in its being ſo many millions, or ſo many hundred millions, but in the quantity of taxes collected every year to pay the intereſt. If this quantity continue the ſame, the burthen of the national debt is the ſame to all intents and purpoſes, be the capital more or leſs. The only knowledge which the public can have of the reduction of the debt, muſt be through the reduction of taxes for paying the intereſt. The debt, therefore, is not reduced one farthing to the public by all the millions that have been paid; and it would require more money now to purchaſe up the capital, than when the ſcheme began.

Digreſſing for a moment at this point, to which I ſhall return again, I look back to the appointment of Mr. Pitt, as miniſter.

I was then in America. The war was over; and though reſentment had ceaſed, memory was ſtill alive.

When the news of the coalition arrived, though it was a matter of no concern to me as a citizen of America, I felt it as a man. It had ſomething in it which ſhocked, by publicly ſporting with decency, if not with principle. It was impudence in Lord North; it was want of firmneſs in Mr. Fox.

Mr. Pitt was, at that time, what may be called a maiden character in politics. So far from being hackneyed, he appeared not to be initiated into the firſt myſteries of court intrigue. Every thing was in his favour. Reſentment againſt the coalition ſerved as friendſhip to him, and his ignorance of vice was credited for virtue. With the return of peace, commerce and proſperity would riſe of itſelf; yet even this encreaſe was thrown to his account.

When he came to the helm the ſtorm was over, and he had nothing to interrupt his courſe. It required even ingenuity to be wrong, and he ſucceeded. A little time ſhewed him the ſame ſort of man as his predeceſſors had been. Inſtead of profiting by thoſe errors which had accumulated a burthen of taxes unparalleled in the world, he ſought, I might almoſt ſay, he advertiſed for enemies, and provoked means to encreaſe taxation. Aiming at ſomething, he knew not what, he ranſacked Europe and India for adventures, and abandoning the fair pretenſions he began with, became the knight errant of modern times.

It is unpleaſant to ſee character throw itſelf away. It is more ſo to ſee one's-ſelf deceived. Mr. Pitt had merited nothing, but he promiſed much. He gave ſymptoms of a mind ſuperior to the meanneſs and corruption of courts. His apparent candour encouraged expectations; and the public confidence, ſtunned, wearied, and confounded by a chaos of parties, revived and attached itſelf to him. But miſtaking, as he has done, the diſguſt of the nation againſt the coalition, for merit in himſelf, he has ruſhed

into meaſures, which a man leſs ſupported would not have preſumed to act.

All this ſeems to ſhew that change of miniſters amounts to nothing. One goes out, another comes in, and ſtill the ſame meaſures, vices, and extravagance are purſued. It ſignifies not who is miniſter. The defect lies in the ſyſtem. The foundation and the ſuperſtructure of the government is bad. Prop it as you pleaſe, it continually ſinks into court government, and ever will.

I returned, as I promiſed, to the ſubject of the national debt, that offspring of the Dutch-Anglo revolution, and its handmaid the Hanover ſucceſſion.

But it is now too late to enquire how it began. Thoſe to whom it is due have advanced the money; and whether it was well or ill ſpent, or pocketed, is not their crime. It is, however, eaſy to ſee, that as the nation proceeds in contemplating the nature and principles of government, and to underſtand taxes, and make compariſons between thoſe of America, France, and England, it will be next to impoſſible to keep it in the ſame torpid ſtate it has hitherto been. Some reform muſt, from the neceſſity of the caſe, ſoon begin. It is not whether theſe principles preſs with little or much force in the preſent moment. They are out. They are abroad in the world, and no force can ſtop them. Like a ſecret told, they are beyond recall; and he muſt be blind indeed that does not ſee that a change is already beginning.

Nine millions of dead taxes is a ſerious thing; and this not only for bad, but in great meaſure for, foreign government. By putting the power of making war into the hands of foreigners who came for what they could get, little elſe was to be expected than what has happened.

Reaſons are already advanced in this work ſhewing that whatever the reforms in the taxes may be, they ought to be made in the current expences of government, and not in the part applied to the intereſt of the national debt. By remitting the taxes of the poor, *they* will be totally relieved, and all diſcontent on their part will be taken away; and by ſtriking off ſuch of the taxes as are already mentioned, the nation will more than recover the whole expence of the mad American war.

There will then remain only the national debt as a ſubject of diſcontent; and in order to remove, or rather to prevent this, it would be good policy in the ſtock-holders themſelves to conſider it as property, ſubject like all other property, to bear ſome portion of the taxes. It would give to it both popularity and ſecurity, and as a great part of its preſent inconvenience is balanced by the capital which it keeps alive, a meaſure of this kind would ſo far add to that balance as to ſilence objections.

This may be done by ſuch gradual means as to accompliſh all that is neceſſary with the greateſt eaſe and convenience.

Inſtead of taxing the capital, the beſt method would be to tax the intereſt by ſome progreſſive ratio, and to leſſen the public taxes in the ſame proportion as the intereſt diminiſhed.

Suppoſe the intereſt was taxed one halfpenny in the pound the firſt year

year, a penny more the ſecond, and to proceed by a certain ratio to be determined upon, always leſs than any other tax upon property. Such a tax would be ſubtracted from the intereſt at the time of payment, without any expence of collection.

One halfpenny in the pound would leſſen the intereſt, and conſequently the taxes twenty thouſand pounds. The tax on waggons amounts to this ſum, and this tax might be taken off the firſt year. The ſecond year the tax on female ſervants, or ſome other of the like amount might alſo be taken off, and by proceeding in this manner, always applying the tax raiſed from the property of the debt towards its extinction, and not carry it to the current ſervices, it would liberate itſelf.

The ſtockholders, notwithſtanding this tax, would pay leſs taxes than they do now. What they would ſave by the extinction of the poor-rates, and the tax on houſes and windows, and the commutation tax, would be conſiderably greater than what this tax, ſlow, but certain in its operation, amounts to.

It appears to me to be prudence to look out for meaſures that may apply under any circumſtance that may approach. There is, at this moment, a criſis in the affairs of Europe that requires it. Preparation now is wiſdom. If taxation be once let looſe, it will be difficult to reinſtate it; neither would the relief be ſo effectual, as to proceed by ſome certain and gradual reduction.

Within the ſpace of a few years we have ſeen two Revolutions, thoſe of America and France. In the former, the conteſt was long, and the conflict ſevere; in the latter, the nation acted with ſuch a conſolidated impulſe, that having no foreign enemy to contend with, the revolution was complete in power the moment it appeared. From both thoſe inſtances it is evident, that the greateſt forces that can be brought into the field of revolutions, are reaſon and common intereſt. Where theſe can have the opportunity of acting, oppoſition dies with fear, or crumbles away by conviction. It is a great ſtanding which they have now univerſally obtained; and we may hereafter hope to ſee revolutions, or changes in governments, produced with the ſame quiet operation by which any meaſure, determinable by reaſon and diſcuſſion, is accompliſhed.

When a nation changes its opinion and habits of thinking, it is no longer to be governed as before; but it would not only be wrong, but bad policy, to attempt by force what ought to be accompliſhed by reaſon. Rebellion conſiſts in forcibly oppoſing the general will of a nation, whether by a party or by a government. There ought, therefore, to be in every nation a method of occaſionally aſcertaining the ſtate of public opinion with reſpect to government. On this point the old government of France was ſuperior to the preſent government of England, becauſe, on extraordinary occaſions, recourſe could be had to what was then called the States General. But in England there are no ſuch occaſional bodies; and as to thoſe who are now called Repreſentatives,

preſentatives, a great part of them are mere machines of the court, placemen, and dependents.

I preſume, that though all the people of England pay taxes, not an hundredth part of them are electors, and the members of one of the houſes of parliament repreſent nobody but themſelves. There is, therefore, no power but the voluntary will of the people that has a right to act in any matter reſpecting a general reform; and by the ſame right that two perſons can confer on ſuch a ſubject, a thouſand may. The object, in all ſuch preliminary proceedings, is to find out what the general ſenſe of a nation is, and to be governed by it. If it prefer a bad or defective government to a reform, or chuſe to pay ten times more taxes than there is occaſion for, it has a right ſo to do; and ſo long as the majority do not impoſe conditions on the minority, different to what they impoſe on themſelves, though there may be much error, there is no injuſtice. Neither will the error continue long. Reaſon and diſcuſſion will ſoon bring things right, however wrong they may begin. By ſuch a proceſs no tumult is to be apprehended. The poor, in all countries, are naturally both peaceable and grateful in all reforms in which their intereſt and happineſs are included. It is only by neglecting and rejecting them that they become tumultuous.

The objects that now preſs on the public attention are, the French revolution, and the proſpect of a general revolution in governments. Of all nations in Europe, there is none ſo much intereſted in the French revolution as England. Enemies for ages, and that at a vaſt expence, and without any national object, the opportunity now preſents itſelf of amicably cloſing the ſcene, and joining their efforts to reform the reſt of Europe. By doing this, they will not only prevent the further effuſion of blood, and encreaſe of taxes, but be in a condition of getting rid of a conſiderable part of their preſent burthens, as has been already ſtated. Long experience however has ſhewn, that reforms of this kind are not thoſe which old governments wiſh to promote; and therefore it is to nations, and not to ſuch governments, that theſe matters preſent themſelves.

In the preceding part of this work, I have ſpoken of an alliance between England, France, and America, for purpoſes that were to be afterwards mentioned. Though I have no direct authority on the part of America, I have good reaſon to conclude, that ſhe is diſpoſed to enter into a conſideration of ſuch a meaſure, provided, that the governments with which ſhe might ally, acted as national governments, and not as courts enveloped in intrigue and myſtery. That France as a nation, and a national government, would prefer an alliance with England, is a matter of certainty. Nations, like individuals, who have long been enemies, without knowing each other, or knowing why, become the better friends when they diſcover the errors and impoſitions under which they had acted.

Admitting, therefore, the probability of ſuch a connection, I will

will ſtate ſome matters by which ſuch an alliance, together with that of Holland, might render ſervice, not only to the parties immediately concerned, but to all Europe.

It is, I think, certain, that if the fleets of England, France and Holland were confederated, they could propoſe, with effect, a limitation to, and a general diſmantling of all the navies in Europe, to a certain proportion to be agreed upon.

Firſt, That no new ſhip of war ſhall be built by any power in Europe, themſelves included.

Secondly, That all the navies now in exiſtence ſhall be put back, ſuppoſe to one-tenth of their preſent force. This will ſave to France and England at leaſt two millions ſterling annually to each, and their relative force be in the ſame proportion as it is now. If men will permit themſelves to think, as rational beings ought to think, nothing can appear more ridiculous and abſurd, excluſive of all moral reflections, than to be at the expence of building navies, filling them with men, and then hauling them into the ocean, to try which can ſink each other faſteſt. Peace, which coſts nothing, is attended with infinitely more advantage, than any victory with all its expence. But this, though it beſt anſwers the purpoſe of nations, does not that of court governments, whoſe habited policy is pretence for taxation, places, and offices.

It is, I think, alſo certain, that the above confederated powers, together with that of the United States of America, can propoſe with effect, to Spain, the independence of South America, and the opening thoſe countries of immenſe extent and wealth to the general commerce of the world, as North America now is.

With how much more glory, and advantage to itſelf, does a nation act, when it exerts its powers to reſcue the world from bondage, and to create itſelf friends, than when it employs thoſe powers to encreaſe ruin, deſolation, and miſery. The horrid ſcene that is now acting by the Engliſh government in the Eaſt-Indies, is fit only to be told of Goths and Vandals, who, deſtitute of principle, robbed and tortured the world they were incapable of enjoying.

The opening of South America would produce an immenſe field of commerce, and a ready money market for manufactures, which the eaſtern world does not. The Eaſt is already a country full of manufactures, the importation of which is not only an injury to the manufactures of England, but a drain upon its ſpecie. The balance againſt England by this trade is regularly upwards of half a million annually ſent out in the Eaſt-India ſhips in ſilver; and this is the reaſon, together with German intrigue, and German ſubſidies, there is ſo little ſilver in England.

But any war is harveſt to ſuch governments, however ruinous it may be to a nation. It ſerves to keep up deceitful expectations which prevent a people looking into the defects and

abuſes

abuſes of government. It is the *lo here!* and the *lo there!* that amuſes and cheats the multitude.

Never did ſo great an opportunity offer itſelf to England, and to all Europe, as is produced by the two revolutions of America and France. By the former, freedom has a national champion in the Weſtern world; and by the latter, in Europe. When another nation ſhall join France, deſpotiſm and bad government will ſcarcely dare to appear. To uſe a trite expreſſion, the iron is becoming hot all over Europe. The inſulted German and the enſlaved Spaniard, the Ruſs and the Pole, are beginning to think. The preſent age will hereafter merit to be called the Age of reaſon, and the preſent generation will appear to the future as the Adam of a new world.

When all the governments of Europe ſhall be eſtabliſhed on the repreſentative ſyſtem, nations will become acquainted, and the animoſities and prejudices fomented by the intrigue and artifice of courts, will ceaſe. The oppreſſed ſoldier will become a freeman; and the tortured ſailor, no longer dragged along the ſtreets ike a felon, will purſue his mercantile voyage in ſafety. It would be better that nations ſhould continue the pay of their ſoldiers during their lives, and give them their diſcharge and reſtore them to freedom and their friends, and ceaſe recruiting, than retain ſuch multitudes at the ſame expence, in a condition uſeleſs to ſociety and themſelves. As ſoldiers have hitherto been treated in moſt countries, they might be ſaid to be without a friend. Shunned by the citizen on an apprehenſion of being enemies to liberty, and too often inſulted by thoſe who commanded them, their condition was a double oppreſſion. But where genuine principles of liberty pervade a people, every thing is reſtored to order; and the ſoldier civilly treated, returns the civility.

In contemplating revolutions, it is eaſy to perceive that they may ariſe from two diſtinct cauſes; the one, to avoid or get rid of ſome great calamity; the other, to obtain ſome great and poſitive good; and the two may be diſtinguiſhed by the names of active and paſſive revolutions. In thoſe which proceed from the former cauſe, the temper becomes incenſed and ſowered; and the redreſs, obtained by danger, is too often ſullied by revenge. But in thoſe which proceed from the latter, the heart, rather animated than agitated, enters ſerenely upon the ſubject. Reaſon and diſcuſſion, perſuaſion and conviction, become the weapons in the conteſt, and it is only when thoſe are attempted to be ſuppreſſed that recourſe is had to violence. When men unite in agreeing that a *thing is good*, could it be obtained, ſuch as relief from a burthen of taxes and the extinction of corruption, the object is more than half accompliſhed. What they approve as the end, they will promote in the means.

Will any man ſay, in the preſent exceſs of taxation, falling ſo heavily on the poor, that a remiſſion of five pounds annually of taxes to one hundred and four thouſand poor families is not a *good*

a *good thing?* Will he ſay, that a remiſſion of ſeven pounds annually to one hundred thouſand other poor families—of eight pounds annually to another hundred thouſand poor families, and of ten pounds annually to fifty thouſand poor and widowed families, are not *good things?* And to proceed a ſtep farther in this climax, will he ſay, that to provide againſt the misfortunes to which all human life is ſubject, by ſecuring ſix pounds annually for all poor, diſtreſſed, and reduced perſons of the age of fifty and until ſixty, and of ten pounds annually after ſixty, is not a *good thing?*

Will he ſay, that an abolition of two million of poor-rates to the houſe-keepers, and of the whole of the houſe and window-light tax and of the commutation tax, is not a *good thing?* Or will he ſay, that to aboliſh corruption is a *bad thing?*

If, therefore, the good to be obtained be worthy of a paſſive, rational, and coſtleſs revolution, it would be bad policy to prefer waiting for a calamity that ſhould force a violent one. I have no idea, conſidering the reforms which are now paſſing and ſpreading throughout Europe, that England will permit herſelf to be the laſt; and where the occaſion and the opportunity quietly offer, it is better than to wait for a turbulent neceſſity. It may be conſidered as an honour to the animal faculties of man to obtain redreſs by courage and danger, but it is far greater honour to the rational faculties to accompliſh the ſame object by reaſon accommodation, and general conſent *.

As reforms, or revolutions, call them which you pleaſe, extend themſelves among nations, thoſe nations will form connections and conventions, and when a few are thus confederated, the progreſs will be rapid, till deſpotiſm and corrupt government be totally expelled, at leaſt out of two quarters of the world, Europe and America. The Algerine piracy may then be commanded to ceaſe, for it is only by the malicious policy of old governments, againſt each other, that it exiſts.

Throughout this work, various and numerous as the ſubjects are, which I have taken up and inveſtigated, there is only a ſingle

* I know it is the opinion of many of the moſt enlightened characters in France (there always will be thoſe who ſee farther into events than others) not only among the general maſs of citizens, but of many of the principal members of the former National Aſſembly, that the monarchical plan will not continue many years in that country. They have found out that as wiſdom cannot be made hereditary, power ought not: and that for a man to merit a million ſterling a year from a nation, he ought to have a mind capable of comprehending from an atom to a univerſe; which if he had, he would be above receiving the pay. But they wiſhed not to appear to lead the nation faſter than its own reaſon and intereſt dictated. In all the converſations where I have been preſent upon this ſubject, the idea always was, that when ſuch a time, from the general opinion of the nation, ſhall arrive that the honourable and liberal method would be, to make a handſome preſent in fee ſimple to the perſon, whoever he may be, that ſhall then be in the monarchical office, and for him to retire to the enjoyment of private life, poſſeſſing his ſhare of general rights and privileges, and to be no more accountable to the public for his time and his conduct than any other citizen.

paragraph

paragraph upon religion, viz. "*that every religion is good, that "teaches man to be good.*"

I have carefully avoided to enlarge upon the ſubject, becauſe I am inclined to believe, that what is called the preſent miniſtry wiſh to ſee contentions about religion kept up, to prevent the nation turning its attention to ſubjects of government. It is, as if they were to ſay, "*Look that way, or any way, but this.*"

But as religion is very improperly made a political machine, and the reality of it is thereby deſtroyed, I will conclude this work with ſtating in what light religion appears to me.

If we ſuppoſe a large family of children, who, on any particular day, or particular circumſtance, made it a cuſtom to preſent to their parent ſome token of their affection and gratitude, each of them would make a different offering, and moſt probably in a different manner. Some would pay their congratulations in themes of verſe or proſe, by ſome little devices, as their genius dictated, according to what they thought would pleaſe; and, perhaps, the leaſt of all, not able to do any of thoſe things, would ramble into the garden, or the field, and gather what it thought the prettieſt flower it could find, though, perhaps, it might be but a ſimple weed. The parent would be more gratified by ſuch variety, than if the whole of them had acted on a concerted plan, and each had made exactly the ſame offering. This would have the cold appearance of contrivance, or the harſh one of controul. But of all unwelcome things, nothing could more afflict the parent than to know, that the whole of them had afterwards gotten together by the ears, boys and girls, fighting, ſcratching, reviling, and abuſing each other about which was the beſt or the worſt preſent.

Why may we not ſuppoſe, that the great Father of all is pleaſed with variety of devotion; and that the greateſt offence we can act, is that by which we ſeek to torment and render each other miſerable. For my own part, I am fully ſatisfied that what I am now doing, with an endeavour to conciliate mankind, to render their condition happy, to unite nations that have hitherto been enemies, and to extirpate the horrid practice of war, and break the chains of ſlavery and oppreſſion, is acceptable in His ſight, and being the beſt ſervice I can perform, I act it chearfully.

I do not believe that any two men, on what are called doctrinal points, think alike who think at all. It is only thoſe who have not thought that appear to agree. It is in this caſe as with what is called the Britiſh conſtitution. It has been taken for granted to be good, and encomiums have ſupplied the place of proof. But when the nation come to examine into its principles and the abuſes it admits, it will be found to have more defects than I have pointed out in this work and the former.

As to what are called national religions, we may, with as much propriety, talk of national gods. It is either political craft or the remains of the pagan ſyſtem, when every nation had

had its ſeparate and particular deity. Among all the writers of the Engliſh church clergy, who have treated on the general ſubject of religion, the preſent Biſhop of Landaff has not been excelled, and it is with much pleaſure that I take the opportunity of expreſſing this token of reſpect.

I have now gone through the whole of the ſubject, at leaſt, as far as it appears to me at preſent. It has been my intention for the five years I have been in Europe, to offer an addreſs to the people of England on the ſubject of government, if the opportunity preſented itſelf before I returned to America. Mr. Burke has thrown it in my way, and I thank him. On a certain occaſion three years ago, I preſſed him to propoſe a national convention to be fairly elected for the purpoſe of taking the ſtate of the nation into conſideration; but I found, that however ſtrongly the parliamentary current was then ſetting againſt the party he acted with, their policy was to keep every thing within that field of corruption, and truſt to accidents. Long experience had ſhewn that parliaments would follow any change of miniſters, and on this they reſted their hopes and their expectations.

Formerly, when diviſions aroſe reſpecting governments, recourſe was had to the ſword, and a civil war enſued. That ſavage cuſtom is exploded by the new ſyſtem, and reference is had to national conventions. Diſcuſſion and the general will arbitrates the queſtion, and to this, private opinion yields with a good grace, and order is preſerved uninterrupted.

Some gentlemen have affected to call the principles upon which this work and the former part of *Rights of Man* are founded, "a new fangled doctrine." The queſtion is not whether thoſe principles are new or old, but whether they are right or wrong. Suppoſe the former, I will ſhew their effect by a figure eaſily underſtood.

It is now towards the middle of February. Were I to take a turn into the country, the trees would preſent a leafleſs winterly appearance. As people are apt to pluck twigs as they walk along, I perhaps might do the ſame, and by chance might obſerve, that a *ſingle bud* on that twig had begun to ſwell. I ſhould reaſon very unnaturally, or rather not reaſon at all, to ſuppoſe *this* was the *only* bud in England which had this appearance. Inſtead of deciding thus, I ſhould inſtantly conclude, that the ſame appearance was beginning, or about to begin, every where; and though the vegetable ſleep will continue longer on ſome trees and plants than on others, and though ſome of them may not *bloſſom* for two or three years, all will be in leaf in the ſummer, except thoſe which are *rotten*. What pace the political ſummer may keep with the natural, no human foreſight can determine. It is, however, not difficult to perceive that the ſpring is begun.—Thus wiſhing, as I ſincerely do, freedom and happineſs to all nations, I cloſe the

SECOND PART.

APPENDIX.

AS the publication of this work has been delayed beyond the time intended, I think it not improper, all circumſtances conſidered, to ſtate the cauſes that have occaſioned the delay.

The reader will probably obſerve, that ſome parts in the plan contained in this work for reducing the taxes, and certain parts in Mr. Pitt's ſpeech at the opening of the preſent ſeſſion, Tueſday, January 31, are ſo much alike, as to induce a belief that either the Author had taken the hint from Mr. Pitt, or Mr. Pitt from the Author.—I will firſt point out the parts that are ſimilar, and then ſtate ſuch circumſtances as I am acquainted with, leaving the reader to make his own concluſion.

Conſidering it almoſt an unprecedented caſe, that taxes ſhould be propoſed to be taken off, it is equally as extraordinary that ſuch a meaſure ſhould occur to two perſons at the ſame time; and ſtill more ſo, (conſidering the vaſt variety and multiplicity of taxes) that they ſhould hit on the ſame ſpecific taxes. Mr. Pitt has mentioned, in his ſpeech, the tax on *Carts* and *Waggons*—that on *Female Servants*—the lowering the tax on *Candles*, and the taking off the tax of three ſhillings on *Houſes* having under ſeven windows.

Every one of thoſe ſpecific taxes are a part of the plan contained in this work, and propoſed alſo to be taken off. Mr. Pitt's plan, it is true, goes no farther than to a reduction of three hundred and twenty thouſand pounds; and the reduction propoſed in this work to nearly ſix millions. I have made my calculations on only ſixteen millions and a half of revenue, ſtill aſſerting that it was "very nearly, if not quite, "ſeventeen millions." Mr. Pitt ſtates it at 16,690,000. I know enough of the matter to ſay, that he has not *over* ſtated it. Having thus given the particulars, which correſpond in this work and his ſpeech, I will ſtate a chain of circumſtances that may lead to ſome explanation.

The firſt hint for leſſening the taxes, and that as a conſequence flowing from the French revolution, is to be found in the ADDRESS and DECLARATION of the Gentlemen who met at the Thatched-Houſe Tavern, Auguſt 20, 1791. Among many other particulars ſtated in that Addreſs, is the following, put as an interrogation to the government opoſers of the French Revolution. "*Are they ſorry that the pretence for* "*new oppreſſive taxes, and the occaſion for continuing many old taxes will* "*be at an end?*"

It is well known, that the perſons who chiefly frequent the Thatched-Houſe Tavern, are men of court connections, and ſo much did they take this Addreſs and Declaration reſpecting the French revolution and the reduction of taxes in diſguſt, that the Landlord was under the neceſſity of informing the Gentlemen, who compoſed the meeting of the twentieth

tieth of Auguſt, and who propoſed holding another meeting, that he could not receive them *.

What was only hinted at in the Addreſs and Declaration, reſpecting taxes and principles of government, will be found reduced to a regular ſyſtem in this work. But as Mr. Pitt's ſpeech contains ſome of the ſame things reſpecting taxes, I now come to give the circumſtances before alluded to.

The caſe is: This work was intended to be publiſhed juſt before the meeting of parliament, and for that purpoſe a conſiderable part of the copy was put into the printer's hands in September, and all the remaining copy, as far as page 160, which contains the parts to which Mr. Pitt's ſpeech is ſimilar, was given to him full ſix weeks before the meeting of parliament, and he was informed of the time at which it was to appear. He had compoſed nearly the whole about a fortnight before the time of parliament meeting, and had printed as far as page 112, and had given me a proof of the next ſheet, up to page 128. It was then in ſufficient forwardneſs to be out at the time propoſed, as two other ſheets were ready for ſtriking off. I had before told him, that if he thought he ſhould be ſtraightened for time, I would get part of the work done at another preſs, which he deſired me not to do. In this manner the work ſtood on the Tueſday fortnight preceding the meeting of parliament, when all at once, without any previous intimation, though I had been with him the evening before, he ſent me, by one of his workmen, all the remaining copy, from page 112, declining to go on with the work *on any conſideration*.

To account for this extraordinary conduct I was totally at a loſs, as he ſtopped at the part where the arguments on ſyſtems and principles of government cloſed, and where the plan for reduction of taxes, the education of children, and the ſupport of the poor and the aged begins; and ſtill more eſpecially, as he had, at the time of his beginning to print, and before he had ſeen the whole copy, offered a thouſand pounds for the copy-right, together with the future copy-right of the former part of Rights of Man. I told the perſon who brought me this offer that I ſhould not accept it, and wiſhed it not to be renewed, giving him as my reaſon, that though I believed the printer to be an honeſt man, I would never put it in the power of any printer or publiſher to ſuppreſs or alter a work of mine, by making him maſter of the copy, or give him the right of ſelling it to any miniſter, or to any other perſon, or to treat as a mere matter of traffic, that which I intended ſhould operate as a principle.

* The gentleman who ſigned the addreſs and declaration as chairman of the meeting, M. Horne Tooke, being generally ſuppoſed to be the perſon who drew it up, and having ſpoken much in commendation of it has been jocularly accuſed of praiſing his own work. To free him from this embarraſſment, and to ſave him the repeated trouble of mentioning the author, as he has not failed to do, I make no heſitation in ſaying, that as the opportunity of benefiting by the French Revolution eaſily occured to me, I drew up the publication in queſtion, and ſhewed it to him and ſome other gentlemen; who fully approving it, held a meeting for the purpoſe of making it public, and ſubſcribed to the amount of fifty guineas to defray the expence of advertiſing. I believe there are at this time, in England, a greater number of men acting on diſintereſted principles, and determined to look into the nature and practices of government themſelves, and not blindly truſt, as has hitherto been the caſe, either to government generally, or to parliaments, or to parliamentary oppoſition, than at any former period. Had this been done a century ago, corruption and taxation had not arrived to the height they are now at.

His

His refuſal to complete the work (which he could not purchaſe) obliged me to ſeek for another printer, and this of conſequence would throw the publication back till after the meeting of parliament, otherways it would have appeared that Mr. Pitt had only taken up a part of the plan which I had more fully ſtated.

Whether that gentleman, or any other, had ſeen the work, or any part of it, is more than I have authority to ſay. But the manner in which the work was returned, and the particular time at which this was done, and that after the offers he had made, are ſuſpicious circumſtances. I know what the opinion of bookſellers and publiſhers is upon ſuch a caſe, but as to my own opinion, I chuſe to make no declaration. There are many ways by which proof ſheets may be procured by other perſons before a work publicly appear; to which I ſhall add a certain circumſtance, which is,

A miniſterial bookſeller in Piccadilly who has been employed, as common report ſays, by a clerk of one of the boards cloſely connected with the miniſtry (the board of trade and plantation of which Hawkſbury is preſident) to publiſh what he calls my Life (I wiſh that his own life and the lives of all the cabinet were as good) uſed to have his books printed at the ſame printing-office that I employed; but when the former part of *Rights of Man* came out, he took his work away in dudgeon; and about a week or ten days before the printer returned my copy, he came to make him an offer of his work again, which was accepted. This would conſequently give him admiſſion into the printing-office where the ſheets of this work were then lying; and as bookſellers and printers are free with each other, he would have the opportunity of ſeeing what was going on.—Be the caſe however as it may, Mr. Pitt's plan, little and diminutive as it is, would have had a very awkward appearance, had this work appeared at the time the printer had engaged to finiſh it.

I have now ſtated the particulars which occaſioned the delay, from the propoſal to purchaſe, to the refuſal to print. If all the Gentlemen are innocent, it is very unfortunate for them that ſuch a variety of ſuſpicious circumſtances ſhould, without any deſign, arrange themſelves together.

Having now finiſhed this part, I will conclude with ſtating another circumſtance.

About a fortnight or three weeks before the meeting of parliament, a ſmall addition, amounting to about twelve ſhillings and ſixpence a year, was made to the pay of the ſoldiers, or rather, their pay was docked ſo much leſs. Some Gentlemen who knew, in part, that this work would contain a plan of reforms reſpecting the oppreſſed condition of ſoldiers, wiſhed me to add a note to the work, ſignifying, that the part upon that ſubject had been in the printer's hands ſome weeks before that addition of pay was propoſed. I declined doing this, leſt it ſhould be interpreted into an air of vanity, or an endeavour to excite ſuſpicion (for which, perhaps, there might be no grounds) that ſome of the government gentlemen, had, by ſome means or other, made out what this work would contain: and had not the printing been interrupted ſo as to occaſion a delay beyond the time fixed for publication, nothing contained in this appendix would have appeared.

THOMAS PAINE.

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